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ABSTRACT
COMPLEMENTARITY OF POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION:
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION
Jothi S. Themozhi 
Old Dominion University, 2002 
Director: Dr. Roger Richman
This dissertation is designed to examine the impact of the 
complementarity of politics and administration on local governments’ fiscal 
performance. The study adopts Svara’s Politics-Administration 
Complementarity Model, which explains the mutual interdependence and 
reciprocal influence of administrative relationships between the elected and 
appointed officials of local governments towards a General Management City 
(a traditional mayor-council city that appoints a professional city manager to 
conduct the city’s administration without formally adopting the council- 
manager form).
By adopting the politics-administration complementarity model to a 
general management municipal administrative structure, this thesis 
hypothesizes that cities with general management administrative structures 
achieve measurable fiscal performance of a higher order compared to cities 
without professional management (as in traditional strong mayor cities), or 
cities with a clear separation of powers (as in the council-manager forms of 
government).
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This study employs a cross-sectional research design on the 1997 
Census of Government’s data of 1,166 cities that had populations of 25,000 or 
more. This analysis employs four most commonly used dependent variables 
of municipal fiscal performance: namely the composite fiscal stress index, 
revenue capacity per capita, per capita general expenditures, and FTE 
employee rate. An ordinary least square regression model is used to isolate 
the impact of the municipal management structure on dependent variables 
while controlling for the exogenous effects of identified socioeconomic and 
fiscal condition variables.
Results of this study support the hypothesis that the general 
management cities have better fiscal performance levels, as evidenced by 
lower revenue capacity per capita, per capita general expenditures and the 
FTE employee rates than the strong mayor cities. However, the composite 
fiscal stress index was lower in the strong mayor cities when compared with 
the general management cities. Thus, three out of four research hypotheses 
were not rejected based on the results of regression analyses.
Exploratory analyses of the general management cities show that they 
have great fluctuations in population growth. The cities that have recently 
adopted general management structure struggle financially. Though the 
findings did not support claims based on Svara’s politics-administration 
complementarity model, still this study contributes substantially to the theory 
and practice of public administration, especially municipal government 
administration.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is designed to examine the impact of complementarity 
of politics and administration on local governments’ fiscal performance. This 
study adopts Svara’s Politics-Administration Complementarity Model, which 
explains the mutual interdependence and reciprocal influence of administrative 
relationships between elected and appointed officials of local governments 
toward a general management city. The International City/County 
Management Association (ICMA) defines a general management city as a 
traditional mayor-council city that appoints a professional city manager to 
conduct the city’s administration without formally adopting the council- 
manager form.
This study examines the impact of a general management city’s 
administrative structure on its fiscal performance. To assess this impact, fiscal 
performance indicators fiscal stress, revenue, and expenditure data of general 
management cities were compared with those indicators in cities organized in 
more common forms of municipal management, namely, mayor-council (also 
known as strong mayor) and council-manager forms of government. To 
assess the impact of different forms of municipal management structures on 
fiscal performance, this study uses a cross- sectional research design. It uses 
the 1997 Census of Government’s database of 1,166 cities that had 
populations of 25,000 or more. The findings of this study will contribute to the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2continuing development of theory and practice of public administration, 
especially to professional management in municipal government 
administration. The effect of different administrative structures of municipal 
governments and the impact of professional administration over municipal 
fiscal performance are the major contributions by this research to the theory 
and practice of public administration.
Background
Generally, U.S. city governments are structured in one of two major 
forms: strong mayor (or mayor-council) or council-manager form. Other less 
common forms of government, such as the commission form or town meeting 
and representative town meeting forms, are still followed by some cities. This 
study’s major intent is to analyze the impact of strong mayor and council- 
manager cities’ administrative structures impact on their municipal fiscal 
performance. Therefore, this research will not address the other less common 
forms of municipal administrative structures. The government structure of 
strong mayor cities consist of an executive branch with a popularly elected 
mayor who has the authority to hire and fire other city officials outside the 
merit system, and a legislative branch with elected council members.
The government structure of council-manager cities is similar to private 
businesses in that the voters, the council, and the city manager play the roles 
of stockholders, board of directors, and chief executive officer, respectively. 
The main characteristics that differentiate the two major forms are: how the 
city’s daily operations are conducted and to what degree authority is granted
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3either to an appointed professional city manager or to an elected mayor in 
conducting municipal operations. An analysis of the impact of professional 
management on policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation of the 
policy outcome is of great interest to practitioners and researchers of public 
administration.
When comparing different forms of government, researchers usually 
classify city governments according to the formal municipal administrative 
structures adopted by the municipalities (Morgan and Watson 1992, Nunn 
1996, and Ihrke 2002). This approach explores the impact of different ‘forms 
of municipal government’ on cities. Researchers of this approach generally 
compared strong mayor cities (denoted as SMC in this study) with council- 
manager cities (denoted by the acronym CMC). The underlying assumption of 
this approach is that strong mayor cities do not have professional managers 
as chief executive officers and that council-manager cities use appointed 
professional city managers as chief executive officers in conducting municipal 
administration.
The striking drawback of this approach is the oversimplified 
classification of municipal administrative structures (Renner 1988, Renner and 
DeSantis 1998, Desantis and Renner 2002, and Frederickson et al. 2002). 
Recent literature suggests that cities today may be adopting a variety of 
structural arrangements that do not follow the traditional, simple forms of 
government classification.
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4As early as the 1960s, the profile of local governments began to show 
significant change. Some strong mayor cities began using an appointed 
professional manager for overall administrative affairs without formally 
adopting the council-manager plan (ICMA, 1997). This resulted in a hybrid 
municipal administrative structure. Starting in July 1969, the ICMA established 
criteria to recognize the hybrid forms of municipal government. In order to 
distinguish the new hybrid municipalities from those recognized as traditional 
council-manager governments, they were designated as General Management 
Cities (called GMC in this study).
Based on the National League of Cities’ 1996 data, Svara (1999a) 
estimated that 35% of strong mayor cities with populations of 10,000 -  49,999 
people had appointed professional managers. Similarly, 39% of strong mayor 
cities with populations of 50,000 people or above had an appointed 
professional manager. Technically, these cities fall under the ICMA’s 
classification of ‘general management cities.’ Svara (1999a) compared the 
characteristics of professional management within strong mayor forms of 
government and council-manager forms of government and found that the 
managers of strong mayor cities had less formal administrative authority over 
city management, but also had less conflict and a higher level of cooperation 
with the mayor and council than found within a council-manager style of 
governance.
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5Theory
Svara (1998) argues within the politics-administration dichotomy model 
that separation of administrative power and political neutrality, the founding 
principles of public administration and the council-manager form of 
government, are an aberration of the founders’ original intent of governance. 
More recently, Svara (1999b and 2001) proposed the politics-administration 
complementarity model to explain the mutual interdependence and reciprocal 
influence of an administrative relationship between elected and appointed 
officials of local governments. Svara claims that the complementarity of 
politics and administration, as outlined in his model, is a legitimate alternative 
to the classical dichotomy model, which delineates separation and insulation 
of administrators from political interference.
By analyzing the nature of a professional manager’s appointment to a 
position in city administration, and the formal authority and administrative 
relationship between appointed and elected officials in a general management 
city, one can argue that the politics-administration complementarity 
administrative relationship is more predominantly present in a hybrid form of 
general management cities than in a politics-administration dichotomy based 
council-manager form of government. As of 2002, a review of the literature 
found no published empirical research on the politics-administration 
complementarity model proposed by Svara. This will be the first such study.
The basic question guiding this research is: does adopting a particular 
form of municipal administrative structure result in significant and visible
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6changes in a city’s fiscal behavior? One could assume that changes in the 
structural characteristics of city government might have fiscal policy 
consequences. The impact of the management structure and its practices 
over municipal fiscal performance is the primary focus of this study.
Therefore, to understand the impact of the general management city’s 
administrative structure on municipal fiscal performances, this study adopts 
Svara’s politics-administration complementarity model to explain mutually 
interdependent reciprocal influences in the administrative relationship between 
elected and appointed officials within the general management cities. 
Hypothesis
By applying the politics-administration complementarity model to 
general management city functions, it is hypothesized that general 
management cities exhibit a more efficient fiscal management than the strong 
mayor and council-manager cities. In this study, the term ‘municipal fiscal 
performance’ generally represents a local government’s financial condition. 
Based on the types of administrative relationships present in these cities, this 
thesis hypothesizes that general management cities are more likely to have 
lower composite fiscal stress index, revenue capacity per capita, per capita 
general expenditure, and full-time equivalent rate of employees than the 
strong mayor and council-manager cities.
If the financial indicators differ between cities without a corresponding 
change in the quality of service to the citizen’s satisfaction, then it can be 
assumed the city with lower fiscal stress, general revenue and expenditures,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7and FTE employee ratios is better managed. Therefore, if a city is considered 
to be managed with fiscal efficiency, then it should have lower fiscal stress, 
revenue capacity per capita, general expenditures, and FTE rates.
The objective of this study is to empirically test the politics- 
administration complementarity model. Building an analytical model and 
generating statistical evidence in support of this model is imperative to support 
the theoretical assumptions of enhanced fiscal performance with a general 
management city. To understand the impact of a general management city’s 
administrative structure on a city’s fiscal performance, the fiscal performance 
indicators of those cities were compared with the fiscal performance indicators 
of mayor-council and council-manager cities.
Limitations
This study includes only cities with populations of 25,000 or above in its 
analysis. This restricts the generalizability of analytical outcomes and makes 
these inapplicable to cities with populations of less than 25,000. The results of 
this study will explain the impact of different types of administrative 
relationships among elected and appointed city officials on municipal fiscal 
performance. The effect of different administrative structures of municipal 
governments and the impact of professional administration over municipal 
fiscal performance are the major contributions by this research to the theory 
and practice of public administration. Therefore, the importance of this study 
is that its findings can contribute substantially to the theory and practice of 
public administration, especially to the professional municipal government
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8administration. The literature review clearly shows that a need exists to 
analyze the impact of a general management city’s administrative structure on 
its fiscal performance. Thus, by investigating one of the structural 
prescriptions for municipal fiscal performance, this study warrants both interest 
and concern by political leaders, scholars, and practitioners in the field.
This chapter introduced the research question and discussed its 
importance by identifying the gap in current literature. The following Chapter 
“Municipal Government in the United States,” describes the profile of U. S. 
cities and their municipal administrative structures in detail. Chapter 3, 
“Theoretical Framework,” explores the underlying theories of this study and 
provides a literature review. Chapter 4, “Research Methods,” covers the 
sources and types of data, variables included, analytical techniques, and 
statistical procedures employed in this study. Chapter 5, “Data Analysis and 
Results,” explains the findings of the data analysis. Finally, Chapter 6, 
“Discussion,” explores the results of the study in light of urban literature and 
provides suggestions for future research.
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9CHAPTER II
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
Introduction
This chapter will briefly explore the history of professional management, 
provide a profile of municipal governments in U.S., and discuss the most 
common forms of municipal administrative structures adopted by municipal 
governments. American cities have a rich history of local government 
administration. American cities evolved through experimentation from their 
colonial beginnings and continue to experiment with new administrative 
approaches. Frisby (1999) summarizes this evolution thus: “From the 
aldermen and councilors of colonial America to the mayors, council members, 
commissioners and managers of the 20th century, local government in the 
United States has passed through a variety of incarnations. The history of city 
and county management is rooted in parliamentary England, but it has evolved 
into an uniquely American balancing act between elected and appointed 
officials.”
In fact, ‘city’ is an honorary title granted to the traditional English 
boroughs that had a cathedral. These first American cities operated under a 
unicameral council consisting of an alderman and councilors. These cities 
were legal corporations with special charters granted by the governor who 
represented the English Crown (Frisby, 1999).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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History of Professional Management
During the late 19th century, local government corruption and its 
accompanying partisan politics led the citizens, especially an emerging middle 
class, to distrust their local government. In this atmosphere, the middle class 
voters enthusiastically embraced the introduction of the council-manager plan. 
In an attempt to eradicate corruption, reformers supported the formulation of 
charters that centralized bureaucratic responsibility in the mayor’s office.
The National Municipal League, established in 1895 by bringing the 
reformers’ groups across the country together, endorsed the model city charter 
that concentrated municipal power in the elected executive. In 1908,
Staunton, a small city of Virginia, hired Charles Ashbumer as the country’s first 
city manager (Stillman, 1974). In the early council-manager plans, the 
manager was granted administrative authority that, in theory, enabled 
functioning free from the elected body’s interference.
This city manager plan, as it is traditionally called, has characteristics 
similar to those of business models, specifically of the business corporation. 
This gave the plan “validity in terms of the middle-class values of economy 
and efficiency and the dichotomy between politics and administration,” and the 
plan guaranteed, “administrative expertise divorced from political 
considerations” (Banovetz, 1994). Hayes and Chang (1990) describe this as 
“an institutional guarantee against a possible stalemate between the executive 
and legislative branches of government.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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During 1914-24, the city manager profession established its identity and 
during 1924-38, the profession reflected the values of the scientific 
management philosophy and the politics-administration dichotomy with a clear 
distinction between the policy-forming council and policy-implementing and 
policy-administering professional management. Whereas, these two periods 
reflected support for a limited government, subsequently public mood toward 
government has changed in expecting greater responsiveness to citizen 
needs. The city manager’s role has been transformed to that of a community 
leader and managers are expected to be actively involved in submitting policy 
proposals to the council and providing advice on policy matters (Stillman, 1974 
and Nalbandian, 1991).
Even from its colonial beginnings, local government in America has 
struggled through a history of experimentation. “The twentieth century could 
well be called the century of local government in American democracy” 
(Hansell, 2000). Tracing the evolution of the city management profession, 
Stillman (1974) relates the municipal structural changes to changing public 
expectations of the government.
Profile of U.S. Municipal Governments
Government Units In 2002
As of June 30, 2002; of the 38,971 general-purpose local government 
units in the U.S. recognized by U.S. Census Bureau, 3,034 are county 
governments, 19,431 are municipal governments, and 16,506 are township
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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governments. These figures are nearly identical to the distribution of local 
governments in 1992. This corresponds generally to the incorporated places 
recognized in the Census Bureau reporting of population and housing 
statistics. In 2002, there are 2,624 more municipal governments than in 1952, 
a 16 percent increase. According to 2002 Census of Governments GC02-1 
(P) publication (issued July 2002), the 19,431 municipal governments reported 
in 2002 reflects a net increase of 59 municipalities since 1997, primarily as a 
result of new incorporations (USDOC, 2002b). According to the Census 
Bureau data, the U.S. has nearly 164 million people living in areas with 
municipal governments. As population grows in small cities, the cities opt for 
professional administrative help to conduct routine business (Adrian, 1988) in 
order to meet the demands of the growing community.
Out of the 19,431 municipal governments enumerated in 2002, the total 
number of cities with more than 25,000 of people (based on the 1996 
estimated population) in all the 50 states, including Washington DC, was 
1,166. Of these cities, the State of California had more cities with populations 
over 25,000. Nearly as many as 20% of the cities (N=238) were present in the 
State of California. This was followed by the State of Texas (7% or N=86).
The State of Illinois and the State of Florida were tied in third place with about 
6% of the total U. S. cities with populations of 25,000 or more (N=75 and N=67 
respectively). Generally, the southern states present in the warmer 
temperatures had more cities except for the State of Illinois. On average, 
each state had 23 cities with more than 25,000 people. The median number
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of cities with more than 25,000 people in each state was 14 (see Appendix-A, 
Profile of U.S. Cities and their Forms of Administrative Structures section for 
more details).
Cities and Their Form of Municipal Administrative Structures
The predominant form of municipal administrative structure among the 
cities was the council-manager form of government. This was followed by the 
strong mayor form of government and then by the general management 
municipal administrative structure. However, the cities of each of the states 
had a tendency to adopt a form of municipal administrative structure that 
closely resembled the one in neighboring cities.
The States of South Dakota, Vermont, and Indiana had more strong- 
mayor cities than any other states. More than 90% of cites within each of 
these states were strong mayor cities. A majority of the states in the U.S. had 
cities that followed the council-manager form of municipal administrative 
structure. In the States of Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Nevada, 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Virginia, California, and Texas, more than 95% of 
the cities within each state had adopted the council-manager form of 
government.
The general management municipal administrative structure was the 
type of administrative structure least preferred by most cities in each state.
But, a minimum one-third (33%) of the cities located in the States of Nebraska, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, and Rhode Island followed the general 
management administrative structure (See Figure 1).




































In 1998, of the 1,166 cities that had populations 25,000 or more (based 
on the 1996 estimated population), 20% (N=228) were strong mayor cities, 
66% (N=767) council-manager cities, and 12% (N=144) general management 
cities while the remaining 2% (N=27) had adopted some other forms of 
municipal administrative structures.
Of the 1,166 cities, 968 maintained the same administrative structure 
consistently from 1993 through 1998. Of the 968 cities, 18% (N=179) were 
strong mayor cities, 75% (N=719) were council manager cities and the 
remaining 7% (N=70) were general management cities. Of the 968, the 
majority of the cities, 82% (N=792), were small cities with populations of 
25,000 to 99,999. The medium-size cities (with populations of 100,000 to 
249,999) were 13% (ISM 25), and 5% (N=51) were big cities with populations 
of 250,000 and above (see Table 1). Appendix A provides detailed 
information on the city size and regional distribution of different municipal 
administrative structures across the country.
Table 1:
Percentage of Cities in Each City Size Group 
(Cities over 25,000 Persons)
City Size N %
Small Cities 792 82
Medium-Size Cities 125 13
Big Cities 51 5
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Of the 968 cities with populations of 25,000 or more, 11% (N=106) were 
located in the Northeast region, 29% (N= 285) in the Southern region, 26% 
(N=251) were in the Midwestern part of the country, 7% (N=65) in the 
Mountain region, and 27% (N=261) in the Pacific region. More cities were 
present in the Southern and Pacific regions of the country. The Mountain 
region had fewer cities when compared with other regions (see Table 2). Of 
the 968 cities, only 31% (N=296) were located in the metropolitan statistical 
area (MSA) and the remaining 69% (N=672) were not in the MSA.
Table 2:
Percentage of Cities in Each Regional Location 







Form of Municipal Governments
American city governments use a variety of formal administrative 
structures. There are generally five basic municipal forms; strong mayor, 
council-manager, commission, town meeting, and representative town meeting 
forms. Out of these five, the most common forms of governments are the 
strong mayor and council-manager forms. Other less common government 
structures such as commissions, town meetings, and representative town
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meetings are still followed by some cities.
Home rule gives the citizenry the right to form its own government: the 
opportunity to choose the form of government that best meets their needs.
The citizenry frames its own local government. U.S. municipal governments 
use a variety of formal structures. Though many types of municipal forms of 
government have been developed and tried by city governments throughout 
history, this study discusses only two forms that are currently very popular with 
city governments. The strong mayor (also called the mayor-council) and the 
council-manager forms are the ones adopted by most of the municipalities, 
regardless of the size of the city. Other forms such as, town meetings, 
representative town meetings, and commissions are on the verge of extinction. 
Strong Mayor Form of Municipal Governments
In general, the traditional strong mayor municipality or mayor-council 
forms of government are characterized by a local government that has a 
direct, at-large election for a mayor (see Figure 2). The elected mayor is 
responsible for the political, policy, and administrative leadership of the 
municipal government. In classical strong mayor governments, the council 
represents a law-making body that has a limited influence over administration, 
except for the budget-adopting process. A strong mayor is given the power to 
appoint department heads without council confirmation and other duties that 
include preparing the budget for submission to council and providing policy 
leadership. The mayor also has the power to veto council decisions, but the 
council may override the veto by a special majority.
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The major advantages of the strong mayor form of government may be 
an efficient centralized power in the mayor and strong policy leadership and 
responsiveness of the mayor to the public needs. The main shortcoming of 
this form is the single-person domination of administration, which could result 
in patronage. Another disadvantage is the potential administrative burden on 
a mayor that could result in an inefficient administration (ICMA 1997). 
Council-Manager Form of Municipal Governments
As mentioned earlier in the review of history of American cities, the 
council-manager form of municipal management was devised in the early 
1900s to overcome the so-called deficiencies of the mayor-council form of 
government. In the classical council-manager form of government, the council 
is the law-making body. The council also plays a major role in policy direction 
and political leadership. The mayor is either elected at-large by the public or 
selected by fellow-members of the council (see Figure 2). The mayor has a 
voice and a vote in council decisions but no veto power. The mayor acts as 
the chair of the council and as an executive representative of the city 
government. The mayor also performs ceremonial duties. Generally, the 
power of the mayor in a council-manager form of government is less than the 
power of a mayor in a mayor-council form of government. The mayor may or 
may not have the power to appoint the city manager, city boards, and 
committees. If the mayor has the power to appoint, then the final approval is 
subject to confirmation by the council (ICMA 1997).
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Policy directions provided by the council are implemented by an 
appointed professional city manager, who maintains political neutrality while 
providing professional advice on policies under consideration. In addition to 
the administration of council policies, the city government budget is also under 
the full control of the qualified professional city manager. However, the council 
retains the power of final approval on a budget. The appointed city manager 
has the power to appoint and dismiss department heads and other officials 
without consulting or seeking approval from the council. The appointed city 
employees report to the city manager. The charters of the municipal 
government expressly restrict the interference of the mayor or council in the 
city manager’s administrative duties and decisions (ICMA 1997).
The International City/County Management Association, which 
recognizes professionalism in municipal administration, has devised and 
revised, many times, criteria for formal acknowledgement of the professional 
managers and professional management in local governments. Appendix B 
reproduces the ICMA Local Government Recognition Criteria and Guidelines 
for Recognition. This document spells out, in detail, the council-manager 
position and the authority given to professional city managers for successful 
conduct of municipal business.
The proponents of this form of government claim that efficiency, 
effectiveness, and economy result from conducting a city government 
administration in a business-like manner with an appointed professional 
manager. The centralized administrative power, authority, and decision-
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making power of a professional manager are considered an advantage in 
streamlined operation of municipal business. Also, the political neutrality of 
the council-manager form of government allegedly promotes government 
administration without the corruption that can result from the spoils and 
patronage system. This proponents claim, the financial resources of the 
government are utilized for the programs needed rather than wasted on 
programs selected out of political favoritism. However, possible drawbacks 
include dispersed political leadership and reduced responsiveness to 
community needs, since the city manager is not necessarily responsive to the 
public since the manager’s reporting requirement restricted to mayor.
The General Management Cities / Hybrid Form of Municipal Management
Very rarely, an at-large mayoral election, in a strong mayor form of 
government, results in the election of an official who handles complex 
administrative responsibilities. In order to compensate for possible 
deficiencies of the mayor, some municipal government charters empower the 
elected mayor to appoint a chief administrative officer or a professional 
business manager to conduct the daily operations of municipal government 
and supervise various departments.
As early as the 1960s, the profile of local governments began to show 
these administrative changes. Some mayor-council municipalities began 
using an appointed professional manager for overall administrative affairs 
without adopting the council-manager plan. The International City Manager’s 
Association recognized this change in tradition. From its analysis of this new
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approach and administrative affairs conducted in this hybrid form government 
structure, the ICMA concluded that these newly developed city manager 
positions did not significantly vary from the traditional professional city 
manager positions provided for in the council-manager form of government. 
But the formal administrative authority of the manager was dispersed when 
compared with that of their council-manager counterparts (ICMA, 1997).
In July 1969, the ICMA began the process of recognizing municipalities 
that provided positions of professional managers while retaining a mayor- 
council form of government. In order to distinguish the new hybrid 
municipalities from those recognized as traditional council-manager 
governments, these new hybrid governments were designated as “general 
management” municipalities. The ICMA (1997) also established criteria to 
recognize the hybrid form of municipal governments (see Appendix A). In his 
study, Banovetz (1994) also observed this new trend in the administration of 
the local government. He recalled that the 1988 Municipal Yearbook had 
noted a convergence of the council-manager and mayor-council plan, 
“excellent prospects for the further interchange of aspects of structure and 
function.”
On the basis of the National League of Cities’ 1996 data, Svara 
(1999a) estimates that approximately 35% of the strong mayor cities with 
populations of 10,000 -  49,999 had appointed professional managers. 
Similarly, 39% of the strong mayor cities with populations of 50,000 and above 
had appointed professional managers. Technically, these cities fell under the
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ICMA’s “general management cities” classification. DeSantis (1998) observed 
this trend and stated that “the large number of localities that have adopted 
hybrid forms of government signals the growing acceptance of this 
organizational relationship.”
However, scholars do not enthusiastically pursue the idea of this new 
“general management” reorganization. Bill Hanseil (1999), then executive 
director of the ICMA, observed that “our 30 - year effort to introduce the idea 
of a ‘general management’ position into non-council-managers government 
still has meaning only for a limited number of members.” A scanning of 
municipal government literature can support this statement. Only a handful of 
studies are analyzing the non-traditional hybrid form of administration in 
municipal management (Renner, 1988, Renner and DeSantis, 1998 and Svara 
1999a). Of those studies, the most notable one is by public administration 
scholar James Svara (1999a). While comparing the characteristics of 
professional management of mayor-council and council-manager forms of 
government, Svara found that the mayor-council city managers have less 
formal administrative authority over city management, but they have less 
conflict and higher cooperation with the mayor.
Most of the duties performed by these managers are similar to the city 
managerial functions performed by the city manager of a council-manager 
form of government. This is an attempt by the local governments to blend the 
best of both the strong mayor and council-manager forms of government. 
However, this results in an organizational structure with an unclear line of
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authority and responsibility.
Svara (1999a), in one of his studies on city management, takes this 
difference in professional management one step further by using specific 
terminology to distinguish the professional managers of council-manager form 
of government from general management city managers. For the sake of 
simplicity, he refers to all appointed city management officials, regardless of 
different municipal forms of government, as “Chief Administrators. ” However, 
the terms “City Manager1’ and “City Administrator1’ are used by Svara (1999a) 
to refer to the top appointed administrator in council-manager and general 
management cities respectively (see Table 3).
Table 3:
James Svara’s Taxonomy on City Administrators
Administrative Forms Terminology of the 
Professional Managers
All professional city managers Chief Administrators
Council-Manager City’s city 
manager
City Manager
General Management City’s 
manager
City Administrator
Thus, according to Svara’s terminology, “the City Manager” of council- 
manager cities provides facilitative leadership but is not an executive. The 
“City Administrator” of general management cities serves along with the 
mayor, whereas the mayor is the chief executive officer for the city.
Recent Trend
Large cities of the U.S. generally prefer strong mayor city municipal 
administrative structures. Declining property values, increasing racial
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tensions, and the resulting political turmoil in the city are all factors contributing 
to a continued confrontation between the political and administrative structures 
in city hall leading to an abandonment of the council-manager form of 
government. The city of Hartford, Connecticut is the latest city to abandon five 
decades of council-manager tradition as of the November 2002’s election.
Another example of this municipal administrative change is the city of 
Dallas, Texas, and its return to the strong mayor form of municipal 
government. Oakland, California is another example. With the citizens’ 
supporting abandonment of the city’s 68-year-old council-manager 
government, the city entrusted responsibility for day-to-day administration to a 
nationally recognized professional manager (Massad, 1995).
After their transformation into strong mayor cities, these cities have still 
retained professional city managers operating alongside the mayors who are 
the chief executives in power. This move affords the mayors more time to 
focus on political, as well as, mayoral ceremonial duties and policy 
developments without relinquishing control over the coordination of 
administrative departments. This results in a non-traditional hybrid form of 
municipal government or general management city form as described by the 
ICMA.
Box (1993) observes, in some council-manager cities, “Where there is 
significant disagreement over goals or where many people (or a few very 
powerful people) see their ability to influence the policy process as more 
important than efficient and professional management, the community is likely
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to resist professionalism in the form of a general-management professional.” 
Conclusion
This study intends to analyze another less familiar administrative 
structure that is called the ‘general management’ form. The ICMA defines a 
general management city as a traditional mayor-council city that appoints a 
professional city manager to conduct the city’s administration without formally 
adopting the council-manager form.
From the early reform movement efforts to make cities more efficient 
have been more focused on the structure of local government. However, no 
study has attempted to analyze the benefit and impact of the hybrid 
administrative arrangement on the general management city’s daily 
functioning. Thus, there is a gap in our understanding of the influence of a 
general management city’s manager on its efficient fiscal management, a gap 
that has to be filled by more research.
This study adopts Svara’s politics-administration complementarity 
conceptual framework to general management cities in order to examine the 
politics-administration complementarity model empirically. By doing so, the 
hybrid nature of the administrative authority of the general management city’s 
impact on municipal performance can be analyzed. The next section presents 
the theoretical framework on municipal administrative structures to present the 
current study in a theoretical perspective.





This chapter explores the administrative theories in current research 
including recent research findings of municipal fiscal performance and factors 
influencing municipal fiscal performance. Then it explores the research 
question in the context of the Complementarity of Politics and Administration 
model. Theoretical importance of this study is two-fold. Its critical nature can 
be stated simply by quoting the following statements from scholars of public 
administration and urban services management. In Svara’s (1999 b) view, the 
“relationship of administration to the political process is the key issue in 
defining the scope and nature of public administration.” Stumm and Corrigan 
(1998) state: “Debate over the virtues of one or another form of municipal 
government has raged since the early days of the reform movement.”
Adopting these two statements as guidelines, this research addresses (a) 
theories on the administrative relationship between elected and appointed 
officials and (b) theories on measures of municipal government fiscal 
performance.
This approach to the theory discussion can be justified by citing Dobel’s 
(2001) observation: “The entire constitutional question about governance boils 
down to discretion within a context of institutional accountability and 
operational effectiveness.” Though the prescriptions of political process and
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efficiency models are interlaced and target a similar outcome (better 
performing government in the field of public administration), here they are 
presented under separate classifications. These classifications are mainly 
arbitrary, and an attempt to analyze underlying theories in detail. The roles, 
functions, and powers of managers have been the subject of extensive 
analysis by scholars interested in local government issues (Deno and Mehay, 
1987; Hayes and Chang, 1990; Davis and Hayes, 1993; Massad, 1995; and 
Stumm and Corrigan, 1998). Therefore, this theoretical framework highlights 
the importance of institutional tradition, especially institutional structures, for 
local governance in urban research.
Administrative Theories
Theories on Administrative Relationship Between Elected and Appointed 
Officials
According to Svara (2001), the nature of the relationship between 
elected and appointed administrators, as well as the proper role of 
administrators in the political process, has been the subject of considerable 
debate in the theory and practice of public administration. At the city level, the 
council depends on the expertise and knowledge of its appointed professional 
city manager to function effectively and to implement the council’s policy 
successfully. Gabris et al. (2000) state: “One of the most pivotal relationships 
in the public sector occurs when governing boards and professional staff 
interface.” They add: “...the success of most governmental programs and
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services hinges on how well these two key players build on each other’s 
strengths and minimize the other’s weakness. Normally, success depends on 
cooperative interactions based on high trust, high openness, low risk, and high 
owning.”
The following review of literature on the subject highlights the prominent 
facets of theories that deal with the relationship between elected and 
appointed officials.
(i) Politics-Administration Dichotomy Model as a Founding Theory
Selden et al. (1999) state: “The separation of administration from 
policies gave birth to public administration as an intellectual field.” The 
predominant view in public administration literature is that bureaucracy is best 
subjected to political control through democratic governance. The underlying 
concepts of the politics-administration dichotomy in public administration, such 
as administrative-structural prescriptions for efficiency and businesslike 
professionalism, can be traced back to Wilson (1887).
Wilson (1887) argues: “The field of administration is a field of business. 
It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics . . . Administration lies outside 
the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political 
questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be 
suffered to manipulates its offices.” Wilson suggests that stable and 
businesslike principles of administrative management should be permitted to 
guide the operations of public agencies. In order to achieve some measure of 
efficiency in the operations of government, Wilson also suggests that we
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should look to the private sector for models of administrative management. 
The two prominent themes of Wilson’s work, the distinction between politics 
and administration and the search for scientific principles of administrative 
management that would assist in attaining organizational efficiency, continue 
to be central ideas in the mainstream interpretation of public administration.
Taylor (1912) states that “the best management is a true science, 
resting upon clearly defined laws, rules, and principles," and that the 
responsibility of the manager is to make the organization more efficient. 
Taylor’s ‘principles of scientific management’ approach prescribes the division 
of responsibilities between the management and workers and recommends 
delegation of administrative responsibilities for finding the best way of 
performing organizational tasks to professionally trained managers.
Thus, according to the traditional public administration paradigm, the 
underlying principle of the separation of powers and the political neutrality of 
professional administrators are the key to the efficient functioning of 
government. In a council-manager form of municipal government, the elected 
mayor and council use a variety of hierarchical controls to influence policy 
implementation and these include the appointment of a professional city 
manager to conduct municipal businesses. The executive authority is vested 
in a city manager appointed by a council, similar to a chief executive in a 
corporate board of directors. Richard Childs, considered the father of the city 
manager system, explains that, “the resemblance of the (city manager) plan to 
the private business corporation with its well-demonstrated capacity for
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efficiency,” was an intentional modification introduced in the municipal 
administration structure to reflect the politics-administration dichotomy 
principle (Stillman, 1974).
(ii) Principal-Agent Model to Explain Administrative Authority
The most commonly used model in studying administrative authority is 
the principal-agent model (Stein, 1990). This model is applied either implicitly 
or explicitly in research on administrative authority. The model views the 
elected officials as principals and appointed administrators as agents. It 
assumes a goal conflict and information asymmetry in the relationship 
between bureaucrats and politicians (Meier, Polinard and Wrinkle, 1999). This 
model is based on the assumption that appointed administrators and elected 
officials disagree over the goals and means of public policy. Another 
assumption is that the political control over bureaucrats is made more difficult 
by the fact that bureaucrats have access to policy-relevant information that 
elected officials do not. This model is more applicable in regulatory policy 
area than in distributive policy.
The majority of municipal policy outcomes are distributive in nature.
The relationship between elected officials and appointed administrators in a 
municipal government management is essentially cooperative with shared 
goals and fewer problems generated by information asymmetry. Thus, 
municipal government administration generally does not fit the assumptions of 
the principal-agent model. Based on these observations, Svara (2001) 
questions the applicability of the principal-agent model in analyzing the
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administrative relationship and its impact on policy outcome in a municipal
organization environment.
(iii) Complementarity of Politics and Administration
Contemporary literature on public administration has addressed
extensively the myth of the policy-administration dichotomy where the
distinction between policy and administration has increasingly become blurred
(Kirlin, 2001; Lynn, 2001; Rosenbloom, 2001; Dobel, 2001; Riccucci, 2001 and
Svara 1990, 1995a, 1998, 1999b and 2001). In fact, the most extensively
analyzed issues of administrative relationship and administrative responsibility
relate to the city manager’s involvement in policy formulation (Ammons and
Newell, 1988; Box, 1992; Nalbandian, 1989, 1995a & 1995b; Newell and
Ammons, 1987; Newell, Glass and Ammons, 1995; Svara 1988.1991& 1995b
and Selden et al. 1999). Many studies claim that there is a great deal of
change occurring in the leadership roles of both the manager and the mayor.
The city managers’ involvement in policy-making has long been recognized
and their political neutrality in city governance has been challenged time and
time again throughout the last century (Nalbandian, 1989 and 1991).
Many academicians have discredited the notion of a dichotomy
between politics and administration on these grounds. Banovetz (1994)
summarizes this trend thus:
Many local government administrators and scholars have .. . 
suggested that Woodrow Wilson’s politics-administration 
dichotomy was invalid, and predicted a growing political-policy 
role for city and county managers in the future (Frederickson,
1989)... Even the best contemporary discussions of the city 
management profession have reiterated this evolutionary
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process: Ammons and Newell (1989) recently noted that the
“politics-administration dichotomy...continues to erode in 
practice...in constant quest for the leadership necessary to solve 
the problems of the nation’s cities”, and Svara (1990) predicted 
that ‘a continuing shift toward the policy and political roles (for 
city managers) is likely.’
Ammons and Newell (1989) documented that this shift was also reported by 
city managers as well. Nalbandian (1989) sees a trend toward the city 
manager becoming a “broker” of competing interests of political groups and 
elected officials.
Svara (1998) argues that the politics-administration dichotomy model, 
commonly recognized as the founding theory of public administration, is 
“simplistic” and should be viewed as an aberration that departs from the 
intention and ideas of the ‘founders’ of the field. Svara (2001) reminds us that 
“it should be recognized that the idea of the strict dichotomy does have a 
historical basis in the United States, even though it was not the normative 
model proposed during the founding period of American public administration.” 
Svara (2001) points out that the early contributors to the field such as Wilson, 
Goodnow and Leonard White, favored and acknowledged a policy role for 
administrators.
These early public administration scholars’ works show a simultaneous 
emphasis on separation and insulation of administrators from political 
interference on one hand, and interaction and incorporation of administrative 
contributions in the design and the implementation of public policy on the 
other. However, their acknowledgement of the administrators’ policy role,
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according to Svara, has been ignored over time. The main reason for the 
persistence of the dichotomy model in public administration, according to 
Svara, is the absence of a satisfactory alternative model. In order to eradicate 
this deficiency, Svara proposes a politics-administration complementarity 
model. As shown in Figure 3, Svara’s conceptual complementarity model 
framework includes differentiation along with interaction of politics and 
administration as an alternative to a dichotomy model.
Figure 3:
Politics -  Administration Complementarity Model









administrative are committed to Bureaucratic
autonomy
High
competence and accountability and 
commitment * responsiveness *
* Reciprocating values that reinforce the position o f  other set o f officials
Understanding the Interaction between Politicians and Administrators
(Source: Svara, 2001)
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The relationship between elected and appointed officials could be seen 
as the interaction between political control and professional independence, 
Svara explains that the control involves the capacity to set direction and 
maintain oversight, while independence involves asserting professional 
perspectives in policy formation and adhering to professional standards in 
implementation. These relationships include the reciprocating values of 
respect for administrators by elected officials and commitment to 
accountability by administrators that add balance to the relationship. The zone 
of complementarity results from high political control and high administrative 
independence. This results in key reciprocating value in administrative 
decision-making.
Svara (2001) rejects the classical dichotomy model as too “simplistic” to 
help understand the theory and practice of public administration that 
emphasizes commitment to public serving values, substantive ends as well as 
technical means, and procedural fairness in public service. He builds his 
politics-administration complementarity model on the following premise:
Elected officials and administrators join together in the 
common pursuit of sound governance. Complementarity entails 
separate parts, but parts that come together in a mutually 
supportive way. One fills out the other to create a whole. 
Complementarity stresses interdependence along with distinct 
roles; compliance along with independence; respect for political 
control along with commitment to shape and implement policy in 
ways that promote the public interest; deference to elected 
incumbents along with adherence to the law and support for fair 
electoral competition; and appreciation of politics along with 
support for professional standards.
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Svara (2001) further stresses: “Complementarity recognizes the
interdependence and reciprocal influence among elected officials and 
administrators. Elected officials and administrators maintain distinct roles 
based on their unique perspectives and values and the differences in their 
formal positions, but the functions they perform necessarily overlap . . . The 
reconciliation comes from recognizing the reciprocating values that underlie 
complementarity.” Further, Svara asserts that “most interactions among 
officials reflect complementarity, and evidence from local government in 14 
countries supports this generalization” (Mouritzen and Svara, 2001).
If we consider the underlying democratic theory and administrative 
philosophy of strong mayor cities as a thesis and the council-manager politics- 
administration dichotomy philosophy as an antithesis, then we can reasonably 
interpret that the hybrid general management city with the proposed politics- 
administration complementarity model is the synthesis in municipal 
management theories.
Municipal Fiscal Performance Measurement
The fiscal performance of a municipality, in general terms, refers to a 
“government’s ability to generate enough revenues over its normal budgetary 
period to meet its expenditures and not incur deficits” (Groves and Valente, 
1994). More specifically, fiscal performance refers to a government’s ability to 
maintain existing service levels, withstand local and regional economic 
disruptions, and meet the demands of natural growth, decline and change.
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This is commonly called the “budgetary solvency” of a government.
Municipal governments are expected to serve the needs of their citizens 
in many diverse but traditional ways. Fire protection, police services, storm 
water drainage, sewage collection, water supply, parks and recreation facilities 
services are a few common traditional services provided by cities. Also, these 
services are expected to be provided in an efficient and cost-effective way to 
meet the citizens’ satisfaction (Stumm and Corrigan, 1998). Stumm and 
Corrigan (1998) state that taxpayers define efficiency as less government 
spending and taxes. Further, the scholars emphasize the importance of the 
municipality’s functional efficiency concept by stating that, “as taxpayers at the 
local level continue to demand more services without accompanying tax 
increases, the quest continues for greater efficiency in city government.”
The scholars of municipal research have applied many different models 
to measure the municipal fiscal performance. The input measures are the 
fiscal expenditure on services and labor. However, public service output 
levels are not directly measurable (Hayes and Chang, 1990). Therefore, if the 
financial indicators differ between cities without corresponding changes in the 
quality of service at the citizen’s satisfaction level, then the city with a low 
taxation and an optimal expenditure level can be credited with better 
management. In other words, if two cities have an equal quality of life, then 
the city that spends less can be recognized to be more efficient. However, 
Hayes and Chang (1990) report that the literature on the relative efficiency of 
professional management cities is inconclusive about which form of municipal
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administrative structure contributes to efficiency.
Davis and Hayes (1993) find that the presence of a city manager has 
no significant impact on efficiency, and this finding is consistent with much of 
the existing literature. They warn, though, that this should not be interpreted 
to suggest that the government structure is irrelevant. Time series analysis of 
22 cities over 11 years, done by Morgan and Pelissero (1980), show that 
changes in the city government structure has no impact on changes in taxing 
and spending levels. According to their research, there is no apparent 
difference between the efficiency levels of the two different municipal 
government structures. Similarly, Deno and Mehay (1987) found no apparent 
difference between the efficiency levels of the two municipal government 
structures. Hayes and Chang (1990) also found no differences when 
examining expenditures for police, fire, and sanitation services in the cities 
listed in the 1981 ICMA Municipal Yearbook.
However, after analyzing the Census Bureau data on municipal 
governments and data from the Places Rated Almanac, Massad (1995) finds 
that large cities managed by city managers appear to be more efficient than 
those managed by mayors. This cost-benefit analysis significantly favors the 
council-manager form as more efficient than the mayor-council or strong 
mayor forms. Massad (1995) defines the efficiency of municipal government 
as a function of two factors: the financial factor, including per capita spending 
and taxation, and quality of life. His finding is that large cities managed by city 
managers appear to be more efficient than those managed by mayors;
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however, Massad finds no significant difference in efficiency between the 
mayors and the managers of small cities. Massad concludes that, “city 
managers are demonstrably more responsible fiscally” than the mayor-council 
system.
Feiock and Kim (2000) state that a government’s structure affects its 
responsiveness to economic and organizational forces that will eventually 
influence the local economic development policies and development 
programs. Though the form of government does not have a direct effect on 
policy outcomes, they found evidence that the form of government has an 
interactive effect that mediates the effect of certain economic conditions and 
administrative arrangements on development policy.
Following are the measures generally used by urban scholars to 
measure municipal fiscal performances. The most common indicators used by 
many studies dealing with the analysis of municipal fiscal performance have 
been adopted for this study. These indicators are: municipal fiscal stress 
(operationalized as composite fiscal stress index), municipal revenue capacity 
(operationalized as revenue capacity per capita), general expenditures 
(operationalized as per capita general expenditures), and municipal 
productivity [operationalized as full-time equivalent employee rate (FTE 
employee rate)].
(i) Municipal Fiscal Stress
Municipal fiscal stress is a measure of economic distress of a locality. It 
measures the fiscal conditions of a local government in terms of revenues and
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expenditures. Fiscal stress may exist in a city when there is an imbalance 
between the municipality’s revenue raising capacity and its expenditure need. 
Fiscal stress is a relative measure that explains a locality’s financial strain in 
relation to other local governments’ performance in a given comparison group. 
The fiscal stress score comprises the level of revenue capacity per capita, the 
degree of revenue effort, and the magnitude of median household income of a 
locality.
The composite fiscal stress index reflects the cumulative conditions of 
other fiscal indicators, most commonly the locality’s fiscal indicators such as 
revenue capacity, revenue effort, median adjusted gross income etc., This 
index identifies those cities experiencing high fiscal stress compared to other 
cities across a given group. Researchers attempted to measure composite 
fiscal stress index in many different methodological approaches (Badu and Li, 
1994 and Clark, 1994).
According to Pammer (1990), several theoretical approaches have 
been used in an attempt to understand the causes of municipal fiscal stress. 
Pammer also points out that, though most of these theories have been 
developed independently of one another, none of them offers a complete 
explanation for causes for a municipal fiscal stress. However, the 
socioeconomic decline model is considered the best approach to explain a 
fiscal stress condition. The socioeconomic decline model attempts to explain 
how changes in economic, social, and structural conditions affect municipal 
fiscal problems. According to this model, cities are in financial difficulty
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because of (1) declining populations, (2) rising costs of public services, and (3) 
lagging growth in revenues.
Stanley (1976) and Martin (1982) proposed an intemal-management 
perspective that claims unsound financial management leads to revenue 
shortfalls or at least contributes to the inability of cities to foresee and 
adequately manage budget problems. Martin (1982) argues that revenue 
problems are exacerbated by inept managers who create fiscally strained 
budgets.
It is evident that the prevailing theories of the causes of urban fiscal 
stress each offer different explanations. Stonecash and McAfee (1981) 
proposed a fiscal stress model that combines elements from both models. 
According to Stonecash and McAfee (1981), cities respond differently to 
changes in resource level. The variations in responses are attributable to the 
political decision-making process characteristic of cities. The combination of 
administrative decision-making and socioeconomic factors contribute to 
influence municipal fiscal conditions.
(ii) Revenue Capacity
Municipal revenues include funds received from both local sources, 
such as local taxes and user fees, and external sources, such as 
intergovernmental revenue. The principal form of local revenue for a 
municipality consists of local property taxes. The revenue capacity of a 
locality measures the degree of a municipality’s capability to raise potential 
revenue. Revenue capacity per capita of a locality shows changes in
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revenues relative to changes in population size. As population grows, 
revenues and the need for municipal services may be expected to increase 
proportionately. The assumption is that the cost of services is directly related 
to population size. The revenue capacity determines the capacity of a local 
government to provide services (Groves and Valente, 1994).
Since the fiscal position of a local government is affected by the growth 
in its revenue base over time, it is an important dimension of a local 
government’s fiscal position. If the revenue base does not grow at a rate that 
is consistent with the demand for services, then the local government could be 
faced with increasing taxes, increasing user charges, or reducing services. 
However, if a city’s revenue capacity exhibits strong growth, the city is in a 
better position to continue to provide existing services without increasing taxes 
or other revenue-raising mechanisms (Williams, et al., 2002).
(iii) Municipal Expenditures
A city’s general fund is the source of routine general expenditures for 
city services and the general operation of the government. Schneider and 
Teske (1992), following Peterson’s (1981) classifications, divided local 
government expenditures into three categories: allocational, developmental, 
and redistributive. Allocational expenditures are generally routine operational 
expenditures. Hayes and Chang (1990) observe, from the Census of 
Government data, that police protection, fire protection, and refuse collection 
account for 40% of the total general expenditure, a major portion of the 
operating budget. Developmental expenditures, such as capital outlay and
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debt repayment, are incurred on major projects that cover extended periods of 
time and service long-term debts. Municipal spending on health, education, 
and the welfare of citizens fall under redistributive expenditures. Unlike in the 
case of allocational expenditures, city administrators have little control over the 
decisions of developmental and redistributive services expenditures. Thus, if 
city officials prefer to show their efficiency in administration, allocational 
expenditures normally covered by general fund expenditures are their only 
option of influence (Schneider and Teske, 1992).
Stumm and Corrigan (1998) found no statistically significant difference 
in total expenditures for different municipal forms of government. However, 
they find that professionally managed cities have substantially and statistically 
significant, lower general expenditures. Stumm and Corrigan (1998) state 
that, “while many other variables affected municipal expenditures, the effects 
of having a professional manager were clearly most substantial, resulting in 
per capita savings in the general fund of nearly $90 per capita in local general 
fund expenditures.” This result should be expected in professionally managed 
cities when considering the short tenure of professional managers and the 
nature of general funds. A conflict-free working environment and the 
opportunity for professional advancement determine the average tenure of a 
professional city manager. Thus, if an effort is made by professional city 
management to show its impact on administration, then general expenditures 
should be the preferred choice of indicator for efficiency analysis.
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(iv) Municipal Productivity
“Local governments in the United States are expensive,” states 
Schneider (1988). The labor intensiveness of municipal services can be 
translated as high cost for service provision. The cost of local government is 
largely a function of the size of the workforce and corresponding salaries and 
benefits. Bergman (2002) states that, according to the Census Bureau’s 2001 
Annual Survey of State and Local Government Employment and Payroll, state 
and local governments employed 15.4 million full-time equivalent employees 
(FTE) in 2001, a 2 % increase over 2000. Local governments alone reported 
11.2 million FTE; and most full-time equivalent employees worked in 
education, hospitals and police protection.
The number of full-time equivalent employees is equal to the number of 
hours worked by part-time employees divided by the standard number of 
hours for a full-time employee. The result is then added to the number of full­
time employees. When a city provides quality service with a minimal number 
of employees, it results in enhanced productivity. Research conducted by 
urban scholars on municipal productivity shows that growing human resources 
budgets contribute more to a city’s debt than other socioeconomic factors 
(Nivola, 1982, Adams and Nathan 1989). The expanded payrolls in the form 
of average employee salaries and expense of employee pension plans are 
significantly correlated with strained municipal fiscal conditions (Pammer,
1990).
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Factors Influencing Fiscal Performance
According to Groves and Valente (1994), evaluating a municipality’s 
fiscal performance is a complex process. A municipality’s fiscal condition is 
affected by a number of factors ranging from the national economy, 
socioeconomic characteristics of the population, the local government’s fiscal 
policies, political culture, and administrative practices. The relations between 
these factors add to the complexity. The changes in socioeconomic or 
environmental factors are the primary forces that influence the organizational 
factors (administrative decisions and actions) that, in turn, determine municipal 
financial conditions.
Groves and Valente (1994) state that: “Management practices and 
legislative policies are often regarded as the most critical influences on 
financial condition because a local government can theoretically adjust to 
environmental changes by changing its expenditure patterns.” Further, 
Groves and Valente (1994) claim that, “in theory, any government can remain 
in good financial condition if it makes an appropriate organizational response 
to changing environmental conditions.” The underlying assumptions of these 
arguments are that the local government has adequate notice of problems, 
understands their nature and extent, makes appropriate and necessary 
decisions, and implements them in order to lessen adverse financial 
outcomes. Another critical factor that contributes to this assumption is that 
management practices and policies are under the government’s control, which 
they can use wisely to manage municipal fiscal performance.
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In studies focused on a comparative analysis of the fiscal condition of 
localities, and aimed at understanding the relative fiscal performance of the 
municipal administrative structures on municipal functioning, the municipality is 
modeled as a multi-product firm, where the outputs are a vector of services 
provided by the city (Hayes and Chang, 1990). These socioeconomic, 
environmental factors may create a service demand or provide revenue for 
operation or may create both demand and provide resources. Therefore, the 
municipal fiscal management is an effect in a cause-and-effect relationship. 
These socioeconomic/environmental and municipal fiscal control variables are 
independent variables and their effects on municipal fiscal performance 
dependent variables are controlled in analysis to understand the impact of 
municipal administrative structure explanatory variables. These control 
variables are discussed below separately as socioeconomic factors that 
influence municipal fiscal performance and as indicators of existing municipal 
fiscal conditions that influence municipal fiscal performance.
(i) Socioeconomic Factors That Influence Fiscal Performance
The community needs and resources indicators (the supply and 
demand) encompass the socioeconomic factors. The economic, demographic 
characteristics include factors such as population, personal income, 
employment, and property values. The tax base of a municipality determines 
its wealth and ability to raise revenue to support service provision. Also, the 
socioeconomic characteristics of a locality indicate its demand for services 
such as public safety, social services, and infrastructure maintenance. Other
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factors, such as the localities’ sensitivity to local economic cycles, the size and 
regional advantage of a locality, and the presence in a larger economic region 
such as a metropolitan area, also impact municipal fiscal performance.
All of the economic and demographic factors are closely related. 
Theoretically, any change in community needs and resource factors impact 
other factors since the community’s demand and supply factors are 
interrelated to each other economically. Similarly, other financial conditions 
prevailing in municipalities affect spending patterns and service provision.
In a hypothetical recession, a decrease in employment opportunities 
results in an outward migration of population that has job skills and an earning 
potential. This would, ultimately, result in a lower demand for real estate and a 
corresponding decline in the property value of housing that would eventually 
result in a slump in the property revenues of a locality. Besides impacting 
property values, the employment loss would result in less personal income for 
residents with a reduced buying power that would affect retail sales. This, in 
turn, would have a negative effect on local sales taxes and shrink local 
governments revenues further (Groves and Valente 1994).
The domino effect forces a local government into an unbalanced budget 
due to increased welfare service demands along with fixed local services that 
cannot be scaled down proportionately according to the decline in population. 
Many primary services such as education, health and welfare and, to some 
extent, public safety and public works are need-driven. Therefore, many local 
governments have little discretionary control over whether services are to be
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provided. The possible option to balance the budget is to increase taxes and 
that would burden the remaining population. This financial struggle of the city 
makes it unattractive for any business relocation and a less attractive place to 
live. This could result in a further decline of the population.
(ii) Municipal Financial Factors That Influence Fiscal Performance
Most governments are required to have a balanced budget. The 
ongoing fiscal pressures are reflected in the fiscal budget actions that localities 
have to take in order to control expenditures and to balance the budget. If 
local governments are struggling with inadequate revenues or a weak revenue 
growth, then budget actions to control expenditure growth are often taken 
(Groves and Valente 1994). For example, faced with an inadequate or a 
slowing revenue growth, local governments may decide to reduce fringe 
benefits, salaries, or even the number of staff they employ. They may 
eliminate positions through attrition or by freezing job vacancies.
Other budget controls frequently used by local governments include 
deferral of spending on capital projects and deferral of maintenance on 
existing equipment, facilities, and programs. On the other hand, localities may 
increase taxes, or turn to other revenue-raising alternatives in order to 
increase revenue sources to continue providing necessary services. Though 
the specific nature and number of budget actions and administrative decisions 
taken by local governments are important, the subject is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. We need only to note here that proper budgetary actions help a 
government maintain a fiscal balance and continue providing basic necessary
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services to its residents.
Research Problem
Politics-Administration Complementarity Model and the Contribution of Current
Research
To understand the impact of a general management city’s 
administrative structure on a city’s fiscal behaviors, the fiscal revenue and 
expenditure data of those cities should be compared with the revenue and 
expenditure data of strong mayor and council-manager cities. By analyzing 
the nature of a professional manager’s appointment to a city administrative 
position and the formal authority and administrative relationship between the 
appointed and elected officials in a general management city, one can argue 
that the politics-administration complementarity administrative relationship is 
more predominantly present in a hybrid form of general management cities 
than in a politics-administration-dichotomy-based council-manager form of 
government. Thus, this study has adopted Svara’s politics-administration 
complementarity model, which proposes the mutual interdependence and 
reciprocal influence in administrative relationships between the elected and 
the appointed officials of local governments in a general management city.
The adoption of the politics-administration complementarity model 
suggests that general management cities can be fiscally more efficient than 
other forms of municipal management. Based on this model, this thesis 
hypothesizes that the general management cities are more likely to have lower
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composite fiscal stress indices, revenue capacities per capita, per capita 
general expenditures, and full-time equivalent rates of employees than strong 
mayor and council-manager cities.
It is assumed that the city government decision-maker’s objective is to 
minimize cost, regardless of the structure of the government. Implicit in this 
analysis is the assumption that all local governments have access to the same 
technology and skilled personnel and have similar production functions and 
provide the minimum required services at the citizens' satisfaction level. 
Another assumption made in this study is that lower property tax collection in a 
locality is due to an efficient operation and frugal spending that warrants no 
necessity for more revenue. However, lower spending is not assumed to be 
due to less available resources and less revenues.
Therefore, this study examines the impact of a general management 
city’s administrative structure on its fiscal performances. The main objective of 
this study is to test empirically the hypothesis about the superior fiscal 
performance of general management cities that bear structural similarities to 
the politics-administration complementarity model in better administrative 
relationship between elected and appointed officials.
Summary
The impact of management practices over municipal fiscal performance 
is the primary focus of this study. To understand the influence of different 
forms of municipal administrative structures over municipal fiscal performance, 
this study adopts Svara’s politics-administration complementarity model. By
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applying this model to general management city functions, it is hypothesized 
that general management cities reveal a more efficient management of fiscal 
financial measures than strong mayor and council-manager cities. If the 
financial indicators differ between cities without corresponding changes in the 
quality of service at the citizen’s satisfactory level, then it can be assumed that 
the city with lower fiscal stress indices, revenue capacities, general fund 
expenditures, and FTE employee ratios is better managed.
Cities are complex multi-dimensional systems, and attempting to 
describe and explain cities fiscal performance in terms of a single key factor 
can be misleading. Therefore, this study uses multiple fiscal performance 
indicators and a fiscal analysis method that incorporates factors, both internal 
and external to the municipalities’ control. However, it is imperative to build a 
theoretical model and generate statistical evidence to support the theoretical 
assumptions of enhanced fiscal performance by a general management city 
structured as described in the politics-administration complementarity model.
This chapter on the literature review explored the administrative 
theories including recent research findings of municipal fiscal performance and 
factors influencing municipal fiscal performance. Then it explored the 
research question in the context of Complementarity of Politics and 
Administration model. The next chapter, “Research Methods,” covers the 
sources and types of data, variables included, analytical techniques, and 
statistical procedures employed in this study.





While much has been written about municipal administrative 
organization, new approaches continue to emerge to address continuing 
questions about alternative local governance arrangements. This study does 
not attempt to deal with the nature of relationship between elected and 
appointed officials in local government but analyze the impact of the 
administrative relationship over municipal fiscal performance. It does, 
however, contribute new data and a new analytical approach to the fiscal side 
of the discussion. In order to assess the contributions of a hybrid form of 
general management municipal administrative structure to the field of public 
administration, comparisons between the hybrid general management city 
(GMC) government and other more common strong mayor city (SMC) and 
council-manager city (CMC) governments are vital.
This study re-examines the impact of different government structures 
on municipal government’s fiscal performance by incorporating the new hybrid 
form of general management cities into the research design. This study uses 
the 1997 Census Financial Macrodata of Cities to test the hypothesis that 
general management cities (GMC) that achieved measurable fiscal 
performance compared favorably with cities without professional management 
as in strong mayor cities (SMC) and with cities with a clear separation of
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powers as in the council-manager cities (CMC). The effect of different 
administrative structures of municipal governments and the impact of 
professional administration over municipal fiscal performance are the major 
contributions by this research to the theory and practice of public 
administration. Thus, the findings of this study can provide significant input to 
both scholars and practitioners of public administration.
Research Objective
The objective of this study is to employ the politics-administration 
complementarity model to analyze the contributions of the general 
management city’s administrative structure to the field of public administration. 
This study examines the impact of different government structures on the 
municipal government’s fiscal performance. It uses 1997 Census of 
Government Data of Cities to test the hypothesis that cities with general 
management administrative structures achieved measurable fiscal 
performance of a higher order compared to cities without professional 
management as in traditional strong mayor cities, and to cities with a clear 
separation of powers as in the council-manager forms of government. 
Statement of the Research Problem
This study examines the impact of municipal administrative structure on 
city fiscal performance. The study will compare general management cities 
(GMC) with the more traditional forms of strong mayor cities (SMC) and 
council-manager cities (CMC).
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Research Hypotheses
H1 General management cities are likely to have lower fiscal stress
than either strong mayor or council-manager cities
H2 General management cities are likely to have lower revenue
capacity per capita than either strong mayor or council-manager 
cities
H3 General management cities are likely to have lower general fund
expenditures than either strong mayor or council-manager cities
H4 General management cities are likely to have lower full-time




An analytical model is derived based on the factors representing 
primary forces that influence a municipal financial condition (see Figure 4). 
The factors are grouped as environmental/socioeconomic factors and 
organizational factors. The environmental factors are generally the 
socioeconomic variables and the existing municipal financial condition that 
impact municipal fiscal performance.
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Figure 4: Analytical Model To Measure Municipal Government Fiscal Performance
Fiscal Management Policy Formulation 
and Implementation
Administrative Activities
Lower fiscal stress 
Low revenue capacity 
Lower general expenditures 
Lower FTE ratio
Fiscal Performance
Per Capita Income, Median Value o f Single 
Family Homes, Percent Owner Occupied 
Home, Poverty Rate, Crime Rate, 
Unemployment Rate, Median Age of Resident, 
Population, Population Growth, Population 
Density, Presence in MSA, Region
Demographic Characteristics of the 
Municipality (Socioeconomic Control 
Variables)
Strong Mayor Form 
Council-Manager Form 
G eneral Management Form
Government Form and / or Organizational 
Structure of the Municipality
(Independent Variable)
The organizational factors include different forms of administrative structures 
with different level of authorities of decision-making and administrative 
relationship between elected and appointed officials.
Taken together, they can be used as a guide to the varied issues that 
must be considered in analyzing municipal financial condition. According to 
the arrows on the schematic representation, both environmental factors and 
organizational factors determine outcome of an administrative decision or
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fiscal policy decision. The policy decision and resulting administrative 
activities in turn determine municipal fiscal performance and implies a cause- 
and-effect relationship.
Environmental Factors: Environmental factors are the external influences on a 
municipal government. Environmental factors can affect a municipal 
functioning favorably or unfavorably either by creating demands or by 
providing resources. For example, an increase in population both increases 
the revenue sources as well as the demand for services.
Organizational Factors: The municipal administrative structure determines 
decision-making authority and administrative relationship on elected and 
appointed officials. This, in turn, determines the government’s response to 
changes in environmental factors. In theory, any government can remain in 
good financial condition if it makes appropriate administrative decisions. 
Research Plan
The research plan of this study encompasses four separate 
components to address the basic question under investigation: can different 
municipal administrative structures affect the fiscal performance of a city? The 
research design is described in the following data analysis and results section 
as 1. the descriptive statistics of three types of cities under investigation, 2. the 
hypothesis testing of fiscal performance of cities with different municipal 
administrative structures, as illustrated in the analytical model (see Figure 4),
3. the analysis on the influence of environmental/control variables on 
municipal fiscal performance, and 4. the analysis of change over time to
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understand the impact of administrative structural changes of General 
Management Cities (GMC) on their fiscal performance. This research plan 
with the sequence of study is schematically represented in Figure 5.
Figure 5: 
Research Plan
Descriptive Statistics of the Strong Mayor 
Cities (SMC), the Council-Manager Cities 
(CMC), and the General Management Cities 
(GMC)
X I
Hypothesis Testing of the Impact of the 
Forms of Administrative Structures on 
Municipal Fiscal Performance
-a
Analysis of the Influence of Environmental 
Variables on Municipal Fiscal Performance
The Analysis of Change Over Time to 
Understand the Impact of Administrative 
Structural Changes of General Management 
Cities (GMC) on Their Fiscal Performance
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The first component, the descriptive statistics section, examines the 
differences in the demographic features of the three types of cities under study 
(namely, SMC, CMC, and GMC) to ensure that the cities under study are 
similar in certain fundamental ways and that they are proportionally distributed 
across the city sizes and regions.
On the contrary, if they have some fundamental differences in 
distribution, these can help in interpreting the observed variance in municipal 
fiscal performance. Similarly, a number of comparisons of the cities’ 
socioeconomic and municipal revenue and expenditure patterns are made to 
ensure the cities with different administrative structures do not differ from each 
other in any other significant way.
This study addresses the hypothesis testing of the impact of the forms 
of administrative structures over municipal fiscal performance as the second 
component and employs a cross-sectional research design to test the basic 
hypothesis that different municipal administrative structures impact the 
municipal fiscal management policies which, in turn, impact fiscal 
performances.
To determine if fiscal behavior differs across cities with different 
municipal administrative structures, an ordinary least square regression model 
is constructed using categorical variables to isolate the effect of different 
municipal administrative structures (SMC, CMC and GMC) on fiscal 
performance. The municipal fiscal performance is measured in four separate 
regression equations with (1) composite fiscal stress index, (2) revenue
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capacity per capita, (3) per capita general fund expenditures, and (4) the FTE 
employee rate as dependent variables as described in the following equation: 
General Municipal Fiscal Performance Equation:
Fiscal performance measure oc Form of government + Control variables
A city’s general fund is the source for a majority of the routine 
expenditures incurred on city services and for the general purposes of 
government. The revenue that replenishes this source makes these services 
possible. Any imbalance in revenue and expenditure (or budgetary 
imbalance) exerts fiscal stress. Also, expanded payrolls that denote inefficient 
operation contribute to financial strain. Therefore, the preferred measures of 
the outcome of fiscal performance are lower levels of (1) composite fiscal 
stress index, (2) revenue capacity per capita, (3) per capita general fund 
expenditures, and (4) the FTE employee rate under efficient municipal 
functioning.
To capture any underlying differences across cities, as well as 
differences in cities themselves, variables that impact municipal fiscal 
performances other than municipal administrative structures are included in 
the regression equations as control variables. Socioeconomic variables, 
identified theoretically to impact the municipal fiscal performances such as the 
per capita income (accounting for variations in municipal services and the 
related expenditures), the median value of single family homes and the 
percentage of owner-occupied home (factors that determine municipal taxing
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and spending), the percent poverty, the crime rate, the unemployment rate, 
the median age of residents, the population, the percentage of net change in 
population, and the density (factors that determine variations in service 
demands), are employed as controls in the regression equation.
By applying the regression model, the effects of various exogenous 
factors are accounted for while controlling for other related influences, so that 
a correct estimate of the effects of administrative structures emerges. As 
described in Figure 4, the socioeconomic variables and administrative 
decisions made by a municipality impact municipal fiscal performance 
outcomes.
The third component of the research analyzes the Influence of 
environmental variables on municipal fiscal performance. The purpose of this 
approach is to determine if municipal administrative structures impact fiscal 
performances in particular environments. Thus, the correlation coefficients of 
fiscal performances and different city characteristics are computed to 
understand the differences in the municipal fiscal performance of different 
administrative structures under different exogenous effects.
Still the circumstances that direct a general management city to either 
adopt or discontinue a particular form of government structure are not 
understood well. Therefore, the fourth component of this study analyzes the 
changes over time to understand the impact of administrative structural 
changes of general management cities (GMC) on their fiscal performance.
The general management cities (GMC) were categorized into three groups of
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cities based on either presence or absence of administrative change 
intervention prior to the point of analysis. The municipal fiscal performance of 
GMC that retained their administrative structure was compared against the 
GMC that dropped their status and with cities that were recently adopted GMC 
status. By exploring socioeconomic indicators and municipal fiscal 
performances of the cities that have undergone such changes, we further our 
knowledge of the influence of different factors that prompt a city to change its 
administrative structure.
Research Variables
The impact of different forms of government was investigated by 
incorporating three different dummy variables: strong mayor city (SMC), 
council-manager city (CMC), and general management city (GMC), that 
assume a value of one for cites with form of government variable under study 
and zero for all other cases. In this study, the fiscal performance of a city’s 
administration was measured by focusing on the rates of change in the fiscal 
stress, revenue capacity per capita, total general fund expenditures, and the 
rate of full-time equivalent employees employed to conduct municipal 
business. More details on operationalizing and measuring the variables are 
available in the Appendix (see C. Technical Appendix). Appendix D provides 
computation steps in operationalizing of the variables used in the study.
The comparison of data between individual units of municipal 
government must be made with caution and it should be taken into account
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that the governmental structure and functional responsibilities vary from state 
to state. To enable a fair comparison across the cities with variation in 
demographics, appropriate standardized measures such as ratios, per capita 
measures, percent change, and relative measures were introduced in the 
analyses.
In order to mitigate the population’s effects on fiscal performance 
measures, per capita measures are incorporated in the analysis. Similarly, in 
order to find the effect of the city size on fiscal performance, the cities are 
divided into three sub-samples: (1) small cities (populations of 25,000 -  
99,999); (2) medium-size cities (populations of 100,000-249,999); and (3) big 
cities (populations of 250,000 and above).
A clear understanding of the technical terms used in this study is 
necessary to interpret the statistical findings properly. This research 
document uses a number of terms that in other contexts might have different 
meanings. However, other concepts are self-explanatory or commonly used 
and easily understood. A glossary of technical terms used in this document is 
provided (see Appendix E). More details on the variables involved in the study 
are given in the Appendix Section as data source (see Appendix F).
Dependent Variables /Fiscal Performance Indicators
Measuring fiscal performance is considered to be a complex process by 
many urban scholars, especially when comparing jurisdictions. The obstacles 
generally are: (1) the nature of local government as a public entity where 
service is the focus rather than profit, (2) the impact of many factors on a
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municipal fiscal position along with its inter-correlated effect on fiscal condition 
with no accepted theory to explain the link between the economic base and 
government revenues, (3) the uniqueness of each local government in its 
demography and operations, and (4) the lack of complete accounting data with 
normative standards (Groves and Valente, 1994).
Because of these characteristics, inter-jurisdictional comparisons have 
not gained authoritative acceptance in urban research. Similarly, Clark (1994) 
also observed the lack of commonly accepted practice and tools in measuring 
municipal fiscal performance. In view of this, this study incorporates municipal 
fiscal measures most commonly identified by other published studies, namely 
the composite fiscal stress index, revenue capacity per capita, per capita 
general expenditures, and the municipal productivity levels (by incorporating 
FTE employee ratio) to measure cities’ fiscal performance.
(i) Composite Fiscal Stress Index
In operationalizing the municipal fiscal stress indicator as composite 
fiscal stress index, this study mainly adopted the methodology devised by 
Virginia’s Commission on Local Government, that in turn can be traced back to 
Virginia’s Joint Legislative and Audit Commission, and ultimately back to the 
U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. This methodology 
of measuring the fiscal strain indicator was modeled after the representative 
tax system (Williams, et al., 2002).
The process of index construction begins with jurisdictional measures 
denoting (1) the level of revenue capacity per capita over a designated fiscal
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period, (2) the degree of revenue effort throughout the same time span, and 
(3) the magnitude of median household income among all residents as 
described in the following equation.
Composite fiscal stress index score = Relative revenue capacity per capita score +
Relative revenue effort score +
Relative median household income score 
From each of the raw-score variables, a corresponding z-score 
distribution was derived (that characterized by a mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 1, with the latter statistical series being computed to ensure 
measurement equivalence across the several index dimensions). Technical 
Appendix (Appendix -  C) presents the formulae for deriving composite fiscal 
stress index.
Next, two sets of derivative values (i.e., the jurisdictional z-scores linked 
to revenue capacity per capita and median household income) were multiplied 
by -1 in order to create distributions manifesting directional consistency with 
the local z-score series calculated from the baseline measure of revenue 
effort. Following this adjustment, every z-score distribution (i.e., relative stress 
variable) was transformed into a congruent measure with a mean of 55 and a 
standard deviation of 5 for the purpose of eliminating negative numbers from 
the array of jurisdictional values. However, this conversion procedure did not 
alter the relative position and distance of any specified jurisdiction in regard to 
each of the other localities in a given city size group such as small, medium- 
size and large cities.
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As the final step, a fiscal stress total was generated with respect to any 
given locality through the addition of its converted z-scores (or relative stress 
values) on the capacity, effort, and adjusted gross income dimensions. The 
computed composite stress values, though not indicative of the fiscal strain 
endured by municipalities in absolute terms, nevertheless served to identify 
the standing of the various localities relative to one another during the 
specified time frame. An illustration of the step-by-step computational method 
appears in Appendix D that uses the city of Norfolk, Virginia, as an example.
(ii)Revenue Capacity Per Capita
Revenue capacity per capita gauges degree of jurisdictional affluence 
and revenue potential of the locality (from taxes, service charges, regulatory 
license and privilege fees) relative to changes in population size. As 
population increases, it might be expected that revenues and the need for 
services would increase proportionately, and therefore the level of per capita 
revenues would remain at least constant in real terms. This reasoning 
assumes that cost of services is directly related population size.
Provided that all the other factors are equal between different forms of 
local governments, cities that are efficiently functioning need to generate less 
revenue to provide the same services at citizens’ satisfaction level. Therefore, 
revenue capacity per capita standardizes the municipal revenue indicator and 
improves comparability across the cities that were computed by dividing total 
general fund revenues of a locality by its population (See Appendix C).
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(iii)Per Capita Measure of General Expenditures
The city’s general fund is the major source for routine municipal 
expenditures allocated for municipal services and the general purposes of 
government. Provided that all the other factors are equal between different 
forms of local governments in service provision, cities that are spending less 
than other cities can be considered efficient cities. Per capita measure of 
expenditures standardizes the expenditures indicator and improves 
comparability across the cities that were computed by dividing total general 
fund expenditures of a locality by its population (See Appendix C).
(iv)Full-time Equivalent Employee Rate (FTE)
Full-time equivalent employee rate is a better measure to estimate 
human resources involved in the provision of municipal services than per 
capita expenditure in salaries and wages paid to employees. Therefore, the 
full-time equivalent employee rate (FTE), a relative frequency, is used to 
standardize the employment data instead of per capita payroll expenditure 
measures or average earnings rates. This is because salaries and wages are 
vulnerable to factors including (1) the proportion of highly trained or skilled 
personnel in the field of technology, (2) the concentration of employees in 
metropolitan or urban areas where the cost of living is higher, and (3) the 
exclusion of housing, meals, or other compensation in kind that may be 
provided to employees. Because of the misleading elements of salary and 
wage measures, these were not utilized. Instead, the FTE employee rate (per 
10,000 population), a standardized measure that increases the comparability
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of municipal employment pattern across the cities, was introduced in the 
analysis (See Appendix C). In this analysis, the rate of FTE was per 10,000 
resident populations. This rate was calculated by dividing the frequency of 
raw full-time equivalent rate by the population of the jurisdiction (i.e., the total 
frequency count). The base number was then multiplied the resulting figure. 
Socioeconomic Control Variables
The socioeconomic factors that may theoretically affect the municipal 
fiscal performance are operationalized as research variables and discussed in 
the following section:
• Population: The population fluctuations of a locality have a direct 
impact on municipal government revenues since some taxes are 
collected on a per capita basis. Also, intergovernmental revenues are 
distributed according to formulae based on the population figures of a 
locality. As a basic economic principle, increased population demands 
more service from the government. However, a decline in population 
rarely results in proportional reduction and cutback in fixed municipal 
services.
• Population density: The population density measure is represented as 
persons per square mile. Generally, cities spend substantially more on 
public safety and public works than on other functions. This is due to 
the service needs of densely populated areas. Such expenditure needs 
for urban services include additional law-enforcement, more extensive 
road and transportation networks and their maintenance, and sewer
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and water services for cities. Density increases service efficiency. At 
the same time, it is a diseconomy of scale due to an increased demand 
for services and external diseconomies.
• Percent population net change: Population growth results in increased 
service demand. Rapid growth, as well as rapid decline, will result in 
fiscal budgetary imbalances due to the time needed to adjust for a 
sudden increase or decrease in service demands.
• Median age of population: The life-cycle hypothesis suggests that as 
the proportion of senior citizens increases, the government service 
expenditure may increase because the elderly population might need 
specialized programs in the health and welfare sector. However, senior 
citizens, spending power and income are limited and this, in turn, 
contributes towards a decline in municipal revenues.
• Per capita income and median household income: Per capita income 
and/or median household income measure is a proxy measure for a 
municipality’s wealth. It is also a commonly used critical measure in 
studying municipal financial climate. A higher per capita or a household 
income of a locality accounts for the spending power of its citizens that 
stimulates the local economy. It also indicates a community’s ability to 
pay sales, property, business, and income taxes to generate municipal 
revenues. Per capita income accounts for variations in services and 
related expenditures. A population with a high per capita income 
demands less services from the municipality since they can afford such
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services and are also less dependent on government welfare services. 
Therefore, per capita income and median household income account 
for variations in services and related expenditures and provides a good 
proxy measure to represent a community’s wealth.
• Poverty rate: The poverty rate of a locality stands for the number of 
public assistance recipients who depend on the municipal government 
for their welfare service needs. An increase in the poverty rate is a 
warning sign for a local government about a greater need for municipal 
services for people living below the poverty level.
• Unemployment rate: Like the poverty rate, the unemployment rate also 
indicates an increased level of government-service-dependent 
population. Unemployment in a locality causes a rippling effect on a 
local economy, leading to the outward migration of a population with 
earning potential and to a decline in municipal revenues along with an 
increase in the number of service-dependent poor residents.
• Crime rate: An increase in the crime rate, besides making the locality a 
less preferable place to live, creates more public safety service 
demands.
• Median value of single-famiiy homes/Property value: The median value 
of single-family homes impacts municipal property tax revenue.
Property taxes constitute a major portion of most local governments' 
general fund revenues. Therefore, any change in property value 
directly impacts the property tax. A negative effect results in a decline
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in general fund revenues that, in turn, force the municipality to take 
actions to cut the spending on services.
• Percentage of owner-occupied home: The percentage of homeowners 
represents the population that contributes to property tax revenues. 
Residents who favor lower property tax negatively impact tax revenue.
• Presence in metropolitan statistical area (MSA): Generally, 
metropolitan areas have experienced similar economic conditions.
State laws and federal grants-in-aid formulae regarding welfare and 
social services are identical for all units of a given type of jurisdiction. 
Generally, MSA localities face a competition between neighboring cities 
to attract and retain business and are forced to provide tax benefit 
packages.
• Geographic region: Interregional migration patterns, natural disasters 
encountered in a geographic region, changes in the nature of 
employment base, employment sectors such as manufacturing, 
agricultural and service sectors, climates and many other unspecified 
regional variations impact a region and many of the regional variations 
may be unique to a region. The impact of a regional characteristic on 
municipal fiscal performances may be either direct or indirect.
® City Size: The large cities managed by city managers found to be more 
efficient than those large cities that are managed by mayors.
Generally, as the city size gets larger, it increases the complexity of 
routine operations.
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Municipal Fiscal Factors
Municipal fiscal factors that influence the municipal fiscal performance are 
discussed in detail in the following section:
• Relative fiscal capacity: The fiscal capacity measures the localities’ 
financial ability to provide services. It is a ratio of the total city revenues 
to the total city expenditures regardless of the revenue source and the 
nature of expenditure. The ratio is calculated by dividing a city’s 
revenue-raising capability by its relative expenditure when compared 
with groups of similar-sized cities.
• Relative revenue effort/Tax effort: The revenue effort measure 
describes the degree to which municipalities actually utilize the revenue 
generating potential of its locality by utilizing local taxes, service 
charges, license fees, etc. The revenue effort denotes the extent to 
which a particular municipality converts its revenue-generating potential 
into actual collections through the imposition of revenue sources.
• Percent total current liabilities: Percent outstanding debt or current 
liabilities are defined as the sum of all liabilities due at the end of the 
fiscal year relative to a municipality’s population size. The current 
liabilities comprise the short-term debts; the current portion of long-term 
debt, all accounts payable, accrued liabilities, and other current 
liabilities. Increasing current liabilities at the end of the year as a 
percentage of net-operating revenue demonstrates the poor financial 
condition of a city.
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Research Models
Ordinary Least Square regression models are constructed to isolate the 
impact of different municipal structures over municipal fiscal performance 
dependent variables. This study controlled for the differences in localities by 
using appropriate intervening or mediating variables. Table 4 describes the 
research model in detail. The municipal fiscal performance dependent 
variables employed in this study are composite fiscal stress index, revenue 
capacity per capita, per capita general fund expenditures and the FTE 
employee rate. This study controlled for socioeconomic variables, such as per 
capita income, median value of single family homes, percentage of owner- 
occupied home, percent poverty (percent people living below the poverty 
level), crime rate (per 100,000 population), unemployment rate (per 100,000 
population), median age of residents, population, percentage of net change in 
population (population growth was measured as the percent change in 
population between 1990 to 1996), and density (people per square mile) for 
their expected impact on municipal fiscal conditions.
The presence of the city in a metropolitan area (located in MSA or non- 
MSA) was treated as a dummy variable in the model. The unspecified 
regional factors that could affect fiscal performance were considered by using 
a series of dummy variables to account for five regions (Northeast, South, 
Midwest, Mountain and Pacific) that assume a value o f ‘T for the variable 
under study and ‘O' for all other cases. Similarly, the unspecified factors
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associated with the size of a city that could affect fiscal performance were 
considered by using a series of dummy variables to account for three sizes 
(small, medium-size and big cities) that assume a value o f ‘T for the variable 
under study and ‘0’ for all other cases.
Table 4: Regression Analysis by Municipal Administrative Structure
Basic hypothesis:
General management (GM) cities will have a better fiscal performance than either 
traditional strong mayor and council-manager cities.
Hypothesis
Dependent variables: Municipal fiscal performance indicators
H i :  Municipal Fiscal Stress 
H2: Revenue Capacity
H3: Municipal Expenditures 
H4: FTE Employee Rate
Independent
variable
Management structure Management structure
Control
variables
•  Per capita income
•  Median value of single family 
homes
Percent owner-occupied home
•  Percent poverty
•  Crime rate
•  Unemployment rate
•  Median age of residents
•  Population
•  Percent population net change
•  Density
•  Presence in MSA
•  Geographic region
•  City size
•  Percent total outstanding debt
•  Per capita income
•  Median value of single family 
homes
•  Percent owner occupied home
•  Percent poverty
•  Crime rate
•  Unemployment rate 
Median age of residents
•  Population
.  Percent population net change
•  Density
• Presence in MSA
• Geographic region
•  City size
•  Relative fiscal capacity
•  Relative revenue effort
To examine the comparative fiscal performances of different municipal administrative 
structures of cities:
Independent variable values: TvDe of citv government: Strong mayor, council-manager, and 
general management
Dependent variables: Municipal fiscal performance in fiscal stress, revenue capacity, general 
fund expenditures and FTE employee rate
General Municipal Fiscal Performance Eguation: Fiscal performance measure «  Form of 
government + Control variable
Along with the socioeconomic control variables, variables that influence 
a locality’s fiscal performance, such as the relative fiscal capacity, the relative
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revenue effort, and the percent outstanding liability, were added to the 
regression equation. Incorporating these measures of financial conditions of a 
locality in analyses as controls helped in understanding whether the low 
spending was the result of frugal spending or due to poor financial conditions.
Whenever applicable, the relative fiscal performance measures were 
used in place of simple fiscal measures. The relative fiscal measure of a given 
city is its position relative to other cities’ average fiscal measure in a given city 
size group such as small, medium-size or large cities.
Regression Analysis bv Municipal Administrative Structure
As hypothesized, a mutual interdependence and reciprocal influence of 
administrative relationships between elected and appointed officials of local 
governments of a general management city (GMC) was expected to result 
better financial condition than other common forms of municipal governments. 
The underlying assumption is that the combination of the best features of 
appointed and elected officials should result in measurable fiscal performance 
than other more traditional forms of government.
Theoretically, an increase in per capita income of the residents of the 
city that denotes their financial affluence tends to decrease the municipal fiscal 
stress since affluent citizens contribute more to municipal revenue and 
demand less social services from the government. Similarly, median home 
values also represent financial well-being of the residents. That the citizens 
can afford homes with higher values means increased revenue in the form of 
property taxes. Percentage of owner-occupied homes is expected to have a
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negative association with municipal revenue and spending. Citizens who do 
not favor taxes in the form of property taxes constrain municipal spending and 
expect efficient operation by the city government.
Increased crime rates negatively impact municipal financial conditions 
by costing more in policing services. Percent poverty rates and 
unemployment rates of a locality negatively impact municipal financial 
conditions since needy citizens expect more social services and contribute 
less towards municipal revenue. Similarly, as the median age of residents 
increases, the older citizens not in the workforce and with less spending power 
demand more services. Population is expected to impact both positively and 
negatively since increased population is associated with more revenue as well 
as the demand for more service provision.
A sudden fluctuation in population growth (either in positive or in 
negative direction) is expected to impact municipal financial condition 
negatively. A sudden increase in population demands more service and 
exerts financial stress on the local government. Conversely, a rapid decrease 
in population leaves a municipal government to struggle to maintain existing 
services. Population density negatively impacts municipal financial conditions 
by increasing the demand for services. Presence in a metropolitan location, 
particular region, and city size, also impacts the municipal financial condition 
that is a unique characteristic of the location and size respectively. A 
municipality’s poor financial situation, such as an increased level of 
outstanding debt, increased revenue effort, and lower fiscal capacity,
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negatively impacts the municipal fiscal performance since poor financial 
conditions restrict the ability of a municipality to raise the revenue needed to 
maintain existing services.
Statistical Procedure
An Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model was used to isolate 
the impact of the municipal management structure on dependent variables 
while controlling the exogenous effects of identified socioeconomic and fiscal 
condition variables. This procedure helped to answer one of the common 
types of research questions concerning the examination of relationships 
(Tabachnik and Fidell, 1989) between variables.
The multiple regression model, used for this research, was modeled 
after Stumm and Corrigan’s (1998) study. These researchers reasoned that, 
since the municipal governments were non-utility enterprises, this regression 
model was appropriate to study the municipal spending and revenue changes. 
Beyond understanding the interaction effect of multiple independent variables 
on municipal fiscal performance variables, beyond asserting that independent 
variables and dependent variables are related to each other and beyond 
understanding the strength and nature of the relationship between them, 
predicting the value of dependent variable from a set of independent variables 
is important to shed more light on the research questions. Therefore, by 
estimating a regression model, the interactive effects of various factors can be 
accounted for while controlling for other related influences.
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The multiple regression procedure requires the assumptions that all the 
observations are independent, that the distribution of values of the variables in 
the population is normal, that the distributions have the same variance and, 
most importantly, the assumption of a linear relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. The linear model assumes that a 
straight line can appropriately describe the relationship between the variables 
and the appropriate linear model can be utilized to calculate the regression 
equation. From using the computed regression equation model, the unknown 
dependent variable value can be predicted by plugging in the known 
independent variable values (Norusis 1997 and O’Sullivan 1995).
Since the variables included in the model were measured in different 
metrics (per capita, percentage, ratio and raw scores), the beta coefficients 
results of the regression model were used to interpret the significance and 
direction of the relationship. List-wise exclusion of the cases technique was 
used to treat the missing values. This helped in computing the model’s 
correlation coefficient while using only the cases that have valid data for all 
variables. This approach ensured that the coefficients in the matrix were all 
based on the same cases.
The resulting beta coefficients from the regression model measured the 
change in the standard deviation of the fiscal performance measures. This 
fiscal performance measure score was associated with unit change in the 
standard deviation of the independent variables. Bohrnstedt and Knoke 
(1988) and McClendon (1994) state that beta coefficients are useful measures
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when the variables are measured according to different metrics like per capita, 
raw values, ratios, percentages, etc. The empirical relationship of dependent 
and independent variables was analyzed and the impact of independent 
variables on fiscal performance measures was studied after controlling for 
independent influences such as density, population, metropolitan status, and 
the city’s regional location in the country.
A number of comparisons were made among all three different forms of 
governments. The objective of the comparisons was to ascertain whether the 
cities with a general management structure differed from those with other 
traditional forms in any significant way. Descriptive statistical techniques were 
used to analyze the distributions of other common demographic characteristics 
of cities within and among the groups.
Similarly, a comparative analysis was conducted to understand the 
similarities and differences between the fiscal performance measures and 
socioeconomic characteristics of the following three groups of general 
management cities: (1) general management cities that consistently 
maintained the same form of administrative structures from 1993 to 1998, (2) 
other municipal administrative cities that adopted general management city 
administrative structure during the 1993-98 period, and (3) the general 
management cities that dropped the general management structure and 
adopted some other form of municipal administrative structure during the 1993 
-98 period.
The impact of the decision to maintain the GMC status, drop the GMC
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status, and adopt the GMC status was investigated by incorporating three 
different dummy variables: maintained GMC status cities, dropped GMC status 
cities and adopted GMC status cities, that assume a value of one for the given 
GMC status variable under study and zero for all other cases.
Statistical Package
The SPSS, or Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, was used to 
analyze the data. The SPSS/PC (a program version for personal computers), 
especially SPSS for Windows -  Release 8.0.2 (The Standard Version 
released on September 23, 1998) was used for the data analysis.
Data Sources
Main data sources for this research were compiled from the Census of 
Government’s aggregated 1997-fiscal data on political jurisdictions and the 
ICMA’s 1998 Municipal Year Book data on municipal structures. Many 
different data tables and/or databases from these two major sources were 
combined to form the research database (see Table 5).
Census Bureau Data
The Census of Government’s 1997 aggregated fiscal data by political 
jurisdiction were used to generate the fiscal performance measures that were 
the dependent variables in this study. The ‘County and City Data Book: 2000’ 
and Census 2000’s summary file- 3 were the source for socioeconomic/control 
variables.
A more detailed listing of data sources is attached in the Appendix (see
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Appendix Tables 8, 9 and 10). The following paragraphs explain the data 
sources in detail. At the time of the analysis, the latest available data on 
dependent variables were for 1997 (i.e., for 1996-97 fiscal year) and the latest 
available data on socioeconomic/control variables were for 1998 and from the 
Census 2000 decennial data. The compiled database became the foundation 
of this study.
Table 5: Data Sources
Major Sources Subsidiary Sources Data Tables
1. U. S. Census A. 1997 Census of Governments
B. 1997 Census of Governments
C. County and City Data Book: 1994
D. County and City Data Book: 2000
E. Census 2000
Volume 3's Table 2 
Volume 4's Table 18 
Table C
Tables C-2, C-4 and C-7 
Summary File 3 -
Tables QT-P34, P-53, P-82 and H-85
2. ICMA A. 1993-Municipal Year Book
B. 1998-Municipal Year Book
C. 1997-1998 Who's W ho-





Census data were the sources for (1) municipal fiscal performance 
dependent variables and (2) socioeconomic/control variables.
Dependent Variables: A Census of Government has been taken every five 
years since 1957 as required by law under Title 13, United States Code, 
Section 161. This covers the following four major subject fields of the 
government: government organization, public employment, taxable property 
values and government finances. The Census of Government for fiscal year
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1997 was this study’s source for the data related to government finances and 
public employment. The census provides data for all individual municipalities 
with a population of 25,000 or more. There are 1,166 municipal governments 
in the U.S. that have populations of 25,000 or more according to the 1997 
Census of Government data.
The section on the fiscal year of 1996-97 financial statistics covers data 
on revenue, expenditure, debt, and financial assets of municipalities.
Similarly, the section on the employment of major local governments 
comprises statistics on employment and payroll information for all 
municipalities that have populations of 25,000 or more. The Census Bureau 
data were used to analyze the fiscal performance measures (financial and full­
time employee rate) that are the dependent variables in this study.
Control Variables: The Census Bureau data were the source for control 
variables such as population in 1990 and 1996, population growth, area, 
density, metropolitan status and regional location in the country. The Census 
2000 decennial data summary file- 3 and County and City Data Book 2000 
were the major sources for control/socioeconomic variables.
Both the Census of Government data and Census 2000 are available 
and accessible in an electronic format via the Internet at the Census Bureau 
Website (www.census.gov) as the following publications:
• Finances of Municipal and Township Governments, 1997 Census of 
Governments, Volume 4, Government Finances (GC97 (4)-4) that was 
issued in September 2000, covers the financial data in a variety of
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categories under two major subdivisions of revenue and expenditure 
(U.S. DOC. 2000b).
• Employment of Major Local Governments, 1997 Census of 
Governments, Volume 3, Public Employment (GC97 (3)-1), issued in 
February 2000, covers the employment data (U.S. DOC. 2000a).
• County and City Data Book 2000, A Statistical Abstract Supplement, 
13th Edition, issued in November 2001, covers the financial and 
socioeconomic data in a variety of categories (U.S. DOC. 2001).
International City/County Management Association’s Data
The independent variables used in this study, information as to the form 
of government, presence of a professional manager and the general 
management recognition status data, were compiled from two different 
International City/County Management Association’s (ICMA) directories.
Since the study targeted the cities that consistently maintained the chosen 
form of municipal administrative structures prior to the point of study in 1997, 
data on the form of municipal government were obtained from both the 1993 
and 1998 Municipal Year Book Directories. The ICMA’s 1993 and 1998 
Municipal Yearbooks provided the form of municipal government information 
and the presence of professional manager in a municipal government 
(International City/County Management Association 1993 and 1998).
Information on the general management cities’ official recognition status 
was obtained from the ICMA’s 1997-1998 Who’s Who in Local Government 
Management Directory (International City/County Management Association,
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1997). This directory provided city government data from the 1996 ICMA 
survey.
Data were extracted from the ICMA’s 1998 Municipal Year Book that 
denoted the cities’ forms of government and the presence of a professional 
manager. The strong mayor cities that had appointed professional managers 
were coded as general management cities by following the ICMA’s city 
municipal form recognition criteria (see Appendix B). The obtained data of 
independent variables were then merged with the census data by using the 
localities’ unique identifiers (location name and state). The resultant database 
became the foundation of this study.
Description of Data
Because of fiscal data availability, other works of research on the policy 
effects of local government reform rely on data source and variables similar to 
the ones utilized in this study. Therefore, the resultant sample was judged to 
be the best available for statistical analysis, given the realities of municipal 
survey research. The compiled database of the Census and the ICMA 
consists of descriptive, control, independent, and dependent variables for the 
U.S. cities with populations of 25,000 or more. To enable a fair comparison 
across the cities with variations in demographics, appropriate standardized 
measures were introduced in the analyses.
From the original compiled data, certain standardized measures like per 
capita financial measures, relative fiscal measures, percent population growth, 
and full-time equivalent employee rate were derived. These standardized
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measurers were then determined and then appropriately calculated by
applying the respective standard formulae. These measures and the formulae 
for calculating the measures are recorded in the appendix (see Appendix C- 
Technical Appendix).
Assumptions
It was assumed that the city government decision-makers’ objective is 
to achieve better fiscal performance regardless of the structure of the 
government. Implicit in this analysis is also the assumptions that (1) the 
application of professional management skills and authoritative power to make 
and implement fiscal policy decisions could make a difference in the fiscal 
performance outcome; and (2) all local governments had access to the same 
technology and skilled personnel and similar production functions. These 
accesses to different choices included the exercise of the option of contracting 
private firms for any services deemed to be appropriate. This meant that cities 
could select the best available cost-efficient service delivery choice to provide 
services to the citizens’ satisfaction. Another main assumption of the study is 
that all the cities provided the minimum, basic required services at the citizens' 
satisfaction level.
Limitations of the Study
This study includes only cities with populations of 25,000 or above in its 
analysis. This restricts the generalizability of analytical outcomes and makes 
these inapplicable to cities with populations of less than 25,000. According to
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the January 1997 data of the Census Bureau, there were 19,372 municipal 
governments in the U.S.(U.S. DOC.2000c and 2000d). Out of those municipal 
governments, cities with populations of 25,000 and above account for only 
1,166. Therefore, the findings of this study do not apply to more than 6% of 
the cities under analysis. However, this generalizability issue can be 
overlooked on the grounds that city managers are most commonly not found in 
small cities that have populations lower than 25,000 (Scally, 1992).
Another limitation of this study is that the chosen better performance 
measure of a municipality is restricted only to fiscal measure. Even though 
fiscal performance measure is critical, it does not reflect the quality of life in a 
given city. Fiscal performance measure does not account for all the other 
positive or negative aspects of a municipality that make a city either a 
preferable place or unfavorable place to live.
The non-sampling errors possible in this study include non-response 
and response errors and processing errors. The non-response rate for the 
major local governments for government-public employment data was 17.4 
percent and 15 percent for financial data (U.S. DOC. 20Q0e). To overcome 
this, imputations were done for these missing data by Census. Although the 
Census of Governments is designed to achieve a high standard of 
completeness and accuracy, human and mechanical errors occur in any mass 
statistical operation. Besides, the Census data are still vulnerable to 
omissions, errors in reporting, electronic documentation, and other possible
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data-processing errors due to human and mechanical errors, like any other 
secondary data.
Similarly, the ICMA’s municipal government structure data were self- 
reported data collected by the ICMA in 1997 through a mail survey. This 
approach to data collection makes the ICMA data prone to non-sampling 
errors that may include non-response and response errors and processing 
errors.
This one-shot study, on performance for fiscal year 1997, does not 
account for the impact of fiscal decisions made by the municipality in previous 
years that might have gone through unique situations. For example, cities like 
Orlando, FL, might spend beyond their means due to circumstances like 
anticipated future growth. On the contrary, some cities like Detroit, Ml and 
Pittsburgh, PA, might have been forced to be fiscally wise and responsible by 
past economic hard times (Massad, 1995). These variations in history are not 
accounted for in this study and thus there is an absence of control for the 
threat of history (Campbell and Stanley, 1963; Morgan and Pelissero, 1980).
Conclusion
It is apparent from literature on the subject that there has always been 
concern about the impact of professionalism and form of government on 
municipal fiscal performance. The theoretical basis of the present research is 
that, going by the underlying concepts of the politics-administration 
complementarity model, the general management cities’ fiscal performance
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should be superior to that of reformed council-manager or traditional mayor- 
council cities. This Research Methods chapter covered the Research 
Hypotheses, Research Design, Research Variables, Research Models, and 
Data Sources of this study.
Since this study was intended to test empirically the politics- 
administration complementarity model and to test the superiority of general 
management cities’ fiscal performance, it compared the distributions of each 
fiscal measure for cities with strong mayor, council-manager, and general 
management municipal governments. The municipal fiscal performance 
measures for each government structure were estimated and compared with 
those for other forms in order to find out if the fiscal performance level varied 
with the government structure. In order to determine how different forms of 
municipal government performed, the correlation coefficients for fiscal 
performance levels and city characteristics were calculated. The following 
data analysis and results section explains this process in detail.
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CHAPTER V
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Introduction
General management administrative structures started to appear on the 
American landscape in the 1960s. However, much still remains to be learned 
about the effects of the general management structure on municipal fiscal 
performance in the earlier part of the 21st century. Therefore, this dissertation 
examines the effect of different management structures on the fiscal 
performance measures of all U.S. cities in 1997 with populations of 25,000 or 
more (based on the 1996 estimated population). In the course of this study, 
relationships among socioeconomic characteristics, municipal financial 
condition indicators and municipal fiscal performance were examined. Cities 
were categorized as strong mayor cities, council-manager cities, and general 
management cities to uncover differences in municipal fiscal performance in 
terms of the composite fiscal stress index, revenue capacity per capita, per 
capita general fund expenditures and the FTE employee ratio.
This data analysis section provides the summary statistics and figures 
on most analyses. The results of more detailed data analyses and statistical 
information are attached as an appendix to this dissertation (see Appendix -A 
and Tables 11 through 65 in Appendix-I).
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Descriptive Statistics
To ensure a rigorous test, cities that consistently maintained the same 
form of administrative structure for five years prior to 1998 (1993-1998), were 
included in the analyses. As mentioned before, of the 1,166 cities, 968 
maintained the same administrative structure consistently from 1993 through 
1998, and were included in the data analyses carried out to answer the 
proposed research questions. This approach of filtering out the cities that 
changed their municipal administrative structures reduced ambiguity in 
interpreting the impact of different municipal administrative structures on 
municipal fiscal performance. This approach controlled for the municipal 
administrative change interventions in the analyses and improved the cross- 
sectional research design.
Of the resultant 968 cities that were selected for the data analyses,
18% (N=179) were strong mayor cities (SMC), 75% (N=719) were council 
manager cities (CMC) and the remaining 7% (N=70) were the general 
management cities (GMC). The observation showed that the council-manager 
form of municipal administrative structures was the most common one in the 
U.S. cities; also these cities were the ones that intended to change the least to 
a different form of administrative structure. Overall about 82% (N= 789) cities 
with populations of 25,000 or more were maintained by professional 
administrators (combined council-manager and general management cities).
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A Comparison of Socioeconomic Characteristics of Different Municipal 
Administrative Structures:
Comparative descriptive statistics on the socioeconomic characteristics 
of different municipal administrative structures are presented in Table 6. More 
detailed information is presented in the data analysis and the results sections 
of the appendix (see Appendix Tables 20, 21, 22, and 23).
Table 6: Comparison of Socioeconomic Chari 
Municipal Administrative Structures (Fopulat
acteristics of the Cities with Different 











































































As a general observation, most of the socioeconomic variables did not 
show much variation between different municipal administrative structures 
except for population and crime rate. The population of strong mayor cities 
showed great fluctuations along with the standard deviation. The possible 
reason for this finding could be the fact that most of the strong mayor cities
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were distributed among either small or big cities. As observed in 
crosstabulation findings, strong mayor municipal administrative structures 
were more common in big cities; especially the Northeast region of the country 
had more big cities with strong mayor form of municipal administrative 
structures. Strong mayor municipal administrative structures were also 
favored by most small cities, especially the small cities located in the Mountain 
region of the country preferred strong mayor form of municipal administrative 
structures to any other form of municipal administrative structures (see 
Appendix A).
Similarly, as an exploratory approach, the socioeconomic 
characteristics of general management cities that consistently maintained the 
same form of municipal administrative structures for five years prior to the 
point of study (N=70) were compared with general management cities that 
dropped the general management status and adopted some other form of 
government (N= 67) and other form of cities that adopted general 
management municipal administrative structures (N=73). Comparative 
descriptive statistics on the socioeconomic characteristics of ‘adopted GMC 
status’ cities, ‘dropped GMC status’ cities and ‘maintained GMC status’ cities 
are presented in Table 7.
Again, the socioeconomic characteristic of groups of cities with different 
GMC status did not show many variations among them. No particular pattern 
emerged except for the population growth that showed a large standard
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deviation from the mean in cities that recently adopted the GMC administrative 
structure when compared with other groups of GMC status cities.
Table 7: Comparison of Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Cities with Different 
GMC Status (Population 25,000 or more)
Adopted GMC Dropped GMC Maintained GMC
(N=73) (N=67) (N==70)
Socioeconomic Factors Mean Std. Devi. Mean Std. Devi. Mean Std. Devi.
Population 121103.65 137319.14 117180.33 336294.88 177928.13 292401.11
Population Density 4572.85 3827.57 4736.07 6789.41 4851.53 7267.32
Population Growth 8.79 40.24 6.76 12.52 7.62 18.86
Median Age of Residents 34.22 3.53 34.48 3.34 33.41 3.45
Per Capita Income 20385.51 5574.22 21090.09 6493.84 20988.57 6255.44
Median Household Income 38795.95 11151.54 43084.30 13984.29 42030.99 13343.28
Unemployment Rate 4.26 1.80 4.00 1.87 4.24 1.82
Crime Rate 6312.08 2879.35 5971.41 3519.01 7126.29 3136.87
Percent Owner-Occupied
Home 55.54 12.21 60.02 12.72 56.39 13.28
This observation could be interpreted to suggest that the strong mayor 
cities that experienced sudden great fluctuation in population growth, either 
positively or negatively, hired a professional manager to handle the expected 
outcome of sudden fluctuations in population. That is, these newly hired 
professional managers could have been hired to manage the change rather 
than to manage the day-to-day routine municipal business.
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Hypothesis Testing of Fiscal Performance
The Impact of Forms of Administrative Structures on Municipal Fiscal 
Performance:
The research questions were linked to empirical relationships with the 
localities' socioeconomic factors and municipal fiscal indicators in this 
inferential statistics section. To what extent is the general management 
administrative structure associated with municipal fiscal indicators? Two 
methods were used to address this question and to examine the differences 
among cities with different administrative structures -  a comparison of means 
and an OLS regression analysis. After the cities were stratified by municipal 
administrative structure and by population size, the differences among various 
fiscal performance measures were calculated. The findings suggested by the 
mean differences analyses were further subjected to closer scrutiny in the 
regression analyses.
As an exploratory approach, first, the means of municipal fiscal 
performance indicators under study were compared among the different form 
of municipal administrative structures. The composite fiscal stress index 
figures did not vary much across the different form of municipal structures. 
Though they remained almost the same around 165, the strong mayor cities 
(SMC) showed the lowest stress index level (164), the council-manager cities 
(CMC) index level was 165 and the general management cities (GMC) had the 
highest fiscal stress index level (166) (see Table 8).
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However, while comparing the means of revenue capacity per capita, 
per capita general expenditures and the FTE employee rate indicators across 
the different forms of city government, the resulting pattern showed that 
council-manager cities (CMC) spent less ($955) in per capita general fund 
expenditures and employed fewer employees (105) than other forms of city 
governments. General management cities (GMC), which spent $1,144 per 
capita general fund expenditures and employed 128 employees were followed 
the council-manager cities (CMC). The strong mayor cities (SMC), which 
spent $1,283 per capita general fund expenditures and employed 162 
employees, were the highest spenders among the different forms of city 
governments (see Table 8 and Figures 6 and 7).
Further analysis of the means of the other municipal financial figures 
like revenue capacity per capita and per capita revenues from taxes across 
the different form of municipal administrative structures showed that the strong 
mayor cities taxed more and spent more than the other forms of city 
governments (see Table 8).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
95
Figure 6: Comparison of Revenue Capacity Per Capita and Per Capita General 
Expenditures Among Different Municipal Administrative Structures
h SMC 
□  CMC 
a  GMC
Revenue Capacity Per Capita Per Capita General Expenditures
Figure 7: Comparison of Composite Fiscal Stress Index and FTE Employee Rate Among 
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The strong mayor cities (SMC) extracted more in per capita general 
fund revenues ($1,317) and in per capita tax revenues ($564). Also, the 
strong mayor cities (SMC) spent more on per capita general fund expenditures 
($1,283) and hired more employees (FTE 162) than the other forms of city 
governments as mentioned before.
Similarly, a further analysis of the means of revenue capacity per capita 
and per capita revenues from taxes across the different forms of municipal 
administrative structures showed that the council-manager cities (CMC) taxed 
less and spent less than the other forms of city governments. The council- 
manager cities (CMC) extracted comparatively less in per capita general fund 
revenues ($971) and in per capita tax revenues ($427). Also, the council-
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manager cities (CMC) spent comparatively less on per capita general fund 
expenditures ($955) and hired fewer employees (FTE 105) than other forms of 
city governments.
The general management cities (GMC) municipal fiscal figures fell in 
between the strong mayor cities (SMC) and the council-manager cities (CMC) 
fiscal figures. The general management cities’ mean revenue capacity per 
capita was $1,162 and their mean per capita tax revenue was $494. The per 
capita general fund expenditure of the general management cities (GMC) was 
$1,144 and the mean FTE rate was 128.
Generally, all the fiscal performance indicators portrayed the same 
pattern, with council-manager cities (CMC) revealing better fiscal performance 
indicators, general management cities (GMC) following the council-manager 
cities (CMC) in fiscal performance and strong mayor cities (SMC) showing the 
poor fiscal performance among the group. However, this pattern was not 
present when the composite fiscal stress index indicators of the different 
municipal administrative structure groups were compared. Strong mayor cities 
(SMC) showed a lower fiscal stress index (see Figure 7). This deviation 
warranted further exploration on the revenue-generating and spending pattern 
of cities with different administrative structures.
In order to understand the observed revenue-generating and spending 
fiscal behavior of the cities, the revenue-generating capabilities and spending 
behavior patterns of different municipal administrative structures were further 
explored in detail (see Table 9 and Figure 8).
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The per capita municipal revenues of eight local government revenue 
categories were compared among different municipal administrative 
structures. The per capita measures of (1) total municipal revenues, (2) 
general revenues, (3) total intergovernmental revenues (IGR), (4) IGR from 
federal government, (5) IGR from state government, (6) revenues from local 
governments’ own sources, (7) revenue from all taxes, and (8) revenues from 
local property taxes consistently showed a similar pattern of higher revenue 
extracting nature of strong mayor cities. This confirmed the previously 
observed pattern of strong mayor cities' higher revenue-extracting nature 
among different municipal administrative structures. Similarly, as observed 
before, the council-manager governments extracted lower revenues that were 
followed by the general management cities (see Table 9).








Revenue Variables Mean Std. Devi. Mean Std. Devi. Mean Std. Devi.
Per Capita Total 
Revenue $1,586.55 $1,265.85 $1,230.04 $744.65 $1,441.63 $942.85
Per Capita General 
Revenue $1,316.92 $1,047.74 $970.93 $536.09 $1,161.76 $703.59
Per Capita Total IGR
$391.16 $493.90 $173.54 $210.01 $286.51 $310.15
Per Capita IGR from 
Federal government $65.23 $254.90 $29.51 $48.60 $49.39 $54.69
Per Capita IGR from 
State Government $325.93 $414.66 $144.03 $189.75 $237.13 $281.09
Per Capita General 
Revenue from Own 
Source $892.16 $688.15 $770.14 $410.77 $847.86 $476.15
Per Capita Local 
Revenue from Taxes $563.64 $540.71 $427.35 $250.04 $494.32 $268.42
Per Capita Revenue 
from Property Tax $378.16 $397.96 $218.35 $222.03 $278.77 $227.74
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To understand the spending behavior of different administrative 
structures, the relative fiscal capacity measure of cities were compared. The 
relative fiscal capacity is a relative fiscal measure that indicates the ratio of 
total municipal revenues to total municipal expenditures (regardless of the 
sources of revenue and regardless spending functions) of a given city size. 
The measure of 1 and above indicates better fiscal performance relative to 
other cities in its cohort. However, the strong mayor cities measure of less 
than one (0.99) when compared with other municipal administrative structures 
confirmed the bigger spending nature of the strong mayor cities (see Figure 8).
Fiscal changes are highly incremental. It is unlikely that a structural 
change intervention produces much immediate difference in municipal fiscal 
behavior, if any. However, exploratory comparisons of the mean of different 
GMC status cities (cities that maintained, adopted and dropped GMC status) 
were conducted to identify any possible changes in the dependent fiscal 
performance variables (see Table 10).
Table 10: Comparison of Fiscal Indicators Among Different GMC Status Municipal 
Administrative Structures
Fiscal Performance Indicators
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As expected, there were not many differences among different GMC 
status city groups. However, the comparative analysis of mean fiscal
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performance measures showed a general pattern in which the GMC cities that 
dropped their general management status showed better fiscal performance 
measures (lower stress index, revenue capacity per capita, per capita general 
expenditures and lower FTE employee rate) when compared with cities that 
maintained the GMC status or cities that recently adopted the GMC status. It 
can be inferred that some GMC cities discontinued the professional 
management help after reaching some satisfactory fiscal performance level.
Figure 9: Comparison of Revenue Capacity Per Capita and Per Capita General 










Revenue Capacity Per Capita Per Capita General Expenditures
■  Adopted GMC 
□  Dropped GMC 
a  Maintained GMC
The cities that adopted the general management administrative 
structures showed the highest scores on fiscal performance indicators (that 
indicated poor fiscal performance) and the general management cities that 
maintained their structures fell in between these two groups (see Figures 9 
and 10). A comparison of the means of the socioeconomic factors of cities
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differing in their GMC status (see Table 7) previously showed that cities that 
recently adopted the GMC status showed a great fluctuation in population 
growth. Probably, the factors associated with sudden fluctuations in 
population growth might be the causes leading to poor fiscal performance in 
these cities. Therefore, it can be argued that a sudden fluctuation in 
population growth may result in poor fiscal performance, leading to the hiring 
of professional managers in strong mayor cities. However, these data-based 
assumptions need further scrutiny to confirm these findings.
Figure 10: Comparison of Composite Fiscal Stress Index and FTE Employee Rate 











Composite Fiscal Stress Index FTE Rate
Generally, in the process of comparing means, only main effects that 
are compared. The main effects are the effects of each of the individual 
factors, obtained by ignoring other factors and their interaction effects. Testing 
for interaction of other variables effects is important, and they must be
H Adopted GMC 
□  Dropped GMC 
E Maintained GMC
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considered together to come to a conclusion about the data. While differences 
among the means of the various fiscal performance measures were very 
informative, they left unanswered the question of whether other urban 
socioeconomic factors and the current fiscal conditions might have influenced 
the mean differences discussed above.
Regression Analysis bv Different Types of Municipal Administrative Structures 
Literature on the municipal financial administration suggests that 
municipal fiscal performance is a complex phenomenon influenced by a 
variety of socioeconomic and fiscal factors of the cities (Groves and Valente, 
1994). To clarify the effect of these exogenous factors, an ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression model was constructed to isolate the impact of 
different municipal administrative structures on municipal fiscal performance 
measures, while controlling for the other important independent variables. The 
socioeconomic variables were considered as control vectors and used to 
control for the most obvious exogenous effects on the dependent variables. 
The control variables that used were: population, population growth, 
population density, median age of residents, per capita income, median home 
value, percent owner-occupied homes, percent poverty, unemployment rate, 
crime rate, MSA, region, city size, relative fiscal capacity, relative revenue 
effort and current liabilities of the cities. The different forms of government 
variables were the main interest of this thesis and they were constructed as 
categorical variables.
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Based on the initial observations on the comparative analysis of the 
means of municipal financial figures, the council-manager cities (CMC) were 
considered as the reference category. Mathematically, the reference or 
baseline category makes no difference, however it allows for more 
straightforward substantive interpretation since the intercept estimate 
effectively becomes the baseline category (Lewis-Beck, 1995). Customarily, 
an extreme value should be selected as the reference category. Therefore, 
the council-manager category with a better fiscal performance level than other 
municipal administrative structures has been designated as the reference 
category.
Thus, two dummy variables were used -  one for the strong mayor cities 
(SMC) and the other for the general management cities (GMC). That is, one 
for the officially declared traditional strong mayor cities (where the mayor has 
the complete control over the municipal business) and the other for the 
general management cities (still the traditional strong mayor cities where the 
mayor retains the administrative authority but conduct the municipal business 
with a professional managerial help). In order to “dummy up” the ordinal 
‘municipal administrative structure’ variable (that was originally coded as, 1 =  
SMC, 2 = CMC, and 3 = GMC), it was recoded into dummy variables by 
applying the following recoding steps:
SMC = 1, if previous coding was 1; if else 0 (i.e., 2 and 3 recoded to 0)
GMC = 1, if previous coding was 3; if else 0 (i.e., 1 and 2 recoded to 0)
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To reflect,
If city = CMC, intercept = (30
If city = SMC, intercept = (30 + y SMC
If city = GMC, intercept = (30 + y GMC
The dummy variables introduced in the model to isolate the impact of 
five different regions were dropped in order to enhance the postulated 
regression model. Using the postulated regression model, the dummy- 
variable regression coefficients measured the difference in the municipal fiscal 
performance dependent variables compared to the council-manager cities. 
Since the above-mentioned control/independent variables were closely related 
to each other, the model was scrutinized for multicollinearity. When 
multicollinearity exists in a postulated model, the regression equation cannot 
accurately estimate the independent effects on the dependent variable. The 
strength of the linear relationships among the independent variables was 
measured by the tolerance statistics. Tolerance is the proportion of the 
variability of the given variable that is not explained by its linear relationships 
with the other independent variables in the model. Since tolerance statistics is 
a proportional measure, its values range from 0 to 1. In that case, a value 
closer to 1 indicates that an independent variable has little of its variability 
explained by the other independent variables.
Similarly, the preliminary observation on the collinearity statistics 
showed that the per capita income, median home value, and percent poverty
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rate of a locality were highly correlated with each other. Their linear 
relationships with the dependent variables could be explained by using one of 
these three variables as a proxy measure to represent the others. Based on 
this observation, a decision was made to retain the per capita income variable 
as the surrogate measure. The proposed model was modified by eliminating 
the median home value and percent poverty rate of a locality that were highly 
correlated to the per capita income and measuring the same concept. Thus, 
due to multicollinearity, independent variables -  median home values and 
percent poverty rate of the localities -  were dropped from the equations in 
order to improve the regression models. This step improved the tolerance 
statistics of the per capita income variable, but did not affect the standardized 
beta coefficients of the other independent variables and the R Square values 
of the regression models. The main point is, however, that including median 
home values and percent poverty did not significantly increase explained 
variance and did not affect the sign and the magnitude for the municipal 
administrative structure variables.
The results of the regression analyses are shown in Tables 11 through 
14 that depict the standardized beta coefficients for each of the models. The 
beta coefficients measured the change in the standard deviation of the 
dependent variable associated with a unit change in the standard deviation of 
the independent variable. Beta coefficients were used in the analyses since 
the analyses were intended to indicate the significance and direction of the 
relationship rather than the quantitative movement in the variables. Another
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reason to employ beta coefficients was that the variables were measured 
according to different metrics like per capita (per capita income), raw values 
(population), percentages (percent owner occupied home), ratios (crime rate), 
and etcetera. This approach was supported by Bohrnstedt and Knoke (1988) 
and McClendon (1994).
Therefore, beta coefficients of the regression models reported the 
change in the standard deviation of the municipal fiscal performance 
dependent variable for a one-unit change in the standard deviation of the 
independent variable, holding other independent variables constant. For 
example, with other control variables set at their means, an increase of one 
standard deviation in the general management cities variable resulted in a 
-0.006 decrease in the standard deviation of the composite fiscal stress index 
(see Table 11).
Findings of Postulated Hypotheses Testing: The Influence of Municipal 
Administrative Structures on Municipal Fiscal Performance;
Overall the OLS regression models’ regression coefficients confirmed 
the findings of the means test about the difference in the ‘direction of the 
relationships’ between independent and dependent variables. That is, the 
composite fiscal stress index was lower in the strong mayor cities (SMC) when 
compared with the general management cities (GMC) and the council- 
manager cities (CMC), but the revenue capacity per capita, per capita general 
expenditures, and the FTE employee rate were higher in the strong mayor 
cities than both the general management cities and council-manager cities
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after controlling for other key variables. The significance of these associations 
is analyzed in the following paragraphs.
The significance of test results is reported in three ways as suggested 
by Coolican (1990), based on ‘p’ the probability level:
• Significant (0.05 > p < 0.01 and represented by *),
• Highly significant (0.01 > p < 0.001 and represented by **), and
• Very highly significant (0.001 > p and represented by ***).
All probabilities reported are based on two-tailed tests as each comparison 
had two possible directions.
General Management Cities (GMC) Versus Strong Mayor Cities (SMC)
This thesis hypothesized that the general management cities were 
more likely to have a lower composite fiscal stress index, revenue capacity per 
capita, per capita general expenditures, and full-time equivalent rate of 
employees than strong mayor cities. Table 15 provides the summary statistics 
on the comparison of municipal administrative structures' influence on the 
fiscal performance indicators of general management cities and strong mayor 
cities (as shown in Tables 11 through 14). In sum, general management cities 
(GMC) had better fiscal performance levels than strong mayor cities (SMC) 
except for the composite fiscal stress index.
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Table 11: Assessing the Impact of Municipal Administrative 
Structures on Composite Fiscal Stress Index of GMC and SMC
H1 - Dependent Variable: Composite Fiscal Stress Index
Independent Variables Std. B t Sig.
SMC -0.117*** -3.301 0.001
GMC -0.006 -0.171 0.864
Population -0.048 -1.179 0.239
Population Growth 0.022 0.613 0.540
Population Density 0.031 0.803 0.422
Median Age of Residents 0.005 0.118 0.906
Per Capita Income -0.488*** -10.647 0.000
Percent Owner-Occupied Home 0.113** 2.592 0.010
Unemployment Rate 0.013 0.322 0.748
Crime Rate -0.063 -1.732 0.084
Current Liabilities -0.094** -2.645 0.008
MSA 0.059 1.488 0.137
Medium-Size City -0.010 -0.280 0.780
Big City 0.018 0.429 0.668
(Constant) 172.497 69.828 0.000
N 693
R 0.476
Adjusted R Square 0.210
Std. Error of the Estimate 7.100
F 14.155
Sig. 0.000
Note: Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients.
* 0.05 > p < 0.01 two-tailed test
** 0.01 > p < 0.001 two-tailed test
*** 0.001 > p two-tailed test
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Table 12: Assessing the Impact of Municipal Administrative 
Structures on Revenue Capacity Per Capita of GMC and SMC
H2 - Dependent Variable: Revenue Capacity Per Capita
Independent Variables Std. B t sig-
SMC 0.174*** 5.242 0.000
GMC 0.069* 2.093 0.037
Population 0.240*** 6.256 0.000
Population Growth -0.088** -2.581 0.010
Population Density -0.049 -1.364 0.173
Median Age of Residents 0.178*** 4.269 0.000
Per Capita Income 0.156*** 3.625 0.000
Percent Owner-Occupied Home -0.386*** -9.453 0.000
Unemployment Rate -0.076* -2.007 0.045
Crime Rate 0.089** 2.579 0.010
Current Liabilities 0.019 0.584 0.560
MSA -0.012 -0.334 0.738
Medium-Size City 0.059 1.780 0.075
Big City 0.069 1.720 0.086
(Constant) 1052.177 5.749 0.000
N 693
R 0.565
Adjusted R Square 0.305
Std. Error of the Estimate 525.972
F 22.657
Sig. 0.000
Note: Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients. 
* 0.05 > p < 0.01 two-tailed test 
** 0.01 > p < 0.001 two-tailed test 
*** 0.001 > p two-tailed test
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Table 13: Assessing the Impact of Municipal Administrative Structures 
on Per Capita General Expenditures of GMC and SMC
H3 - Dependent Variable: Per Capita General Expenditures
Independent Variables Std. B t sig-
SMC 0.166*** 5.268 0.000
GMC 0.072** 2.259 0.024
Population 0.225*** 6.109 0.000
Population Growth -0.089** -2.712 0.007
Population Density -0.029 -0.830 0.407
Median Age of Residents 0.170*** 4.241 0.000
Per Capita Income 0.183*** 4.420 0.000
Percent Owner-Occupied Home -0.365*** -9.338 0.000
Unemployment Rate -0.091* -2.506 0.012
Crime Rate 0.062 1.880 0.060
Relative Fiscal Capacity 0.182*** 5.926 0.000
Relative Revenue Effort -0.225*** -7.010 0.000
MSA -0.035 -0.994 0.321
Medium-Size City 0.073* 2.262 0.024
Big City 0.084* 2.193 0.029
(Constant) -2611.691 -2.790 0.005
N 693
R 0.611
Adjusted R Square 0.360
Std. Error of the Estimate 507.347
F 26.914
Sig. 0.000
Note: Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients.
* 0.05 > p < 0.01 two-tailed test
** 0.01 > p < 0.001 two-tailed test
*** 0.001 > p two-tailed test
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Table 14: Assessing the Impact of Municipal Administrative 
Structures on the FTE Employee Rate of GMC and SMC
H4 - Dependent Variable: FTE Rate
Independent Variables Std. B t Sig.
SMC 0.211*** 5.791 0.000
GMC 0.053 1.428 0.154
Population 0.123** 2.883 0.004
Population Growth -0.099** -2.647 0.008
Population Density -0.089* -2.234 0.026
Median Age of Residents 0.196*** 4.246 0.000
Per Capita Income -0.049 -1.021 0.308
Percent Owner-Occupied Home -0.327*** -7.337 0.000
Unemployment Rate -0.131** -3.126 0.002
Crime Rate 0.056 1.473 0.141
Relative Fiscal Capacity 0.073* 2.050 0.041
Relative Revenue Effort -0.188*** -5.064 0.000
MSA 0.080 1.921 0.055
Medium-Size City 0.042 1.138 0.255
Big City 0.016 0.352 0.725
(Constant) 34.619 0.200 0.841
N 590
R 0.544
Adjusted R Square 0.277
Std. Error of the Estimate 84.549
F 16.058
Sig. 0.000
Note: Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients.
* 0.05 > p < 0.01 two-tailed test
** 0.01 > p < 0.001 two-tailed test
*** 0.001 > p two-tailed test
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General management cities (GMC) had significantly lower revenue 
capacities per capita and per capita general fund expenditures than strong 
mayor cities (SMC). Also, strong mayor cities (SMC) had higher revenue 
capacities per capita and per capita general fund expenditures than general 
management cities (GMC) at a very highly significant level.




Fiscal Performance Indicators Cities (GMC) (SMC)
H1-Composite Fiscal Stress Index -0.006 -0.117***
H2-Revenue Capacity Per Capita 0.069* 0.174***
H3-Per Capita General Expenditures 0.072* 0.166***
H4-FTE Employee Rate 0.053 0.211***
Note: Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients.
* 0.05 > p < 0.01 two-tailed test
** 0.01 > p < 0.001 two-tailed test
*** 0.001 > p two-tailed test
The FTE employee rate of general management cities (GMC) was 
lower than that of strong mayor cities (SMC), but not at a significant level. 
However, the FTE employee rate of strong mayor cities (SMC) was higher 
than of general management cites (GMC) at a very highly significant level. 
Therefore, these three models (i.e., models based on revenue capacity per 
capita, per capita general fund expenditures and FTE employee rate) 
supported the research hypotheses that general management cities (GMC) 
were likely to have better fiscal performance than strong mayor cities (SMC).
The strong mayor cities (SMC) had a lower composite fiscal stress 
index level at a very highly significant level when compared with the general
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
113
management cities' composite fiscal stress index level. Therefore, the 
hypothesis that the general management administrative structures were likely 
to have a lower composite fiscal stress index than strong mayor cities -- was 
rejected on the grounds of the regression analysis findings. The composite 
fiscal stress index had an inverse relationship with the strong mayor cities. 
This called for further investigation of the composite fiscal stress index 
municipal financial measure and will be explored later in this chapter.
General Management Cities (GMC) Versus Council Manager Cities (CMC) 
This thesis hypothesized that the general management cities (GMC) 
were more likely to have a lower composite fiscal stress index, revenue 
capacity per capita, lower per capita general expenditures, and full-time 
equivalent employee rate than council-manager cities (CMC).
On contrary, the council-manager cities (CMC) had better fiscal 
performance levels than general management cities (GMC) except for 
composite fiscal stress index. Council-manager cities (CMC) had lower 
revenue capacity per capita, per capita general fund expenditures and FTE 
employee rate than general management cities (GMC). Therefore, these 
three models did not support the research hypotheses that claimed general 
management cities (GMC) would have better fiscal performance than council- 
manager cities (CMC).
The absolute value of the correlation coefficient (R) for all the models 
was positive and about 0.5 or above 0.5. The goodness of the fit for the 
proposed regression equations was at an acceptable level. This showed that
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there was an acceptable level of correlation between independent and 
dependent variables. The adjusted R2 or the coefficient of determination of 
the composite fiscal stress index regression model was 0.21. Therefore, the 
proposed models to test the composite fiscal stress index explained the 21% 
of variability in the composite fiscal stress index. Similarly, the other proposed 
regression models explained 31% of the variability in the revenue capacity per 
capita, 36% of the variability in the per capita general expenditures and 28% of 
the variability in the FTE employee rate. The small city variables were 
dropped from the regression equations.
Thus, three out of four research hypotheses were not rejected based on 
the results of regression analyses. In a nutshell, the overall outcome of the 
analyses showed that general management cities (GMC) had better fiscal 
performance than the strong mayor cities (SMC), but council-manager cities 
(CMC) still had best fiscal performance than the general management cities 
(GMC) except for the composite fiscal index measure.
In order to understand the observed deviation of the composite fiscal 
stress index figure from the general pattern of municipal fiscal performance 
indicators among cities (i.e., strong mayor cities’ lowest fiscal stress index 
level when compared with other municipal administrative structures), the 
computation of the composite fiscal stress index level should be analyzed and 
compared with the computation of the other three municipal financial 
measures (i.e., revenue capacity per capita, per capita general expenditures 
and FTE employee rate).
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The adopted model devised by Virginia’s Commission on Local 
Government that, in turn, can be traced back to Virginia’s Joint Legislative and 
Audit Commission, and ultimately back to the U.S. Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations. This methodology of computing the fiscal stress 
indicator is a relative measure and computed the stress index level of a 
municipality to a given city size group (such as small, medium-size and big 
city). Therefore, this computation accounts for both the size of the population 
and the size of the city.
The other municipal fiscal performance measures employed in the 
regression model were computed after the general standardization technique 
such as per capita measures (as in revenue capacity per capita and per capita 
general expenditures) and rate of an incident measure (as FTE employee 
rate). These methods account only for the size of the population. Therefore, 
the main criterion that differentiated these measures from the composite fiscal 
stress index was the absence of the computation of a relative measure to a 
given city size group. That is, city size was not taken into account when 
operationalizing the fiscal performance measures of revenue capacity, general 
expenditures, and FTE employees. Thus, the difference in the computation 
technique might have been the cause for the observed deviation in the fiscal 
stress index level when compared with the pattern of other fiscal performance 
measures pattern.
From the regression models that compared the strong mayor cities 
(SMC) against the general management cities (GMC), it can be concluded that
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having a professional city manager helped a city to have better fiscal 
performance level than a city that had no professional manager. However, 
when the general management cities (GMC) were compared with council- 
manager cities (CMC), the council-manager cities (CMC) fared better than 
general management cities (GMC). This could be inferred from the 
administrative relationship between elected and appointed officials; and the 
power of decision-making and implementing authority of the different types of 
managerial positions. The results suggested that the council-manager cities 
(CMC) modeled after the politics-administration dichotomy model helped the 
cities to attain better fiscal performance level. Therefore, a clear separation of 
powers and authority to make and implement decisions might be necessary for 
a city manager to guide a city to achieve better fiscal performance levels.
Analysis of the Environmental Variables
The Influence of Socioeconomic Variables on Municipal Fiscal Performance 
This study employed population, population growth, population density, 
median age of residents, per capita income, percent-owner occupied home, 
unemployment rate, crime rate, current liabilities, relative fiscal capacity, 
relative revenue effort, MSA status, and size of the city socioeconomic 
variables as control variables in the regression equations. The following 
paragraphs discusses only the repeated strength of certain predictors that are 
statistically significant in the regression equations as shown in Tables 16 
through 19.
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In general, the variable of percent owner-occupied home and relative 
revenue effort accounted for most of the variance for all the models except for 
two or three equations. Customarily, the variables of per capita income and 
population variables are employed as the surrogate measures to account for 
variances of revenue and expenditures in studies of municipal governments' 
efficiency. However, according to this study, the percent owner-occupied 
home and revenue effort emerged as the variables accounting for most of the 
variances that city can face.
Population
Population is a useful surrogate measure for other variations that may account 
for municipal fiscal performance outcomes and it was either statistically highly 
significant or at a very highly significant among most of the municipal fiscal 
performance measures. Especially populations of strong mayor cities had 
highly significant impact on municipal revenue and expenditures. This showed 
that strong mayor cities with larger populations raised and spent more than 
other administrative structures. Big cities that were lead by the strong mayors 
showed the similar trend.
Population Growth
Population growth had the same basic effect in the regression models based 
on the revenue capacity per capita, per capita general fund expenditures, and 
the FTE employee rate. It reflected a negative sign at a highly significant and 
a very highly significant level. This indicated that growing cities tended to 
raise and spend slightly less and employ fewer employees on an average than
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those with slower growth regardless of their municipal administrative structure. 
Particularly the growing general management cities had fewer employees than 
other types of cities at a significant level. Another possible explanation can be 
that cities with the fastest growth in population need time in filling the gap in 
increased service demands associated with growth sprout.
Population Density
Generally, population density bore an inverse relationship to the revenue 
capacity per capita, per capita general expenditures and the FTE employee 
rate. This meant that, when the density increased 1%, the cities could provide 
cost-efficient service provision to their citizens by spending less in per capita 
expenditures and by hiring fewer employees. The density impacted the FTE 
employee rate negatively at a significant level, and this effect was very highly 
significant in council-manager cities.
Median Age of Population
When the median age of a population increases, it generally increases the 
cost of service provision at a very highly significant level. This was shown by 
an increase in the municipal per capita expenditures and also resulted in more 
FTE employee rate in response to the increased service demands. However, 
the median age of residents was also positively related to revenue capacity 
per capita at highly significant levels. This could be because more adults were 
employed and active in the workforce, and their spending power stimulating 
the local economy that could generate a high revenue capacity per capita for 
the city.
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Table 16: Assessing the Influence of Socioeconomic Control Variables 
on Composite Fiscal Stress Index
DV: Composite Fiscal Stress 
Index All cities SMC CMC GMC
Control Variables Std. B Std. B Std. B Std. B
Population -0.064 -0.150 -0.081 0.154
Population Growth 0.035 -0.047 0.005 0.183
Population Density 0.038 0.059 0.051 0.115
Median Age of Residents -0.004 -0.249 0.037 -0.204
Per Capita Income -0.471*** -0.156 -0.549*** -0.749***
Percent Owner Occupied Home 0.118** 0.447** 0.067 0.415*
Unemployment Rate 0.023 0.125 -0.004 -0.146
Crime Rate -0.062 -0.157 -0.065 -0.121
Current Liabilities -0.078* 0.161 -0.107** -0.426*
MSA 0.056 0.075 0.050 0.120
Medium Size City -0.005 0.137 -0.023 0.112
Big City 0.022 0.188 0.050 -0.073
(Constant) 171.663 168.122 173.414 190.230
N 693 112 534 47
R 0.462 0.440 0.519 0.696
Adjusted R Square 0.200 0.096 0.252 0.302
Std. Error of the Estimate 7.147 8.636 6.699 6.468
F 15.396 1.985 15.981 2.659
Sig. 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.012
Note: Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients. 
* 0.05 > p < 0.01 two-tailed test 
** 0.01 > p < 0.001 two-tailed test 
*** 0.001 > p two-tailed test
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Table 17: Assessing the Influ 
Variables on Revenue Capacil
ence of Socioeconomic Control 
y Per Capita
DV: Revenue Capacity Per 
Capita All Cities SMC CMC GMC
Control Variables Std. B. Std. B. Std. B. Std. B.
Population 0.261*** 0.348*** 0.019 -0.013
Population Growth -0.108** -0.011 -0.070 -0.263
Population Density -0.054 -0.060 -0.097* -0.081
Median Age of Residents 0.193*** 0.314** 0.176*** 0.205
Per Capita Income 0.130** 0.064 0.201*** 0.430*
Percent Owner Occupied Home -0.394*** -0.596*** -0.405*** -0.629***
Unemployment Rate -0.091* -0.088 -0.084 -0.057
Crime Rate 0.091* 0.073 0.116** 0.122
Current Liabilities -0.006 -0.207* 0.049 0.195
MSA -0.006 -0.171 0.055 -0.009
Medium Size City 0.053 0.107 0.091* -0.093
Big City 0.077 0.160 0.053 0.306
(Constant) 1151.540 1308.942 1087.934 615.722
N 693 112 534 47
R 0.538 0.715 0.459 0.723
Adjusted R Square 0.277 0.453 0.192 0.354
Std. Error of the Estimate 536.481 669.500 460.148 609.755
F 23.049 8.647 11.568 3.099
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005
Note: Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients. 
* 0.05 > p < 0.01 two-tailed test 
** 0.01 > p < 0.001 two-tailed test 
*** 0.001 > p two-tailed test
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Table 18: Assessing the Influei 
on Per Capita General Expenciil
ice of Socioeconomic Control Variables 
.ures
DV: Per Capita General 
Expenditures All Cities SMC CMC GMC
Control Variables Std. B Std. B Std. B Std. B
Population 0.244*** 0.257* 0.009 0.096
Population Growth -0.112*** -0.122 -0.073 -0.194
Population Density -0.032 0.005 -0.064 0.012
Median Age of Residents 0.185*** 0.293** 0.163*** 0.127
Per Capita Income 0.162*** 0.168 0.220*** 0.356
Percent Owner Occupied Home -0.376*** -0.561*** -0.363*** -0.548***
Unemployment Rate -0.103** -0.019 -0.106* -0.203
Crime Rate 0.062 -0.044 0.087* 0.092
Relative Fiscal Capacity 0.173*** -0.018 0.245*** 0.176
Relative Revenue Effort -0.228*** -0.216* -0.283*** -0.222
MSA -0.031 -0.244** 0.031 0.012
Medium Size City 0.066* 0.161* 0.099* -0.084
Big City 0.090* 0.224* 0.071 0.210
(Constant) -2249.285 3363.984 -2861.927 -5043.313
N 693 112 534 47
R 0.588 0.723 0.559 0.767
Adjusted R Square 0.333 0.459 0.295 0.427
Std. Error of the Estimate 517.806 658.396 438.173 584.241
F 27.577 8.240 18.150 3.639
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Note: Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients. 
* 0.05 > p < 0.01 two-tailed test 
** 0.01 > p < 0.001 two-tailed test 
*** 0.001 > p two-tailed test
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Table 19: Assessing the Influence of Socioeconomic Control Variables 
on FTE Employee Rate
DV: FTE Rate All Cities SMC CMC GMC
Control Variables Std. B. Std. B. Std. B. Std. B.
Population 0.150*** 0.098 -0.021 0.044
Population Growth -0.122** -0.113 -0.088* -0.344*
Population Density -0.096* -0.031 -0.150*** -0.006
Median Age of Residents 0.215*** 0.180 0.216*** 0.335
Per Capita Income -0.074 0.021 -0.062 0.302
Percent Owner Occupied Home -0.346*** -0.437** -0.355*** -0.498*
Unemployment Rate -0.144*** -0.034 -0.172*** 0.099
Crime Rate 0.054 -0.066 0.068 0.225
Relative Fiscal Capacity 0.060 -0.049 0.101* -0.049
Relative Revenue Effort -0.197*** -0.236* -0.207*** -0.012
MSA 0.084* -0.237 0.191*** -0.080
Medium Size City 0,028 0.049 0.092* -0.144
Big City 0.016 0.200 -0.002 0.291
(Constant) 119.303 889.381 -13.932 190.965
N 590 93 455 42
R 0.504 0.536 0.540 0.666
Adjusted R Square 0.237 0.170 0.271 0.184
Std. Error of the Estimate 86.864 128.043 72.215 68.995
F 15.078 2.454 13.982 1.713
Sig. 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.113
Note: Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients. 
* 0.05 > p < 0.01 two-tailed test 
** 0.01 > p < 0.001 two-tailed test 
*** 0.001 > p two-tailed test
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Per Capita Income
When the per capita income of a locality increased, it resulted in a lower fiscal 
stress index score for a city at very highly significant levels. Especially, in the 
council-manager cities, an increase in their citizens’ wealth enabled the cities 
to raise more revenue and spend more on services at a highly significant level. 
Unemployment Rate
As a general observation on the results, the unemployment rate translated into 
less revenue generation for cites. When the unemployment rate increased, it 
increased the cities’ fiscal stress index level at significant levels. It also 
reduced the local revenues at significant levels, the cities’ ability to provide 
services at significant levels, and the cities’ ability to employ more employees 
at significant levels. Particularly, this pattern was present in council-manager 
cities at significant levels.
Percent Owner-Occupied Home
The variable of percent owner-occupied home had an inverse relationship to 
all municipal fiscal performance measures in all the municipal administrative 
structures at a significant to a very highly significant level except for the fiscal 
stress index measure. The percent owner-occupied home is a surrogate 
measure for percentage of homeowners. The percentage of homeowners 
represents the population, which contributes to property tax revenues. This 
finding showed that residents who favored lower property tax negatively 
impacted tax revenues and municipal spending, and constrained municipal 
taxes and spending at significant levels too. Their expectations of low
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spending indirectly influenced the cities in employing fewer numbers of 
employees.
Percent Total Current Liabilities
Increasing current liabilities at the end of the year as a percentage of net- 
operating revenue demonstrated the poor financial condition of a city. Poor 
financial conditions affected the strong mayor cities’ ability to generate 
revenues and spend at significantly more than that of any other type of cities. 
Relative Fiscal Capacity
The fiscal capacity measures the localities’ financial ability to provide service. 
Especially in council-manager cities, the better fiscal capacity levels enable 
the cities to spend more on municipal services and hire more employees for 
service provision at highly significant levels.
Relative Revenue Effort
The revenue effort is the degree to which municipalities actually utilize the 
revenue-generating potential of its locality by utilizing local taxes, service 
charges, license fees, etc. A high level of revenue effort of a locality can be 
translated as the financial struggle to meet the service demands. As 
expected, a higher revenue effort increased the municipalities’ stress index 
scores significantly, regardless of the type of municipal administrative 
structures. An increase in revenue effort reduced the cities’ ability to raise 
more revenues, spend more on services and hire more employees to provide 
services at very highly significant levels. This could be interpreted to mean
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that, when revenue efforts increased, it could end in a cutback on municipal 
services.
Presence in Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)
A city’s presence in a MSA locality significantly increased the fiscal stress. 
Especially strong mayor cities present in the MSA faced a reduced capability 
to raise revenue and spend on services at significant levels. The metropolitan 
council-manager cities employed more employees than any other form of 
cities at very highly significant levels.
Analysis of Changes over Time
Exploratory Analysis on the Impact of Administrative Structural Changes of 
General Management Cities on their Fiscal Performance
This cross-sectional research design restricts the capacity of a study to 
determine whether a change intervention in government structure affects 
municipal fiscal performance. A time-series design is clearly preferable if one 
wishes to assess the consequences of administrative structural changes. 
However, as an exploratory approach, this study compared the differences in 
municipal fiscal performance measures of general management cities that 
consistently maintained the GMC status with other general management cities 
that opted to drop the GMC status and with the cities that recently adopted the 
general management municipal structure.
The impacts of such change-intervention cases on municipal fiscal 
performance levels were compared among the general management cities
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that consistently maintained the general management structure for five years, 
that dropped the GMC status and that recently adopted the GMC status. The 
initial observations on the comparative analysis of the means of municipal 
financial figures showed that the general management cities that ‘dropped 
their GMC status’ had a better fiscal performance level among the group and 
these cities were selected as the reference category.
Thus, two dummy variables were used -  one for the cities that 
maintained the GMC status and the other for the cities that adopted the GMC 
status. In order to “dummy up” the ordinal ‘GMC status variable’ (that was 
originally coded as, 1 = dropped GMC, 2 = adopted GMC, and 3 = maintained 
GMC), it was recoded into dummy variables by applying the following recoding 
steps:
Adopted GMC = 1, if previous coding was 2; if else 0 (i.e., 1 and 3 
recoded to 0)
Maintained GMC = 1, if previous coding was 3; if else 0 (i.e., 1 and 2 
recoded to 0)
To reflect,
If city = Dropped GMC, intercept = (30
If city = Adopted GMC, intercept = po + y Adopted GMC
If city = Maintained GMC, intercept = po + y Maintained GMC
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Table 20: Assessing the Impact of Change Intervention on the 
Composite Fiscal Stress Index of Adopted and Maintained GMC Status 
Cities
Dependent Variable: Composite Fiscal Stress Index
Independent Variables Std. B t sig.
Adopted GMC 0.042 0.457 0.648
Maintained GMC 0.029 0.272 0.786
Population 0.026 0.246 0.806
Population Growth 0.061 0.779 0.437
Population Density 0.005 0.063 0.950
Median Age of Residents 0.185 1.966 0.051
Per Capita Income -0.604*** -5.755 0.000
Percent Owner-Occupied Home 0.127 1.299 0.196
Unemployment Rate -0.039 -0.375 0.709
Crime Rate 0.066 0.693 0.490
Current Liabilities 0.051 0.595 0.553
MSA -0.111 -1.168 0.245
Medium-Size City -0.092 -1.082 0.281
Big City 0.0Q9 0.078 0.938
(Constant) 161.469 18.265 0.000
N 143
R 0.529
Adjusted R Square 0.201
Std. Error of the Estimate 7.677
F 3.548
Sig. 0.000
Note: Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients.
* 0.05 > p < 0.01 two-tailed test
** 0.01 > p < 0.001 two-tailed test
*** 0.001 > p two-tailed test
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Table 21: Assessing the Impact of Change Intervention on the Revenue 
Capacity Per Capita of Adopted and Maintained GMC Status Cities
Dependent Variable: Revenue Capacity Per Capita
Independent Variables Std. B t Sig.
Adopted GMC 0.095 1.099 0.274
Maintained GMC 0.045 0.448 0.655
Population -0.022 -0.220 0.827
Population Growth -0.155* -2.097 0.038
Population Density -0.032 -0.394 0.694
Median Age of Residents 0.033 0.372 0.711
Per Capita Income 0.319** 3.205 0.002
Percent Owner-Occupied Home -0.382*** -4.102 0.000
Unemployment Rate 0.012 0.116 0.908
Crime Rate -0.049 -0.543 0.588
Current Liabilities -0.146 -1.792 0.075
MSA 0.115 1.267 0.207
Medium-Size City 0.112 1.389 0.167
Big City 0.329** 2.971 0.004
(Constant) 1476.417 2.082 0.039
N 143
R 0.592
Adjusted R Square 0.280
Std. Error of the Estimate 615.767
F 4.940
Sig. 0.000
Note: Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients. 
* 0.05 > p < 0.01 two-tailed test 
** 0.01 > p < 0.001 two-tailed test 
*** 0.001 > p two-tailed test
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Table 22: Assessing the I m p a c t  o f  Change Intervention on the Per 
Capita General Expenditures of Adopted and Maintained G M C  Status 
Cities
Dependent Variable: Per Capita General Expenditures
Independent Variables Std. B t Sig.
Adopted GMC 0.137 1.619 0.108
Maintained GMC 0.060 0.622 0.535
Population -0.015 -0.152 0.880
Population Growth -0.147* -2.046 0.043
Population Density -0.046 -0.584 0.560
Median Age of Residents 0.113 1.290 0.199
Per Capita Income 0.298** 3.068 0.003
Percent Owner-Occupied Home -0.400*** -4.521 0.000
Unemployment Rate 0.011 0.110 0.912
Crime Rate -0.088 -1.010 0.314
Relative Fiscal Capacity 0.148* 2.077 0.040
Relative Revenue Effort -0.203** -2.719 0.007
MSA 0.087 0.988 0.325
Medium-Size City 0.081 1.020 0.310
Big City 0.294** 2.782 0.006
(Constant) -2731.403 -1.025 0.307
N 143
R 0.629
Adjusted R Square 0.325
Std. Error of the Estimate 602.292
F 5.550
Sig. 0.000
Note: Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients.
* 0.05 > p < 0.01 two-tailed test
** 0.01 > p < 0.001 two-tailed test
*** 0.001 > p two-tailed test
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Table 23: Assessing the Impact of Change Intervention on the FTE 
Employee Rate of Adopted and Maintained GMC Status Cities
Dependent Variable: FTE Rate
Independent Variables Std. B T sig.
Adopted GMC 0.129 1.326 0.188
Maintained GMC 0.042 0.378 0.706
Population -0.009 -0.081 0.936
Population Growth -0.262** -3.155 0.002
Population Density -0.061 -0.695 0.488
Median Age of Residents 0.204* 2.021 0.046
Per Capita Income 0.152 1.297 0.197
Percent Owner-Occupied Home -0.455*** -4.514 0.000
Unemployment Rate -0.043 -0.393 0.695
Crime Rate -0.139 -1.390 0.167
Relative Fiscal Capacity 0.025 0.309 0.758
Relative Revenue Effort -0.105 -1.225 0.223
MSA 0.113 1.113 0.268
Medium-Size City 0.088 0.955 0.342
Big City 0.183 1.503 0.136
(Constant) 120.336 0.320 0.749
N 123
R 0.581
Adjusted R Square 0.245
Std. Error of the Estimate 80.319
F 3.642
Sig. 0.000
Note: Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients.
* 0.05 > p < 0.01 two-tailed test
** 0.01 > p < 0.001 two-tailed test
*** 0.001 > p two-tailed test
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Using the regression model, the dummy-variable regression coefficients 
measured the difference in the variables affecting municipal fiscal performance 
in the ‘adopted GMC status’ cities and the ‘maintained GMC status’ cities. The 
socioeconomic variables that considered control vectors were used to control 
for the most obvious exogenous effects on the dependent variables. The 
control variables used were: population, population growth, population density, 
median age of residents, per capita income, percent owner-occupied homes, 
unemployment rate, crime rate, MSA, city size, relative fiscal capacity, relative 
revenue effort, and current liabilities of the cities.
The results of the regression analyses are shown in Tables 20 through 
23 that depict the standardized beta coefficients for each of the models. The 
beta coefficients measured the change in the standard deviation of the 
dependent variable associated with a unit change in the standard deviation of 
the independent variable.
Table 24 illustrates the summary statistics on the comparison of 
change-intervention influence on the fiscal performance indicators of ‘adopted 
GMC status’ cities against the ‘dropped GMC status’ cities (as shown in 
Tables 20 through 23). In sum, there were no significant differences in fiscal 
performance levels of different GMC status cities.
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Table 24: Comparison Fiscal Performance Indicator 






Composite Fiscal Stress Index 
Revenue Capacity Per Capita 










Note: Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients. 
No observation is significant at 
* 0.05 > p < 0.01 two-tailed test
That is, cities that maintained the GMC status had lower composite 
fiscal stress indices, revenue capacities per capita, per capita general 
expenditures and FTE employee rates when compared with cities that adopted 
the GMC status recently, but not at significant level. However, the regression 
models showed that population growth had an inverse relationship with 
revenue capacity per capita, per capita general expenditures, and the FTE 
employee rate at significant level.
This can be seen, as previously discussed in the means test results, as 
a response to a changing need resulting from population growth and an 
increased service demand resulting from the fluctuations in the population. 
However, this will be further probed in the following section when analyzing 
the impact of socioeconomic variables on municipal fiscal performance 
measures among city groups differing in their GMC status.
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The Influence of Socioeconomic Variables on Municipal Fiscal Performance of 
Different GMC Status Cities:
In order to control the effect of socioeconomic variables in the 
regression equation, this study employed population, population growth, 
population density, median age of residents, per capita income, percent-owner 
occupied home, unemployment rate, crime rate, current liabilities, relative 
fiscal capacity, relative revenue effort, MSA status, and size of the city. The 
following paragraphs discusses only the strength of certain predictors that are 
statistically significant in the regression equations as shown in Tables 25 
through 28.
In general, the variable of percent owner-occupied home accounted for 
most of the variance for all the models except for two or three equations. 
Fluctuations in population growth significantly affected all types of general 
management cities’ ability to raise revenues and spend on city services. The 
fluctuations also had an impact on the number of employees these cities hired 
for service provision inversely. This meant, that population growth brought 
cost-efficient service provision for general management cities that maintained 
or dropped their GMC status at significant levels. General management cities 
that recently hired a professional manager showed the same pattern, but not 
at a significant level.
General management cities that dropped the GMC status showed that 
an increase in their population density enabled them to provide cost-efficient 
municipal services. Per capita income of the residents of all general
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management cities reduced the fiscal stress at a very highly significant level. 
Especially, the cities that adopted GMC status recently showed that their 
citizens paid more for their services, a sign of those cities’ need for more 
revenues to balance the municipal budget.
The inverse relationship of the percent owner-occupied home with 
revenue capacity per capita, per capita general expenditures, and the FTE 
employee rate was at a significant to a very highly significant level. This 
showed that citizens constrained municipal taxes and spending at significant 
levels in these cities. The unemployment levels of cities that recently adopted 
GMC status showed that these cities faced increased expenditure levels at a 
significant level due to increased unemployment in their jurisdictions. The 
negative impact of high unemployment rate is another cause for recently 
adopted GMC status cities’ poor financial condition.
Current liabilities of municipalities of all categories of GMC status 
significantly increased the fiscal stress level. Cities that recently hired 
professional managers showed that their outstanding debts decreased their 
ability raise revenue and spend for services at a highly significant level. In 
sum, the cities that recently adopted GMC status or hired professional 
managers are in a poor financial condition. Thus, it can be concluded that the 
main reason for these cities’ decisions to turn to professional help is the need 
to ameliorate their unfavorable financial conditions.
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Table 25: Assessing the Influence of Socioe 
Composite Fiscal Stress Index on Cities wit
conomic Control Variables on 
h Different GMC Status
DV: Composite Fiscal Stress Index All Cities
GMC Status
Dropped Maintained Adopted
Control Variables Std. B. Std. B. Std. B. Std. B.
Population 0.023 0.055 0.154 -0.269
Population Growth 0.059 -0.115 0.186 0.234
Population Density 0.003 0.460* 0.114 0.115
Median Age of Residents 0.187* 0.403** -0.201 0.331
Per Capita Income -0.601*** -0.830*** -0.751*** -0.509**
Percent Owner Occupied Home 0.124 0.103 0.411* 0.197
Unemployment Rate -0.040 -0.219 -0.149 -0.266
Crime Rate 0.070 -0.073 -0.111 0.247
Current Liabilities 0.050 0.456** -0.419* 0.122
MSA -0.114 -0.226 0.113 0.082
Medium Size City -0.083 0.045 0.123 -0.198
Big City 0.016 -0.279 -0.112 0.546
(Constant) 161.733 152.799 190.557 134.140
N 143 47 47 49
R 0.528 0.778 0.705 0.721
Adjusted R Square 0.212 0.466 0.319 0.360
Std. Error of the Estimate 7.624 6.968 6.525 6.734
F 4.178 4.351 2.799 3.247
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.003
Note: Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients. 
* 0.05 > p < 0.01 two-tailed test 
** 0.01 > p < 0.001 two-tailed test 
*** 0.001 > p two-tailed test
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Table 26: Assessing the Influence o f Socioeconomic Control Variables 
on Revenue Capacity Per Capita on Cities with Different GMC Status
DV: Revenue Capacity Per Capita All Cities
GMC Status
Dropped Maintained Adopted
Control Variables Std. B Std. B Std. B Std. B
Population -0.031 -0.030 -0.013 0.099
Population Growth -0.159* 0.052 -0.263 -0.209
Population Density -0.040 -0.551** -0.081 -0.104
Median Age of Residents 0.039 -0.190 0.205 0.085
Per Capita Income 0.324*** 0.358 0.431* 0.412*
Percent Owner Occupied Home -0.390*** -0.565** -0.629*** -0.424*
Unemployment Rate 0.011 0.106 -0.057 0.383*
Crime Rate -0.044 -0.040 0.122 -0.199
Current Liabilities -0.148 -0.372* 0.195 -0.378**
MSA 0.120 0.143 -0.009 -0.073
Medium Size City 0.131 0.014 -0.093 0.339*
Big City 0.341** 0.462** 0.306 0.155
(Constant) 1505.381 3664.770 614.991 1544.487
N 143 47 47 49
R 0.587 0.711 0.723 0.750
Adjusted R Square 0.284 0.331 0.354 0.417
Std. Error of the Estimate 613.887 581.899 609.720 526.125
F 5.698 2.898 3.100 3.857
Sig. 0.000 0.007 0.005 0.001
Note: Cell entries are standardized regression coefficient 
* 0.05 > p < 0.01 two-tailed test 
** 0.01 > p < 0.001 two-tailed test 
*** 0.001 > p two-tailed test
s.
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Table 27: Assessing the Influence of Socioec< 
Per Capita General Expenditures on Cities wil
inomic Control Variables on 
:h Different GMC Status
DV: Per Capita General Expenditures All Cities
GMC Status
Dropped Maintained Adopted
Control Variables Std. B Std. B Std. B Std. B
Population -0.029 -0.009 0.075 0.102
Population Growth -0.155* 0.070 -0.195 -0.190
Population Density -0.058 -0.415* 0.019 0.058
Median Age of Residents 0.117 0.066 0.117 0.127
Per Capita Income 0.307** 0.080 0.373 0.449*
Percent Owner Occupied Home -0.412*** -0.647*** -0.548*** -0.322
Unemployment Rate 0.012 0.020 -0.177 0.370*
Crime Rate -0.080 -0.218 0.093 -0.219
Relative Fiscal Capacity 0.160* 0.081 0.168 0.120
Relative Revenue Effort -0.187* -0.245 -0.218 -0.103
MSA 0.098 0.087 0.015 -0.023
Medium Size City 0.110 -0.032 -0.078 0.308
Big City 0.309** 0.380* 0.227 0.054
(Constant) -3237.537 2395.592 -4553.209 -2974.497
N 143 47 47 49
R 0.619 0.719 0.767 0.671
Adjusted R Square 0.321 0.326 0.426 0.246
Std. Error of the Estimate 603.758 587.410 585.078 594.293
F 6.172 2.714 3.621 2.204
Sig. 0.000 0.010 0.001 0.032
Note: Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients. 
* 0.05 > p < 0.01 two-tailed test 
** 0.01 > p < 0.001 two-tailed test 
*** 0.001 > p two-tailed test
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Table 28: Assessing the Influence of Soc 
on FTE Employee Rate on Cities with Difl
oeconomic Control Variables 
©rent GMC Status
GMC Status
DV: FTE Rate All Cities Dropped Maintained Adopted
Control Variables Std B Std B Std B Std B
Population -0.026 0.060 0.046 0.150
Population Growth -0.265** -0.539* -0.340* 0.000
Population Density -0.071 -0.538* -0.013 0.136
Median Age of Residents 0.211* -0.220 0.338 0.528
Per Capita Income 0.162 0.080 0.291 0.216
Percent Owner Occupied Home -0.477*** -0.487* -0.492* -0.411
Unemployment Rate -0.039 -0.164 0.095 0.215
Crime Rate -0.138 -0.300 0.222 -0.319
Relative Fiscal Capacity 0.035 0.116 -0.021 0.160
Relative Revenue Effort -0.092 0.020 -0.015 -0.160
MSA 0.136 0.145 -0.075 0.000***
Medium Size City 0.114 -0.055 -0.141 0.392
Big City 0.197 0.167 0.283 0.009
(Constant) 68.972 147.384 60.694 -857.128
N 123 41 42 40
R 0.572 0.746 0.665 0.683
Adjusted R Square 0.247 0.343 0.183 0.230
Std. Error of the Estimate 80.247 76.690 69.070 88.009
F 4.071 2.605 1.708 1.970
Sig. 0.000 0.017 0.115 0.070
Note: Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients. 
* 0.05 > p < 0.01 two-tailed test 
** 0.01 > p < 0.001 two-tailed test 
*** 0.001 > p two-tailed test
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From a comparison of these findings with those of the impact of 
population growth on general management cities, it can be inferred that these 
cites faced this poor financial situation as the result of fluctuations in 
population growth that could have increased service demands. But this data- 
based assumption needs further testing to help in an understanding of the 
changes in the spending pattern of these cities in relation to population 
growth. An increase in revenue effort reduced the ability of cities of all GMC 
types to raise more revenues, spend more on services and hire more 
employees to provide services at very highly significant level.
Conclusion
The objective of this study is to test empirically the politics- 
administration complementarity model. By adopting the politics-administration 
complementarity model to a general management municipal administrative 
structure, this thesis hypothesizes that the general management cities are 
more likely to have lower composite fiscal stress indices, revenue capacities 
per capita, per capita general expenditures, and full-time equivalent rates of 
employees than strong mayor and council-manager cities.
To understand the impact of a general management city’s 
administrative structure on a city’s fiscal performance, the fiscal performance 
indicators of those cities were compared with those of strong mayor and 
council-manager cities. An initial investigation of the descriptive statistics 
showed that council-manager cities were more low taxing and low spending
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than the other forms of municipal administrative structures such as strong 
mayor and general management cities. The strong mayor cities had the 
lowest fiscal stress index but their revenue capacity per capita, per capita 
general expenditures, and FTE employee rate were higher than those of the 
general management and council-manager cities. Similarly, council-manager 
cities had a higher fiscal stress index but lower revenue capacities per capita, 
per capita general expenditures and FTE employee rates than general 
management and strong mayor cities. The general management cities’ fiscal 
performance fell between that of strong mayor and council-manager cities.
The council-manager cities that presented a better fiscal performance 
level were selected as a reference category in the regression model. The 
regression models confirmed the findings of the difference of the means test. 
The composite fiscal stress index was lower in strong mayor cities when 
compared with general management cities but the revenue capacity per 
capita, per capita general expenditures and the FTE employee rate were 
higher than the general management cities after controlling for other key 
variables. Especially, the composite fiscal stress index had an inverse 
relationship with the strong mayor cities’ variable. This warranted further 
exploration to find the explanations for these outcomes.
Similarly, the composite fiscal stress index was lower in the general 
management cities when compared with the council-manager cities but the 
revenue capacity per capita, per capita general expenditures, and the FTE
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employee rate were higher than the council-manager cities after controlling for 
other key variables.
An exploratory analysis of the general management cities of the three 
different GMC types was carried out by comparing them with each other. 
These cities had great fluctuations in population growth. The cities that 
recently adopted general management structure struggled financially. Thus, it 
was concluded that these cities could have hired managers to manage their 
financial issues.
Customarily, per capita income and population variables are employed 
as surrogate measures to account for variances in municipal services in 
studies of municipal efficiency. However, according to this study, percent- 
owner occupied home also emerged as another strong measure that accounts 
for most of the variances that city could face.
The following discussion part of this dissertation will explore the results 
of the statistical analyses in light of urban literature. The section will also 
analyze the implication of the findings of the study and recommendations for 
future research.





The past few decades have brought an increase in a hybrid form of 
municipal governments called general management cities. Though the 
traditional forms of strong mayor cities and reformed council-manager cities 
are still most prevalent, 12% (N=144) of cities with populations of 25,000 and 
more across the country now operate under a general management city 
version of municipal administrative structure. Most of these general 
management cities are populous enough. Yet almost nothing is known in any 
comparative or systematic way about the consequences of this lesser known 
hybrid municipal administrative structure.
A sizeable literature on the subject has analyzed the effects of the 
urban reform movement on city governments, but we have little understanding 
of the policy consequences of a general management structure among 
American cities. A frequently tested hypothesis in the urban policy literature is 
that different forms of municipal administrative structures have an impact on 
municipal fiscal performance, but the hybrid-nature of general management 
cities has always been left out of those analyses.
There has been a recent of interest in analyzing the contribution of non- 
traditional, hybrid government organizations to public administration theory 
and practice. This is evident from the latest studies conducted by Koppell
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(2001), Moe (2001), and Hoffmann and Cassell (2002). These studies focus 
on the type of organizations that combine characteristics of public and private 
sector organizations. While analyzing federal quasi-governments, Moe (2001) 
raises the following questions; “Hybrid Organizations: Problem or Solution... 
Does this constitute a positive or negative factor in the performance of 
effective democratic governance? Should growth in the number and variety of 
hybrid organizations be encouraged, benignly recognized, or actively 
resisted?” These questions are not only important in federal-quasi 
government situations, but also in the atmosphere of hybrid municipal 
administration and organization.
Hybrid forms of municipal governments such as general management 
cities raise the same critical issues at the local level as well. While the local 
governments are experiencing financial stress for the last two decades, this 
study addresses one of the key questions in this context: what are the special 
contributions by professional city managers to the fiscal performance of hybrid 
municipal governments? Findings of this study shed more light on the role of 
professional management in the fiscal performance of U.S. general 
management cities. Box (1993) observes: “We seem to be in a period of flux 
and change characterized by questioning of structural forms of local 
government, this questioning may well grow more intense before it subsides.”
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Synopsis of the Research and its Findings
Studies by Stumm (1997) and Stumm and Khan (1996) on the effects of 
revenue generation and expenditure show that the municipal government 
structure is related to fiscal management policies that affect municipal property 
tax revenue and expenditures. Like the other urban researchers who were 
interested in municipal administrative structures’ impact on policies, this study 
also intends to assess the impact of the general management administrative 
structure on its policy outcome.
To assess the effects of a general management city’s municipal 
administrative structure, this study employed a cross-sectional research 
design. The analysis utilized 1997 Census of Governments’ aggregated fiscal 
data on political jurisdiction that covered all the U.S. cities (N=1,166) that had 
a population of 25,000 or more as of 1996 estimated population. The 
analyses employed four most commonly used municipal fiscal performances 
dependent variables: (1) the composite fiscal stress index, (2) the revenue 
capacity per capita, (3) the per capita general expenditures, and (4) the FTE 
employee rate. Following are the main findings of this research:
H1. General management cities are likely to have lower fiscal stress than 
either strong mavor or council-manager cities
Results from this research do not support the hypothesis that general 
management cities have lower fiscal stress than strong mayor and council- 
manager cities. Strong mayor cities had the lowest fiscal stress levels 
compared to the other form of governments.
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H2. General management cities are likely to have lower revenue capacity per 
capita than either strong mavor or council-manager cities
Results of this study support the hypothesis that general management cities 
have lower revenue capacity per capita than strong mayor cities.
H3. General management cities are likely to have lower general fund 
expenditures than either strong mavor or council-manager cities
Results of this study support the hypothesis that general management cities 
have lower per capita general fund expenditures than strong mayor cities.
H4. General management cities are likely to have lower full-time equivalent 
employee rate than either strong mavor or council-manager cities
Results of this study support the hypothesis that general management cities 
have lower full-time equivalent employee rate than strong mayor cities.
Thus, results of this study support the hypothesis that general 
management cities have better fiscal performance, such as lower revenue 
capacity per capita, per capita general expenditures and the FTE employee 
rate than the strong mayor cities. But the results failed to support the 
hypothesis that general management cities have a better fiscal performance 
levels than council-manager cities. However, the results supported the 
hypothesis that claimed that the general management cities have a lower 
fiscal stress index level than the council-manager cities. This research 
rejected the null hypothesis of ‘no difference’ (based on the two-tailed test) in 
fiscal stress index levels since the strong mayor cities had a significantly lower 
fiscal stress index level than general management cities.
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To summarize, on the basis of the results, for cities over 25,000 
persons the council-manager form of municipal administrative structure results 
in better fiscal performance level than either the strong mayor and the general 
management municipal administrative structures. This research hypothesized 
that general management cities would have better fiscal performance level 
than either the council-manager and strong mayor cities. Thus, general 
management cities with an administrative structure resembling the politics- 
administration complementarity model does not confirm the hypothesized 
superiority of that model with regard to the management of a municipality’s 
fiscal affairs.
Though the findings did not support claims based on Svara’s politics- 
administration complementarity model, still this study contributes substantially 
to the theory and practice of public administration, especially to municipal 
government administration as described in the following paragraphs. In the 
following section, rather than reviewing each hypotheses outcome, the 
prominent observations of the data analysis are discussed in the context of the 
urban literature.
Can Different Municipal Administrative Structures Affect Fiscal 
Performance of a City?
This is the basic question guiding this research. Does adopting a 
particular form of municipal administrative structure result in significant and 
visible changes in a city’s fiscal behavior? One could assume that changes in
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the structural characteristics of city government might have fiscal policy 
consequences. The frequently tested hypothesis in urban policy literature on 
municipal fiscal behavior claims that reform governments (council-manager 
cities) should tax and spend less than the strong mayor cities. However, as 
Morgan and Kickham (1999) observe, literature that addressed this fiscal 
efficiency issue reveals too much ambiguity and the results of such research 
have been mixed. Some studies (Stumm and Corrigan, 1998 and Massad, 
1995) confirm the basic thesis that reformed cities are largely successful in 
meeting the efficiency criterion. Yet others (Deno and Mehay, 1987; Farnham, 
1987; Hayes and Chang, 1990; Morgan and Pelissero, 1980) have found that 
city government structure has little or no effect on municipal public revenues 
and expenditures.
However, the literature on urban policies has long suggested that the 
form of city government should have policy consequences. Therefore, to 
understand the impact of general management cities administrative structure 
on municipal fiscal performances, this study adopted Svara’s politics- 
administration complementarity model that theorized a mutually 
interdependent reciprocal influences in administrative relationship among 
elected and appointed officials to the general management cities.
In fact, Svara (1999a) distinguishes between chief administrators (all 
the professional city managers - regardless of form of municipal government) 
of the U.S. cities as city managers (council-manager cities’ chief executives) 
and the city administrators (general management cities’ chief executives). The
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city managers may possess powers of setting the legislative agenda, 
controlling the budget, appointing department heads, and overseeing general 
city day-to-day operations.
On the other hand, city administrators of general management cities 
have much more circumscribed authority. They may have limited appointment 
and budgetary powers, for example operating under the close supervision of 
the elected mayor or the governing board. In such cases, the administrators 
have much less opportunity to shape a city’s fiscal policies. Their activities 
may be restricted primarily to assigned tasks and giving advice at the request 
of the elected mayor. This is evident in ICMA’s criteria for official recognition 
of council-manager and general management cities. This could mean that 
GMC’s management position is an administrative position without proper 
authority to perform and make a difference in municipal fiscal policy.
Based on the administrative relationship, this thesis hypothesized that 
general management cities were more likely to have lower composite fiscal 
stress index, revenue capacity per capita, lower per capita general 
expenditures, and full-time equivalent rate of employees than both strong 
mayor and council-manager cities.
The underlying rationale of this study is the professional managerial 
training, type of the relationship among the elected and appointed officials, 
which granted the level of authority and the decision-making power of a 
municipal administrator, could make an observable difference in municipal 
fiscal performances.
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The Association of Professional Management with Municipal Fiscal 
Performance
A frequently discussed hypothesis in the urban literature is that 
professionally managed cities should tax and spend less than non- 
professionally managed strong mayor cities. Some studies confirm the basic 
thesis that relying on the professional management and insulating elected 
executives from administrative authority will protect cities from big spending 
budget maximizing elected executives. However, some researchers have also 
found that changing the administrative structures, as prescribed by the 
reformers in the earlier part of twentieth century, has little, if any effect on 
taxing and spending policy of the municipal governments.
Massad (1995) claims that the researchers have been unable to answer 
the recurring question as to whether the council-manager system results in 
more efficient municipal administration than the mayor-council system with 
certainty. Furthermore, he states that, to date, empirical evidence regarding 
the relative merits of council-manager versus mayor-council systems has been 
ambiguous. More than the lack of definitive findings on the traditional 
administrative structures’ impact on municipal fiscal behavior, the impact of the 
hybrid form of general management municipal administrative structure is 
virtually unknown in the urban literature.
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Association of Professional Management and Municipal Revenue and 
Expenditures:
Stumm and Corrigan (1998) found that professionally managed cities 
have substantial and statistically significant, lower general expenditures. They 
state that, “while many other variables affected municipal expenditures, the 
effects of having a professional manager were clearly most substantial, 
resulting in per capita savings in the general fund of nearly $90 per capita in 
local general fund expenditures”.
After analyzing Census Bureau data on municipal governments and 
data from the Places Rated Almanac, Massad (1995) found that large cities 
managed by city managers appear to be more efficient than those managed 
by mayors. This cost-benefit-perspective analysis significantly favors the 
council-manager form as more efficient than the mayor-council or strong 
mayor forms. Massad concludes that “city managers are demonstrably more 
responsible fiscally" than the mayor-council system. However, Massad finds 
no significant difference in the efficiency level between mayors and managers 
of small cities.
On the other hand, Davis and Hayes (1993) found that the presence of 
a city manager has no significant impact on efficiency. A time series analysis 
of 22 cities over 11 years, conducted by Morgan and Pelissero (1980), showed 
that that city government structure has little or no effect on municipal revenues 
and expenditures and different administrative structures in city government 
has virtually no effect on cities’ fiscal behavior. Also, they find that changes in
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city government structure have no impact on changes in taxation and 
spending levels. Similarly, Deno and Mehay (1987) found no apparent 
difference in the efficiency levels of the two municipal government structures. 
Hayes and Chang (1990) also found no differences when examining 
expenditures for police, fire, and sanitation in the ICMA’s 1981 Municipal 
Yearbook of listed cities.
Contrary to their observations, this study finds significant differences in 
fiscal performances among the three municipal structures under study. 
Council-manager cities, which had a clear separation of power among 
municipal officials, have faired better than the other cities and have shown a 
better fiscal performance. The general management cities that had managers 
with a circumscribed authority followed the council-manager cities in fiscal 
performance. But the strong mayor cities, in the absence of a professional 
manager to oversee the municipal business, lagged in fiscal performance.
The regression models showed that the strong mayor cities had less 
fiscal stress index when compared with the general management cities and 
council-manager cities. But the council-manager cities raised less in revenue 
capacity per capita, spent less in general fund expenditures, and employed 
fewer employees than the strong mayor cities and the general management 
cities. The fiscal performance of general management cities fell in-between 
the strong mayor and the council-manager cities. These relationships held 
after controlling for independent influences such as differences in regional 
location, city size, MSA status, population, density, percent poverty of the
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locality, unemployment rate, crime rate, fiscal capacity, and revenue effort of 
the locality.
Since this study included all the U.S. cities with populations 25,000 or 
more (from different regions of the country and with different city-sizes), the 
findings of this study help to settle the rhetoric on the association of municipal 
administrative structures or professional managements with efficient municipal 
functioning to considerable extent.
Recommendations for Future Research
The void in the urban literature is obvious when considering the number 
of studies that address the general management cities of the U.S. Therefore, 
in the following paragraphs, this study suggests a few angles that could be 
explored by the urban scholars in the future to fill that void to an extent.
1. A study that analyzes the distribution of general management cities 
across the country in relation with the state government’s policies and 
roles regarding granting home rule charters that enable the cities to 
exercise broad powers of self-rule
2. A study that employs a time-series research design to explore the 
outcome of the change intervention of GMC cities to explain the effect 
of the change intervention on the general management cities fiscal 
performances
3. A comparative study that explores the perception of city managers of 
the council-manager and the general management cities to understand
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their administrative role concept that explains their administrative 
leadership, decision-making authority, and a role in policy influence
4. A time-series study or a study that replicates this study by using the 
forthcoming 2002 Census of Government's aggregate fiscal data on 
municipal jurisdiction to understand the impact of general management 
cities’ administrative structure on municipal fiscal performance over the 
time
5. Also, a study that employs a fiscal stress index computed on some 
other model (other than representative tax system that had been used 
in this study) could confirm the results of this study’s findings on the 
association between fiscal stress index and municipal administrative 
structures
Implications for Future Research and Practice
For Research
Generally, most works of research on municipal fiscal performance use 
population and/or per capita income as a proxy measure to account for 
variations in municipal service demands. However, this study finds that the 
percent owner-occupied home also could be used as an excellent proxy 
measure to account for variations in municipal service demands. The variable, 
percent owner-occupied homes showed very highly significant level correlation 
with most of the regression equations. The percent owner-occupied home 
bears an inverse relationship to all municipal fiscal performance measures in
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all the municipal administrative structures at a significant to a very highly 
significant level except for the fiscal stress index measure
Percent owner-occupied home is a surrogate measure for percentage 
of homeowners. Percentage of homeowners represents the population that 
contributes to property tax revenues. The property tax has continually been 
cited as the least favored type of taxation at local level (Stumm and Corrigan, 
1998). This finding shows that residents who favor less property tax 
negatively impact tax revenues and municipal spending, and constrain 
municipal taxes and spending at significant levels too. Their expectations of 
low spending indirectly influence the cities into employing fewer numbers of 
employees.
Davis and Hayes (1993) study supports this observation. They applied 
frontier estimation techniques and constructed efficiency measures that could 
be used to examine the extent to which efficiency is influenced by the 
presence of a professional city manager. Their research resulted in the 
“theory of optimal monitoring” which indicated that tax rates and city size 
affected the citizen monitoring of municipal bureaucrats. Thus, the intensity of 
citizen monitoring along with other institutional factors influence the efficiency 
of government.
For Practice
The city managers of council-manager cities enjoy more independence 
in setting the legislative agenda, controlling the budget, appointing department 
heads, and overseeing the city’s general operation in comparison with city
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mangers of the general management cities (see Appendix -  B). On the other 
hand, the administrators of general management cities have much more 
circumscribed authority. They have limited appointment and budgetary 
powers, for example, operating under the close supervision of the elected 
mayor. In such cases, administrators of general management cities would 
surely have much less opportunity to shape the city’s fiscal and other 
administrative policies.
At least, in ICMA-recognized general management cities, the 
managerial authority and decision-making powers of their managers are 
documented in order to get the official recognition from ICMA. The other non- 
ICMA recognized strong mayor cities that follow the general management 
cities’ administrative structure (by hiring professional manager without officially 
declaring their form of government status) may have no guidelines in defining 
their managers’ role and authority in policy formulation and implementation. 
Chances are that some of these managers primarily perform tasks and give 
advice at the request of the elected mayor. Therefore, a convincing test of the 
policy consequences of general management cities should take into account 
the degree of authority residing in the office of general management city’s 
manager.
According to the results of this study, the traditional strong mayor cities 
have poor fiscal performances while the council-manager cities that give clear 
authority and decision-making powers to their managers have the better fiscal 
performance outcomes. The general management cities that granted
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circumscribed power and authority to their managers were in the middle. 
Based on this study’s results on municipal fiscal performance outcome, it 
might be advisable for a city to adopt a council-manager form of government 
modeled after the politics-administration dichotomy model.
The council-manager model was designed to provide greater economy, 
efficiency, and rational decision-making by granting a clear separation of 
power and authority to a professional manager. Taylor’s “principles of 
scientific management” approach prescribed the division of responsibilities 
and recommended delegating administrative responsibilities of searching for 
the best way of performing organizational tasks to professionally trained 
managers. The results of this study support the assumptions underlying the 
council-manager for of government.
The mutually interdependent, reciprocal influence present between the 
elected and the appointed administrators of general management cities may 
not results in a better fiscal performance than in the council-manager 
municipal administrative structure. But it excelled the strong mayor cities’ 
municipal fiscal performance levels. Therefore, this study’s results also show 
that some kind of a professional manager (either with or without power) is 
better than no manager at all.
In sum, if the cities’ objective is a fiscally efficient municipal 
government, they should opt for a professional manager and should grant 
power and authority to such a manager in order to make policy formulation 
and implementation as the way in council-manager cities.
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Conclusion
Finally, it is critical to define the potential outcome that might result from 
adopting any particular form of municipal administrative structure. Should the 
main concern of a service-oriented city administration be to tax and spend less 
rather than to provide responsive services to its citizenry? A switch to any 
other form of municipal administrative structure should consider other factors 
rather than merely targeting efficiency goals. This study identified that the 
fluctuations in population growth of the cities were significantly associated with 
municipal revenues, expenditures, and the FTE employee rate. Rapid growth 
of a locality can strain existing services and result in an increase in service- 
related expenditures and increased pressure on tax base. Benton and Menzel 
(1993) found that a local government’s decision to turn to a professional 
management often comes in response to the increasing service demands 
stemming from growth and urbanization.
Similarly, Schneider and Park (1989) show that the need for more 
services, especially social services, results in a strong upward push on 
spending. All GMC cities of this study also had a significant inverse 
relationship with revenues, expenditures and FTE employee rate. The cities 
that adopted the GMC status also showed a poor financial condition in the 
form of more outstanding liabilities at the fiscal year end. This could be the 
result of a response to the rising service demands. This response to the 
increased service demand that resulted due to a sudden population growth
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probably compelled the cities to expand services, improve professionalization, 
and risk higher budgets. Perhaps, those cities with greater service role have 
turned to professional managers’ help to better execute responsibilities that 
were already in place. A trend in movement towards choosing the option of 
hiring professional city managers by strong mayor cities when the cities start 
growing in size was also observed by Adrian, (1988).
This line of reasoning could spell out that hiring a professional manager 
is a need-driven choice as in the private sector rather than achieving the goals 
of less taxing and spending. As Wilson suggested, stable and businesslike 
principles of administrative management might have guided the operations of 
public agencies. In other words, targeting for the efficiency and economy may 
not be the main reason behind the decisions to hire a professional manager. It 
might be as simple as that to attain service effectiveness in response to rising 
service demands. However, a time-series research design in which the scope 
of the service is taken into account might help sort out this issue.
On the other hand, chances are that the strong mayor cities’ preference 
of hiring a manager may be the “test-driving” step before actually adopting the 
council-manager form of government. This study finds that, of 67 cities that 
had the general management municipal structure in 1993, 24 eventually 
decided to adopt the council-manager form of government. So there may be 
an evolutionary process in progress too. That process might have been 
started with a population growth, more service demands, hiring a professional 
manager, and finally formalizing the change by adopting council-manager form
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of municipal administrative structure. The general management cities’ 
decision to adopt or to drop the GMC status should be analyzed further with a 
pre-post test to answer this question.
Most of the cities have home rule charters that enable them to exercise 
broad powers of self-rule and an opportunity for exercise of local discretion. 
Thus, they are virtually free to adopt any form of municipal administrative 
structure that they feel suitable for their optimal functioning. As the following 
quote suggests, “For forms of government, let fools contest. Whatever is best 
administered is best.” -Alexander Pope. (Frisby, 1999). As the demand for 
public services and global competition among communities grows in this new 
century, the need for visionary political leadership and effective administrative 
skills will arise. Therefore, any developing new administrative structure will be 
the response to the ongoing needs faced by a given community and will be 
determined by the unique characteristics of the community under evolution of 
the change process. The better management structure for a given community 
is the one that is responsive to its community needs.
But continuous analyses and feedback on the municipal management 
will benefit the cities to select the administrative structure that will fit their need 
best. For instance, a clear understanding of the administrative relationship 
between elected and appointed administrators of the general management 
cities will help cities evaluate the suitability of the hybrid structure for their 
respective municipal government. In order to understand this administrative 
relationship clearly, more sophisticated case studies and cross-sectional
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surveys are needed.
Especially, as suggested before in the recommendations for future 
research directions, a survey study on general management city 
administrators could explain how far these city administrators see themselves 
as policy leaders. A better understanding of their relationship with the elected 
mayor could provide some useful strategies for the city managers who often 
face political perils that are well documented in the academic literature. From 
the early reform movement onward, the effort to make cities more efficient has 
been more focused on the structure of local government. Therefore, a gap in 
understanding the influence of a general management city’s city manager on 
city’s fiscal management has to be filled by more research.
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A. PROFILE OF U.S. CITIES AND THEIR FORMS OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES
Based on the 1996-estimated population, the 1,166 cities with 
populations of 25,000 or more were classified into strong mayor cities and 
council-manager cities (based on their administrative structure). Based on the 
ICMA’s published municipal government recognition criteria (see Appendix B), 
the strong mayor cities that had an appointed city administrators were 
categorized into a new category of general management cities along with the 
traditional strong mayor cities and council-manager cities.
In 1993, of the 1,166 cities that had a populations 25,000 or more 
(based on the 1996 estimated population), 23% (N=266) of the cites were 
strong mayor cities, 62% (N=728) were council-manager cities, 12% (N=138) 
were general management cities and the remaining 3% (N=34) had adopted 
some other forms of municipal administrative structure (See Table 1).
Table 1:
Comparison of Forms of Governments in 1993 and 1998
(Cities over 25,000 persons)
1993 1998
Form of Government N % N %
SMC 266 23 228 20
CMC 728 62 767 66
GMC 138 12 144 12
Other Forms 34 3 27 2
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
172
More or less the same proportions of administrative structures were 
observed by the cities in 1998. Of the 1,166 cities, 20% (N=228) were strong 
mayor cities, 66% (N=767) council-manager cities, and 12% (N=144) general 
management cities while the remaining 2% (N=27) had adopted some other 
forms of municipal administrative structures (See Table 1).
Of the 144 general management cities of 1998, 31% (N=44) got official 
recognition from the ICMA as general management cities. The remaining 69% 
(ISM 00) were traditional strong mayor cities that hired professional managers 
to conduct routine municipal business without formally declaring a general 
management status (see Table 2).
Table 2:
Official ICMA Recognition Status of 1998 General
Management Cities (Cities over 25,000 persons)
Status N %
ICMA Recognition 44 31
No ICMA Recognition 100 69
A comparison was done to identify the cities that maintained the same 
form of administrative structure consistently for five years from 1993 through 
1998. The cities that maintained the same administrative structures were 
coded as 1 and the cities that changed their administrative structure during 
that period were coded as 0. In general, out of 1,166 cities, 968 consistently 
maintained the same form of government. Of the 1,166 cities, 15% (N=179) 
maintained the same strong mayor city administrative structure, 62% (N=719)
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the same council-manager administrative structure, 6% (N=70) the same 
general management form of municipal administrative structure, and 3% 
(N=30), which followed other forms of administrative structures, their 
respective administrative structures without changing. However, 14% (N=168) 
cities changed their 1993 administrative structure and adopted a new form 
(see Table 3).
Table 3:
Form of Administrative Structure Maintained by the Cities for 5 Years 
(Cities over 25,000 persons)




Other Forms 30 3
Changed Forms 168 14
Further analysis for the 168 cities that changed their 1993 
administrative structures showed that, of the 85 strong mayor cities of year 
1993,15 adopted the council-manager form of government and the remaining 
70 hired professional managers to conduct municipal business and thus 
became general management cities. Of the seven council-manager cities, 
which adopted a different form of administrative structure within five years 
from 1993, four adopted the strong mayor city form and the remaining three 
cities adopted the general management administrative structure (see Table 4).
Of the general management cities of 1993, 67 changed their 
administrative structure before 1998. Of the 67genera! management cities
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that changed their administrative structure, 43 became strong mayor cities and 
the remaining 24 formally adopted the council-manager form of government. 
Overall, before 1998 when compared with 1993, the cities created 38 new 
municipal management positions. The changes made by other cities, which 
followed some other forms of municipal administrative structures, were not of 
main relevance to this thesis and are not discussed in detail (see Table 4).
Table 4:
Tracking the Change in Municipal Administrative Structures 
(Cities over 25,000 persons)
Form of Government Status-1993 N Changed
in 1998 to
N
SMC 85 CMC 15
GMC 70
CMC 7 SMC 4
GMC 3
GMC 67 SMC 43
CMC 24
Other Government Form Changes 9
Total Changes 168
The data suggest that the council-manager cities changed less of their 
form of administrative structure. But the strong mayor and the general 
management cities hired professional city administrators and dropped them at 
a higher rate. Overall, 67 cities dropped the general management 
administrative structures but 73 cities adopted the general management 
administrative structure during 1993 to 1998 duration.
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This approach might have helped the strong mayor cities avoid going 
through the difficulties of formal procedural steps involved in adopting the 
council-manager form to get a professional administrator’s help. Generally, a 
change in the municipal administrative structure was accomplished by the 
charter. A charter, which ordinarily requires a popular vote, allows for basic 
structural alterations. Therefore, it is understandable that, if and where 
localities need more than minor changes, then local officials would pursue the 
charter route rather than rely on statutory provisions or a change in form 
accomplished by a local ordinance.
Alternatively, a change in the mayoral position also could have 
contributed towards these changes since the professional managers served at 
the pleasure of the mayors in the strong mayor cities. This observation was 
similar to the one that showed that only 31% of the 1998 general management 
cities got the official general management status from the ICMA (see Table 2).
However, of the 67 general management cities that dropped the GMC 
status before 1998, 25% (N=17) had previously the official general 
management city recognition status from the ICMA in 1993. The 
characteristics of cities that dropped GMC status and adopted GMC status 
were further explored in detail to understand the possible socioeconomic 
characteristics that might have triggered the decision of these cities that had 
changed their administrative form.
To ensure a rigorous test, cities that consistently maintained the same 
form of administrative structure for five years prior to 1998 (1993-1998), were
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
176
included in the analyses. As mentioned before, of the 1,166 cities, 968 
maintained the same administrative structure consistently from 1993 through 
1998, and were included in the data analyses carried out to answer the 
proposed research questions. This approach of filtering out the cities that 
changed their municipal administrative structures reduced ambiguity in 
interpreting the impact of different municipal administrative structures on 
municipal fiscal performance. This approach controlled for the municipal 
administrative change interventions in the analyses and improved the one-shot 
study approach employed in this study.
Of the resultant 968 cities that were selected for the data analyses,
18% (N=179) were strong mayor cities, 75% (N=719) were council manager 
cities and the remaining 7% (N=70) were the general management cities (see 
Table 5).
Table 5:
Form of Municipal Administrative Structures 
(Cities over 25,000 persons)




The above results showed that council-manager form of municipal 
administrative structures was the most common one in the U.S. cities; also 
these cities were the ones that intended to change the least to a different form 
of administrative structure. Overall about 82 % (N= 789) cities with
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populations of 25,000 or more were maintained by professional administrators 
(combined council-manager and general management cities).
Crosstabulation Results: Form of Administrative Structures with City 
Sizes, Regional Distribution and Metropolitan Status of American Cities
Crosstabulation analyses were performed to understand further in detail 
the distribution of the forms of municipal administrative structures in cities of 
different sizes, different regions and the MSA localities.
City Size and the Form of Municipal Administrative Structure: In all city size 
groups, predominant administrative structure was the council-manager form. 
Nearly 75% (N=593) of the small cities and 79% (N=99) of the medium-size 
cities were council-manager cities. But, among the big cities, there was a 
smaller percentage with the council-manager form of municipal administrative 
structure. Of the 51 big cities, only 53% (N=27) had adopted the council- 
manager form of municipal administrative structure.
The strong mayor administrative structure was adopted by nearly 19% 
of small and big cities, but only 14% of the medium-size cities preferred the 
strong mayor form of municipal administrative structure. The administrative 
structure least favored by all city size was the general management 
administrative structure. Only 6% (N=47) of the small cities and 7% (N=9) of 
medium-size cities preferred the general management administrative 
structure. But 28% (N=14) of the big cities hired professional managers 
without formally adopting the council-manager form of government structure
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(See Figure 1). This showed that about 80% of the big cities had professional 
city administrators (combined CMC and GMC governments).
Figure 1:
Percentage of Municipal Administrative Structures in Different City
Size Groups
100-
Small Cities Medium Size Cities Big Cities
Region and Form of Municipal Administrative Structure: Again, the council- 
manager form of municipal administrative structure was adopted by all the 
regions of the country except the Northeast. Of the 106 cities in this region, 
56% (N=59) were strong mayor cities (see Figure 2).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
179
Figure 2:
Percentage of Municipal Administrative Structures in Regions of the
Country
fiSMC




Percentage of Muncipal Administrative Structures in MSA Localities
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MSA Status and Form of Municipal Administrative Structure: Crosstabulation 
of the MSA status and the form of municipal administrative structure did not 
show much difference from the general pattern of municipal administrative 
structure distributed at the national level. Most of the cities in both the MSA 
and non-MSA localities preferred the council-manager form of government, 
followed by preferences for strong mayor and general management municipal 
administrative structures (See Figure 3).
The other patterns of distribution of municipal administrative structures, 
which emerged after the layered crosstabulation of the municipal 
administrative structure variable with the city size, regional location and MSA 
status variables, were as follows:
• A majority of the cities in the Northeast region of the country had the 
strong mayor form of municipal administrative structure and no big 
cities had the council-manager form of administrative structure.
• A majority of the cities in the Southern region of the country had the 
council-manager form of municipal administrative structure and all MSA 
cities of the Southern region had managers.
• In the Midwest region of the country, all the cities in MSA localities had 
professional management help in conducting routine municipal 
business.
• In the Mountain region of the country, the strong mayor municipal 
administrative structure was associated only to the smaller cities. All 
the medium-size and big cities had professional managers.
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• In the Pacific region of the country, all the medium-size cities had the 
council-manager form of municipal administrative structure.
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B. ICMA’S LOCAL GOVERNMENT R E C O G N IT IO N  PROCEDURES
ICMA-Recognteed Local Governments 389
ICMA Local Government 
Recognition
Procedures for Recognition
This section of WHO'S WHO  includes cities, 
counties, councils of governments, and state 
associations of local governments, recognized 
by ICMA as leaving established an appointed 
position of overall professional management. 
An fCMA-recognized position is one that has 
been established through ordinance, referen­
dum, resolution of the governing body, or state 
law. Recognition means the community is iden­
tified as one that provides a legal framework 
conducive to the practice of professional man­
agement.
Introduction. ICMA recognition falls into 
two categories— council manager and general 
management. The criteria related to the coun- 
cil-manager government category are less flex­
ible than those for the general-management 
category. The reasons for this derive from the 
historical significance and the nature of the 
council-manager form. In the council-manager 
form rests the historic basis of the Association's 
origins, and the membership has come fo iden­
tity it as a superior form of government organi­
sation. it is not seen as the only means, of 
fvoviding for overall professional management, 
but the intent is to recognize its contribution to 
focal government by maintaining an identity 
with the wide variety of forms of administrative 
organization established by democratic gov­
ernments throughout the world {adopted Oc­
tober 11, 1969).
Process. Recognition takes the form of desig­
nating either a  council-manager position or a 
general-management position. The process for 
council-manager recognition involves the sub­
mission of an application for recognition along 
with supporting documentation to ICMA. The 
staff reviews the material and approval Is 
extended by the executive director with the 
concurrence of the state association and the 
ICMA regional vice president responsible for 
the applicant’s state. General-management 
recognition also requires the submission of an 
application and supporting documentation; 
however, approval is extended by the full ICMA 
Executive Board.
Docum entation. Documentation that must ac­
company an application for recognition includes 
a copy of legislation and other legal documents 
relating to the establishment and authority of 
the appointed chief management position, a 
copy of the job description for the above, if 
such exists, and an official organization chart, if 
such exists, in addition, the completion of a 
questionnaire Is required for processing.
Counties. The review of county recognitions is 
conducted according to the criteria for council- 
manager or general-management positions. AH 
applications for recognition of counties that 
appear to fafl under the general-management 
category are reviewed by the National Associa­
tion of County Administrators,
Councils o f Governm ents. The review 
of councils of governments is conducted ac­
cording to the same criteria and process as 
general-management positions.
State Associations o f Local Governments.
The recognition of state/provincial associations 
of local governments is conducted according
to the same criteria and process as general 
management positions. The specific criteria are 
as follows:
* The league must be formally established 
and the director must be full-time.
* There should be at least one additional pro­
fessional staff person.
* The league should be involved in the gov­
ernment activities of the area.
o Consideration should be given to the 
extent to which the feague operates pro­
grams directly, such as technical assistance, 
training, and so forth.
* Experience and background of the person 
filling the position of director should be in 
public administration.
The by-taws or constitution must conform to 
the criteria for recognition under the general 
management criteria.
Review o f Recognition Criteria, in October 
1987, the ICMA Executive Board charged the 
ICMA Assistants Steering Committee with the 
task of evaluating ICMA’s recognition criteria in 
relationship to current practices in communi­
ties utilizing the council manager and general 
management forma. The committee's report, 
which was completed in July 1988, recom­
mended retaining the council-manager and the 
general management criteria, and it drafted 
guidelines to help interpret the criteria, much 
as the Code of Ethics guidelines interpret the 
Code. The Executive Board discussed these 
recommendations and possible alternatives 
with ICMA members during the year, and at the 
July 1989 board meeting adopted the criteria 
and guidelines shown on the next page.
* Source ICMA
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B. ICMA’S LOCAL GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZATION PROCEDURES
(Cont)
3 SO WHO’S WHO 1997-1998
Criteria and Guidelines for Recognition
Recognition of a Council- 
Managor Position
(Adopted October 11,1969, and revised 
July 22r 1989)
Appointment. The manager can be appointed 
by a majority of the council for a definite or 
indefinite term and must be  subject to termina­
tion by a majority vote of the council at any
lime.
Guideline. It is recognized that the process for 
appointing the manager may include participa­
tion by others in nominating or recommending 
candidates to be considered. However, the 
firvai responsibility or authority of appointment 
as well as dismissal of the manager must lie 
with a majority of Vie council.
Policy formulation and  im plem entation. The
position should have direct responsibility in 
policy formulation as well as policy implemen­
tation.
Guideline. Final authority for policy formulation 
rests with the council, but the manager should 
ptay an integral role in developing and analyz­
ing alternatives for the council’s consideration 
and be responsible for implementation of coun­
cil-approved policy.
Budget. The manager shall be designated by 
legislation as having responsibility for prepara­
tion of the proposed budget for the council 's 
consideration and as having responsibility 
for implementation of the council approved 
budget.
Guideline. White the manager should have 
responsibility for preparing and presenting the 
budget to the council, it is recognized that 
many parties often participate in the budget 
process and may contribute to the develop­
ment of the manager’s recommended budget. 
Once approved by council, the manager is 
responsible for implementing and administer­
ing the budget.
Appointing authority. The manager strait have 
authority by legislation for the appointment and 
removal of at least most of the heads of the 
principal departments and functions of the lo­
cal government.
Guideline The manager's ability to indepen­
dently select the most qualified personnel for 
Key department head positions and remove 
Ihom when necessary is essential to his or her 
administrative effectiveness. Within this con­
text, it is recognized that a manager may 
choose tc consult with and seek consensus 
trorn council on the appointment arid dismissal 
of key department heads. Though the pre­
ferred arrangement is for the manager to have 
independent authonty to appoint and remove
key department heads, recognition in the 
C-M  category will also be extended to those 
communities in which council is given the au­
thority by legislation to confirm, validate or ratify 
such f>ersonnel actions, as long as responsibil­
ity for recommending them remains with the 
manager.
Organizational relationships. Those depart­
ment heads whom the manager appoints 
should be designated by legislation as admin­
istratively responsible to the manager.
Qualifications required for position. The 
qualifications for the position should bo based 
on the educational and administrative back­
ground of candidates.
Guideline. Appointment to the manager's 
position should be based on professional ex­
perience. administrative qualifications, and edu­
cation to ensure that the community is served 
by a  competent, well-trained professional. Po­
litical affiliations sliouid not in any way influence 
appointment.
Recognition of a General- 
Management Position
(Adopted April 19,1969, and revised 
July 22,1989,1
Appointm ent. The position shall be filled 
by appointment made by an elected represen­
tative and/or  representatives and shall be re­
sponsible to an elected representative and/or 
representatives.
Guideline. This criterion relates to the basic 
concept that overall management is the link 
between the political leadership and program 
execution, it is essential that the person filling 
the position of overall management be ap­
pointed by and responsible to the legislative 
body or the chief elected official of the local 
government.
Policy form ulation and im plem entation.
(Same as for council-manager position.)
Guideline. The position of overall management 
has a primary characteristic of responsibility lor 
creative initiative in the development of public 
policy alternatives and recommendations for 
consideration by elected officials throughout 
the broad spectrum of the local government's 
functions. Responsibility for policy formulation 
means that the person in the position has ac­
cess to the council and works with its mem­
bers even though he/she may report directly to 
the mayor. In the case of a council-appointed 
administrator, his/her access should be direct.
B u d g e t The position should have major 
responsibility for preparation and administra­
tion of the operating and capital improvement 
budgets
Guideline. Both elements should be present 
because it is through the administration of the 
operating budget that basic management con­
trol is exercised, and it is the budget prepara­
tion process that concerns itself with resource 
use. In applying this criterion, the term “major 
responsibility" refers to appointed positions and 
not elected positions. TNs may become criti­
cal in evaluating the work of a mayor-appointed 
administrator.
Appointing authority. The position should 
exercise significant influence in the appoint­
ment of key administrative personnel.
Guideline. The direct or legal appointive power 
will vary considerably. The fact that the posi­
tion may have authority only to recommend the 
appointment of department heads should not 
in and of itself exclude the local government 
from recognition. Neither is there any fixed 
formula as to which or how may appointments 
must be influenced.
It will be necessary to view this in the context of 
the position’s total responsibility, particularly 
the budget process. One important element is 
that the position should have authority to ap­
point a sufficient share of the management 
staff to control budget preparation and admin­
istration.
Organizational relationships. The position 
should have continuing direct relationships with 
operating department heads on the implemen­
tation and administration of programs
Guideline. The important factor here is that the 
position be recognizad.withtn the local govern 
ment organization as the principal genera! man­
agement professional. The relationship is most 
clear if the position has direct supervision over 
department heads. The real issue, however, is 
what day-in and day-out influence the position 
has over department heads. At a minimum, it 
should be expected that overall management 
responsibility includes the status of first peer 
among administrative peers m a horizontal or 
ganization.
Qualifications required for position.
(Same as for council-manager position.}
Guideline. This criterion simply means that the 
person should be chosen on merit and that he/ 
she should have significant administrative ex­
perience and educational background. It ex­
cludes the strictly “political" appointment, it 
does not mean, however, that the person must 
have local government experience per se.
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C. TECHNICAL APPENDIX





* (A) Composite (Al) Relative revenue capacity per capita score+
fiscal stress index (A2) Relative revenue effort score +
score (A3) Relative median household income score




u© capita score * Raw-score revenue capacity per capita converted to z-score
2 distribution of revenue capacity per capita
TS
.S (A2) Relative Total revenues from taxes = Raw-scnm of revenue rffnrtm
!




* Raw-score revenue effort converted to z-score distribution of
revenue effort




distribution of median household income score
(B) Revenue Total general revenues
Capacity Per Population
Capita
(C) Per capita Total general expenditures
general fund Population
expenditures
(D) FTE employee FTE employees y m non
rate Population of the city
* In order to combine a locality’s relative standing in terms of the three measures into a 
single composite fiscal stress index, the raw scores for each measure were standardized. 
This standardization was achieved in two stapes. First, each raw score was converted into 
a corresponding z-score. The z-score is a commonly used statistical transformation, 
which represents how many standard deviations a raw score value is from its mean value 
of a given group of city sizes. The second step is to convert each z-score into a number, 
called a relative stress score, which is positive in all cases. After the standardization was 
completed, a composite fiscal stress index was calculated for each locality by summing 
the relative stress scores across the three measures
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Per capita income Per capita income from census data
Median value of 
single family 
homes
Median value of single family homes from census data
Percent owner 
occupied home
Percent population of a municipality own home from census data
Percent Poverty 
Level
Poverty rate from census data (percentage of people live below 
poverty level)




Unemployment rate from census data (unemployed people per 
thousand population)
Median age of 
residents
Median age of residents from census data




Time 2 Population-Time 1 Population = Population net change





Land area (square mile)
Presence in MSA Precedence in MSA information of a municipality from census data
Geographic
region
Geographic region of a municipality from census data
Percent total 
outstanding debt / 
Current liabilities
Total debt out-standine at end of fiscal vear x  1 nn 
Total general fund revenues
Relative fiscal 
capacity
Raw-score revenue capacity per capita converted to z-score 
distribution of revenue capacity per capita (1)
Raw-score general expenditures per capita converted to z-score 
distribution of general expenditures per capita (2)
Relative revenue capacity per capita (1) = r ^ t i v *  fw ni m p a r itv  
Relative general expenditures per capita (2)
Relative revenue
effort
Total revenues from taxes =  p ^ -s r .m -p  n f  rpvprm p p ffn rt  
Total general revenues
Raw-score revenue effort converted to z-score distribution of 
revenue effort
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D. COMPUTATIONS
I. Computation of the Fiscal Stress Index
City of Norfolk, VA: An Example
Composite Fiscal Stress Index Score = Relative Revenue Capacity Per Capita (Al)+
Relative Revenue Effort (A2)+
Relative Median Household Income (A3)
Computation of Relative Revenue Capacity Per Capita (Al):
Step 1:





Standardization of Revenue Capacity Per Capita Score within the group of Medium 
Size Cities (Z Score of Revenue Capacity Per Capita)
Z = X -p  
a
X -  Raw score of Revenue Capacity Per Capita 
p = Mean Revenue Capacity Per Capita for Medium Size Cities 




Computation of Relative Score from Z Score 
= [2.6158 x (-1) x 5 + 55] =41.921 
Al =41.92
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Computation of Relative Revenue Effort (A2):
Step 1:
Revenue Effort (Raw Score) = Total Revenues From Taxes
Total General Revenues
$245.339.000 = 0.3566 
$687,807,000
Step 2:
Standardization of Revenue Effort Score within the group of Medium Size Cities (Z 
Score of Revenue Effort)
Z = X -u
a
X = Raw score of Revenue Effort 
p = Mean Revenue Effort for Medium Size Cities 




Computation of Relative Score from Z Score 
= [-0.8149 x (1) x 5 + 55] = 50.9255 
A2 = 50.925
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Computation Relative Median Household Income (A3):
Step 1:
Median Household Income (Raw Score) = $31,815 **
Step 2:
Standardization of Median Household Income Score within the group of Medium Size 
Cities (Z Score of Median Household Income)
Z -  X -u
CT
X = Raw score of Median Household Income 
p = Mean Median Household Income for Medium Size Cities 
o = Standard Deviation
31.815-43.408.14* = -0.9092 
12750.27 *
Step 3:
Computation of Relative Score from Z Score 
= [-0.9092X (-1) x 5 + 55] =  59.5462 
A3 = 59.5462
Computation of the Composite Fiscal Stress Index Score:
Composite Fiscal Stress Index Score = Relative Revenue Capacity Per Capita (Al)+
Relative Revenue Effort (A2)+
Relative Median Household Income (A3)
= 41.921 +50.9255 + 59.5462 
Composite Fiscal Stress Index for Norfolk, VA = 152.3927
* Statistics obtained by calculating group mean and standard deviation for the 
Medium Size Cities Group of United States
** Raw Score obtained from United States Census 2000 data (from Summary File 3)
Note: Computation method adopted from the Virginia’s Commission on Local 
Government
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II. Computation of the Relative Fiscal Capacity
City of Norfolk, VA: An Example
Raw-score revenue capacity per capita converted to z-score distribution of revenue 
capacity per capita (1)
Raw-score general expenditures per capita converted to z-score distribution of general 
expenditures per capita (2)
Relative revenue capacity per capita (1) = Relative fiscal capacity (3)
Relative general expenditures per capita (2)
Computation of Relative Revenue Capacity Per Capita (11:
Step 1:





Standardization of Revenue Capacity Per Capita Score within the group of Medium 
Size Cities (Z Score of Revenue Capacity Per Capita)
Z = X - | i  
a
X = Raw score of Revenue Capacity Per Capita
\x = Mean Revenue Capacity Per Capita for Medium Size Cities




Computation of Relative Score from Z Score 
= [2.6158 x (-1) x 5 + 55] = 41.921 
Relative revenue capacity per capita (1) = 41.921
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Computation of Relative General Expenditure Per Capita (2):
Step 1:





Standardization of General Expenditure Per Capita Score within the group of Medium 
Size Cities (Z Score of General Expenditure Per Capita)
Z = X -u
a
X = Raw score of General Expenditure Per Capita
p. = Mean General Expenditure Per Capita for Medium Size Cities




Computation of Relative Score from Z Score 
= [2.63944 x (-1) x 5 + 55] = 41.8028 
Relative general expenditures per capita (2) = 41.8028 
Computation Relative Fiscal Capacity (3):
Relative revenue capacity per capita fl) = Relative fiscal capacity (3)
Relative general expenditures per capita (2)
= 41.921 =1.002827 
41.8028
Relative fiscal capacity (3) = 1.002827
* Statistics obtained by calculating group mean and standard deviation for the 
Medium Size Cities Group of United States
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E. GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS
Composite fiscal stress index: Fiscal stress exists in a city when there is an imbalance 
between the city’s revenue-raising capacity and its expenditure need. A composite 
fiscal stress index is a relative measure that helps to identify those local governments 
which are experiencing a higher level of fiscal stress than other local governments of a 
given city size classification.
Expenditures per capita: Generally, municipal expenditures are considered to be the 
measure that indicates a municipality’s service output. Per capita expenditures of a 
jurisdiction reflects changes in service expenditures relative to changes in population.
FTE rate: The term “full-time equivalent employment” refers to a computed statistic 
representing the number of full-time employees that could have been employed if the 
reported number of hours worked by part-time employees had been worked by full­
time employees per 10,000 resident population of a locality. FTE rate is a relative 
frequency statistic used to standardize the employment figure across the cities.
General management city: Mayor-council municipalities that are using an appointed 
professional manager for overall administrative affairs without formally adopting the 
council-manager plan. This results in a hybrid municipal administrative structure. In 
July 1969, ICMA established criteria to recognize the hybrid forms of municipal 
government. In order to distinguish the new hybrid municipalities from those 
recognized as traditional council-manager governments, they were designated as 
general management municipalities.
Per capita general fund expenditure: Per capita general fund expenditure need is the 
amount the city must spend to provide adequate public services at citizens’ satisfaction 
level.
Percentage of current outstanding debt: Per capita outstanding debt (also referred to as 
current liabilities) is defined as the sum of all liabilities due at the end of the fiscal 
year relative to a municipality’s population size. Current liabilities comprise short­
term debt; the current portion of long-term debt, all accounts payable, accrued 
liabilities, and other current liabilities. Increasing current liabilities at the end of the 
year as a percentage of net operating revenue demonstrates the poor financial 
condition of a city.
Population density: Population density is the average number of inhabitants per 
square mile of land area. It is calculated by dividing the total number of residents by 
the number of square miles of land area of the locality. The census calculated 
population density data is used in this study.
Population net change: Population net change represents the decrease or increase 
between 1990 and 1997. Percent change represents simple percent change between 
these years.
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Relative fiscal capacity: This indicator that shows the local government’s ability to 
satisfy fiscal service needs is the ratio of total city revenues to total city expenditures. 
The fiscal health in terms of the general fund balances of a city depends on its ability 
to generate enough revenues to meet its expenditure needs. The relative fiscal 
capacity measure serves to identify the fiscal capacity of a local government that 
shows the city’s ability to raise sufficient revenue to satisfy expenditure needs when 
compared to other local governments in a given city size category such as small, 
medium-size and big cities. It is the ratio of total city revenues to total city 
expenditures regardless of revenue source and nature of expenditure. It is calculated 
by dividing a city’s revenue raising capability by its relative expenditure when 
compared with its similar size group of cities.
Relative measure: A relative measure serves to identify those local governments 
which are experiencing a given fiscal performance measure compared to other local 
governments across a given size group of cities such as small, medium-size and large 
cities. This means that whether overall local fiscal conditions are good or bad, 
roughly one-half of all cities will have an above-average fiscal position and 
approximately one-half will have a below-average fiscal position.
Relative median household income: A locality’s ability to raise revenues to provide 
services is depending on its residents’ incomes. Some studies use adjusted gross 
income as one dimension in calculating local revenue capacity per capita and fiscal 
stress. This study uses relative median household income data from census as the 
proxy measure to represent local residents’ wealth and spending ability.
Relative revenue capacity per capita: The revenue capacity measures the degree of 
municipality’s potential ability to raise revenue from its own tax sources to meet its 
service demand. This is an important dimension of the local government’s fiscal 
position. Revenue capacity gauges the degree of jurisdictional affluence in collections 
that a locality could anticipate from taxes, service charges, regulatory licenses, 
privilege fees, and various other governmental instruments that open avenues for 
potential revenue. Revenue-raising capacity of a city is defined as the amount of 
money a city can raise (per capita) at a given tax burden on its residents. The relative 
revenue capacity per capita measure explains the municipality’s ability to generate 
revenues from the tax base of a local government when compared to other local 
governments in a given city size category such as small, medium and big.
Relative revenue effort: A local government’s revenue effort is an important indicator 
of fiscal condition. The term ‘revenue effort’ means the portion of the tax base that 
has been tapped as revenue, also called as tax effort. It is the ratio of tax collections of 
a government to its revenue capacity and it is the measure of the effort put forth by the 
government to raise needed revenues. The relative revenue effort measure serves to 
identify the ability to generate tax revenue from the tax base of a local government 
when compared to other local governments in a given city size category such as small, 
medium and big. A local government’s revenue effort is equal to its actual revenue
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from local sources divided by its revenue capacity.
Revenues per capita: Per capita revenues of a locality show changes in revenues 
relative to changes in population size. As population grows, revenues and the need for 
municipal services may be expected to increase proportionately. The assumption is 
that the cost of services is directly related to population size.
z-score: The z-score is a commonly used statistical transformation, which represents 
how many standard deviations from the mean value for a given group of city sizes is 
represented by a raw score value.
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1. Total general fund revenues Fiscal year 1997
1997-Census o f Gov.- CG97(4)- 
4:
Vol. 4, Government Finances
September
2000
2. Population 1996 Estimated
1997-Census of Gov.- CG97(4)- 
4:







1. Total revenues from taxes Fiscal year 1997
1997-Census of Gov.- CG97(4)- 
4:
Vol. 4, Government Finances
September
2000
2. Total general fund revenues Fiscal year 1997
1997-Census of Gov.- CG97(4)- 
4:








to z-score Median household income 2000 Census 2000 Summary file 3
July-October
2002
B. Per capita general
fond expenditure Yes
1. Total general fund expenditure Fiscal year 1997
1997-Census of Gov.- CG97(4)- 
4:
Vol. 4, Government Finances
September
2000
2. Population 1996 Estimated
1997-Census of Gov.- CG97(4)- 
4:
Vol. 4, Government Finances
September
2000
C. FTE rate Yes
1. FTE March 1997





2. Population 1996 Estimated

















Table 9: Data source for control variables:
' f . jAw ii'inpu l’iist i tin« taut r^em it 
1
Per capita income No Per capita income 2000 Census 2000 Summary file 3 July-October2002
Median value of single 
family homes No Median value of single family homes 2000 Census 2000 Summary file 3
July-October
2002
Percent owner occupied 
home No Percent owner occupied 2000




Poverty rate No Poverty rate 2000 Census 2000 Summary file 3 July-October2002
Crime rate No Crime rate/100,000 population For year 1998 County and City Data Book: 2000
November
2001
Unemployment rate No Percent civilian unemployed to total civilian labor force 2000




Median age o f residents No Median age (years) 2000 County and City Data Book: 2000
November
2001
Population No Population 1996 Estimated
1997-Census of Gov.- CG97(4)- 
4:
Vol. 4, Government Finances
September
2000
Percent population net 
change Yes
1. 1990 census population 1990 County and City Data Book: 2000
November
2001
2. 1996 estimated population 1996 Estimated
1997-Census of Gov.- CG97(4)- 
4:




1. Land area in square miles 1990 County and City Data Book: 2000
November
2001
2. Population 1996 Estimated
1997-Census of Gov - CG97(4)- 
4:
















Table 9: Data source for control variables: (Continued)
/ H'thili
ii mHL'c | wii ,c | R i i 'ta <? rfc. <■'’</
Presence in MSA No Metropolitan areas 2000 County and City Data Book: 2000
November
2001
Geographic region No Northeast, south, Midwest and west regions 2000




Percent total outstanding 
debt / Current liabilities Yes
1. Total debt out-standing at end of 
fiscal year Fiscal year 1997
1997-Census of Gov.- CG97(4> 
4:
Vol. 4, Government Finances
September
2000
2. Total general fund revenues Fiscal year 1997
1997-Census of Gov.- CG97(4)- 
4:
VoL 4, Government Finances
September
2000
Relative fiscal capacity Yes
1. Total general fund expenditure Fiscal year 1997
1997-Census of Gov.- CG97(4)- 
4:
Vol. 4, Government Finances
September
2000
2. Total general fund revenues Fiscal year 1997
1997-Census of Gov.- CG97(4)- 
4:
Vol. 4, Government Finances
September
2000
3. Population 1996 Estimated
1997-Census of Gov.- CG97(4)- 
4:
Vol. 4, Government Finances
September
2000
Relative revenue effort Yes
1. Total revenues from taxes Fiscal year 1997
1997-Census of Gov.- CG97(4)- 
4:
Vol. 4, Government Finances
September
2000
2. Total general fund revenues Fiscal year 1997
1997-Census of Gov.- CG97(4)- 
4:
Vol. 4, Government Finances
September
2000
Table 10: Data source for independent variables 
J n  tn i*
•V&'idMes





recoding Form of government Year 1992 survey





recoding Form of government Year 1997 survey





G. DATA CODE BOOK
List of Variables on the Working File Measurement Level







1 Small cities ( 25,000 -  99,999 inhabitants)
2 Medium size cities (100,000 -  249,999 inhabitants)
3 Big cities (250,000 -  and above)
ICMA-Year Recognized Interval
Reorganization Status of GMC Nominal
(ICMA recognized, Non ICMA recognized, Not Applicable)
Form of Government Nominal
Value Label
1 SMC - Strong Mayor City
2 CMC - Council Manager City




Full-time Equivalent Rate Employees Ratio
Independent Variable:
Strong Mayor City 
Council Manager City 
General Management City
Dummy (Yes=l, No=0) 
Dummy (Yes=l, No=0) 
Dummy (Yes=l, No=0)
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DATA CODE BOOK (Cont.)
List of Variables on the Working File Measurement Level
Control Variables:
Per Capita Income Ratio
Median Value of Single Family Homes Ratio
Percent Owner Occupied Home Ratio
Percentage of Poverty Level Ratio
Crime Rate Ratio
Unemployment Rate Ratio
Median Age of Resident Ratio
1996 Population (Estimated) Ratio
Percent Population Net Change Ratio
Population Density Ratio
Presence in MSA Dummy (Yes=l, No=0)
Region - Northeast Dummy (Yes=l, No=0)
Region - South Dummy (Yes=T, No-0)
Region - Midwest Dummy (Yes=l, No=0)
Region - Mountain Dummy (Yes=l, No=0)
Region - Pacific Dummy (Yes=l, No=0)
Relative Fiscal Capacity Ratio
Relative Revenue Effort Ratio
Percent Total Outstanding Debt Ratio
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H. SYNTAX OF THE STATISTICAL ANALYSES
Descriptive Statistics Syntax:
FREQUENCIES
VARIABLES=pop 1996 density popgroth medinage pcapinc medhoinc unemprat 
poverty crimrate homevalu pntowner /FORMAT=NOTABLE 
/STATlSTICS=STDDEV RANGE MINIMUM MAXIMUM MEAN MEDIAN 
/ORDER ANALYSIS .
FREQUENCIES
VARIABLES=pcgenrev pcgenexp pctaxrev revefort fistress refiscap liabilty 
fterate /FORMAT=NOTABLE
/STATISTICS=STDDEV RANGE MINIMUM MAXIMUM MEAN MEDIAN 
/ORDER ANALYSIS .
DESCRIPTIVES
VARIABLES=pop1996 density popgroth medinage pcapinc medhoinc unemprat 
poverty crimrate homevalu pntowner pcgenrev pcgenexp pctaxrev revefort 
fistress refiscap liabilty fterate 
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV RANGE MIN MAX .
Inferential / Hypothesis Testing Syntax 
[All cities data file]
H1 Syntax (Fiscal Stress Index):
REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N 
/MISSING LISTWISE




/METHOD=ENTER smc gmc pop1996 popgroth density medinage pcapinc pntowner
unemprat crimrate liabilty msa small medium big
/RESIDUALS DURBIN
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3)
/SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED SEPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER MCIN ICIN RESID 
ZRESID
SRESID DRESID SDRESID DFBETA SDBETA DFFIT SDFIT COVRATIO .
H2 Syntax (Revenue Capacity Per Capita):
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2 0 0
REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N 
/MISSING LISTWISE




/METHOD=ENTER smc gmc pop1996 popgroth density medinage pcapinc pntowner
unemprat crimrate liabilty msa small medium big
/RESIDUALS DURBIN
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3)
/SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED SEPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER MCIN ION RESID 
ZRESID
SRESID DRESID SDRESID DFBETA SDBETA DFFIT SDFIT COVRATIO .
H3 Syntax (Per Capita General Expenditures):
REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N 
/MISSING LISTWISE




/METHOD=ENTER smc gmc pop1996 popgroth density medinage pcapinc pntowner
unemprat crimrate refiscap a2 msa small medium big
/RESIDUALS DURBIN
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3)
/SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED SEPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER MCIN ICIN RESID 
ZRESID
SRESID DRESID SDRESID DFBETA SDBETA DFFIT SDFIT COVRATIO .
H4 Syntax (FTE Employee Rate):
REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N 
/MISSING LISTWISE




/METHOD=ENTER smc gmc pop1996 popgroth density medinage pcapinc pntowner
unemprat crimrate refiscap a2 msa small medium big
/RESIDUALS DURBIN
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3)
/SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED SEPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER MON ICIN RESID 
ZRESID
SRESID DRESID SDRESID DFBETA SDBETA DFFIT SDFIT COVRATIO .
Socioeconomic variable correlations: 
H1
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REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N 
/MISSING LISTWISE




/METHOD=ENTER pop1996 popgroth density medinage pcapinc pntowner 
unemprat crimrate liabilty msa small medium big 
/RESIDUALS DURBIN 
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3)
/SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED SEPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER MCIN ICIN RESID 
ZRESID
SRESID DRESID SDRESID DFBETA SDBETA DFFIT SDFIT COVRATIO .
H2
REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N 
/MISSING LISTWISE




/METHOD=ENTER pop1996 popgroth density medinage pcapinc pntowner 
unemprat crimrate liabilty msa small medium big 
/RESIDUALS DURBIN 
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3)
/SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED SEPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER MCIN ICIN RESID 
ZRESID
SRESID DRESID SDRESID DFBETA SDBETA DFFIT SDFIT COVRATIO .
H3
REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N 
/MISSING LISTWISE




/METHOD=ENTER pop1996 popgroth density medinage pcapinc pntowner 
unemprat crimrate refiscap a2 msa small medium big 
/RESIDUALS DURBIN 
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3)
/SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED SEPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER MCIN ICIN RESID 
ZRESID
SRESID DRESID SDRESID DFBETA SDBETA DFFIT SDFIT COVRATIO .
H4
REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N 
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS Cl BCOV R ANOVA COLLIN TOL CHANGE ZPP





/METHOD=ENTER pop1996 popgroth density medinage pcapinc pntowner 
unemprat crimrate refiscap a2 msa small medium big 
/RESIDUALS DURBIN 
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTUERS(3)
/SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED SEPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER MCIN ICIN RESID 
ZRESID
SRESID DRESID SDRESID DFBETA SDBETA DFFIT SDFIT COVRATIO .
Exploratory Study Syntax
[GMC cities data file:]
H1 Syntax (Fiscal Stress Index):
REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N 
/MISSING LISTWISE




/METHOD=ENTER gotgmc maingmc pop1996 popgroth density medinage pcapinc pntowner
unemprat crimrate liabilty msa small medium big
/RESIDUALS DURBIN
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3)
/SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED SEPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER MCIN ICIN RESID 
ZRESID
SRESID DRESID SDRESID DFBETA SDBETA DFFIT SDFIT COVRATIO .
H2 Syntax (Revenue Capacity Per Capita):
REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N 
/MISSING LISTWISE




/METHOD=ENTER gotgmc maingmc pop1996 popgroth density medinage pcapinc pntowner
unemprat crimrate liabilty msa small medium big
/RESIDUALS DURBIN
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3)
/SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED SEPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER MCIN ICIN RESID 
ZRESID
SRESID DRESID SDRESID DFBETA SDBETA DFFIT SDFIT COVRATIO .
H3 Syntax (Per Capita General Expenditures): 
REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
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/MISSING LISTWISE




/METHOD=ENTER gotgmc maingmc pop1996 popgroth density medinage pcapinc pntowner
unemprat crimrate refiscap a2 msa small medium big
/RESIDUALS DURBIN
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3)
/SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED SEPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER MCIN ICIN RESID 
ZRESID
SRESID DRESID SDRESID DFBETA SDBETA DFFIT SDFIT COVRATIO .
H4 Syntax (FTE Employee Rate):
REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N 
/MISSING LISTWISE




/METHOD=ENTER gotgmc maingmc pop 1996 popgroth density medinage pcapinc pntowner
unemprat crimrate refiscap a2 msa small medium big
/RESIDUALS DURBIN
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3)
/SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED SEPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER MCIN ICIN RESID 
ZRESID




/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N 
/MISSING LISTWISE




/METHOD=ENTER pop1996 popgroth density medinage pcapinc pntowner 
unemprat crimrate liabilty msa small medium big 
/RESIDUALS DURBIN 
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3)
/SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED SEPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER MCIN ICIN RESID 
ZRESID
SRESID DRESID SDRESID DFBETA SDBETA DFFIT SDFIT COVRATIO .
H2- GMC Cities 
REGRESSION
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/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
/MISSING LISTWISE




/METHOD=ENTER pop1996 popgroth density medinage pcapinc pntowner 
unemprat crimrate liabilty msa small medium big 
/RESIDUALS DURBIN 
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3)
/SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED SEPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER MCIN ICIN RESID 
ZRESID
SRESID DRESID SDRESID DFBETA SDBETA DFFIT SDFIT COVRATIO .
H3- GMC Cities 
REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N 
/MISSING LISTWISE




/METHOD=ENTER pop1996 popgroth density medinage pcapinc pntowner 
unemprat crimrate refiscap a2 msa small medium big 
/RESIDUALS DURBIN 
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3)
/SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED SEPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER MCIN ICIN RESID 
ZRESID
SRESID DRESID SDRESID DFBETA SDBETA DFFIT SDFIT COVRATIO .
H4- GMC Cities 
REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N 
/MISSING LISTWISE




/METHOD=ENTER pop1996 popgroth density medinage pcapinc pntowner 
unemprat crimrate refiscap a2 msa small medium big 
/RESIDUALS DURBIN 
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3)
/SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED SEPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER MCIN ICIN RESID 
ZRESID
SRESID DRESID SDRESID DFBETA SDBETA DFFIT SDFIT COVRATIO .
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I. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Table 11: Distribution of the Cities
Number of Cities in all the states (with population 25,000 and
above -1996 estimated)
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Table 12: Form of Government i n  1993
Year-1993
STATE SMC (N) SMC (%) CMC (N) CMC (%) GMC (N) GMC (%) OTHER (N) OTHER(%) MISSING (N) MISSING (%)
AL 7 47 4 27 2 13 2 13 0 0
AK 0 0 2 67 1 33 0 0 0 0
AZ 0 0 13 87 1 7 0 0 1 7
AR S 67 4 33 0 0 0 0 0 0
CA 3 1 221 93 9 4 0 0 5 2
CO 0 0 16 84 3 16 0 0 0 0
CT 11 61 4 22 3 17 0 0 0 0
DE 0 0 2 67 1 33 0 0 0 0
DC 1 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FL 5 7 56 84 5 7 1 1 0 0
GA 3 IS 10 59 4 24 0 0 0 0
HI 0 0 0 0 1 100 0 0 0 0
ID 5 71 2 29 0 0 0 0 0 0
IL 20 27 40 53 12 16 3 4 0 0
IN 24 86 0 0 4 14 0 0 0 0
IA 3 18 12 71 1 6 1 6 0 0
KS 1 8 11 85 1 8 0 0 0 0
KY 3 27 7 64 1 9 0 0 0 0
LA 7 58 0 0 4 33 1 8 0 0
ME 0 0 2 67 0 0 1 33 0 0
MD 0 0 4 57 3 43 0 0 0 0
MA 29 71 8 20 4 10 0 0 0 0
MI 12 27 27 61 4 9 0 0 1 2
MN 0 0 25 78 7 22 0 0 0 0
MS 3 33 1 11 4 44 1 11 0 0
MO 3 15 12 60 5 25 0 0 0 0
MT 1 17 4 67 1 17 0 0 0 0
NE 1 20 1 20 3 60 0 0 0 0
NV 0 0 6 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
NH 2 33 4 67 0 0 0 0 0 0
NJ 14 45 6 19 8 26 3 10 0 0
NM 0 0 7 70 3 30 0 0 0 0
NY 17 59 10 34 1 3 1 3 0 0
NC 0 0 20 91 2 9 0 0 0 0
ND 2 50 1 25 0 0 1 25 0 0
OH 24 47 19 37 8 16 0 0 0 0
OK 0 0 13 93 1 7 0 0 0 0
OR 1 7 12 86 0 0 1 7 0 0
PA 12 55 5 23 4 18 0 0 1 5
RI 3 50 1 17 2 33 0 0 0 0
SC 0 0 8 62 5 38 0 0 0 0
SD 1 33 0 0 0 0 2 67 0 0
TN 7 41 6 35 2 12 2 12 0 0
TX 3 3 76 88 5 6 1 1 1 1
UT 6 43 5 36 2 14 0 0 1 7
VT 1 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
VA 0 0 17 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
WA 7 26 14 52 3 11 0 0 3 11
WV 3 60 2 40 0 0 0 0 0 0
WI 12 46 6 23 8 31 0 0 0 0
WY 1 33 2 67 0 0 0 0 0 0
266 23% 728 62% 138 12% 21 2% 13 1%
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Table 13: Form of Government in 1998
Year-1998
STATE SMC (N) SMC (%) CMC (N) CMC (%) GMC (N) GMC (%)OTHER (N) OTHER (%) MISSING (N) MISSING (%)
AL 7 47 4 27 2 13 2 13 0 0
AK 2 67 1 33 0 0 0 0 0 0
AZ 1 7 13 87 0 0 1 7 0 0
AR 6 50 4 33 2 17 0 0 0 0
CA 1 0 233 98 3 1 0 0 1 0
CO 0 0 18 95 1 5 0 0 0 0
CT 9 50 4 22 5 28 0 0 0 0
DE 1 33 2 67 0 0 0 0 0 0
DC 1 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FL 5 7 57 85 3 4 2 3 0 0
OA 2 12 10 59 5 29 0 0 0 0
HI 0 0 0 0 1 100 0 0 0 0
ID 3 43 2 29 2 29 0 0 0 0
IL 14 19 45 60 14 19 2 3 0 0
IN 19 68 1 4 8 29 0 0 0 0
IA 1 6 14 82 1 6 1 6 0 0
KS 2 15 11 85 0 0 0 0 0 0
KY 1 9 7 64 2 18 1 9 0 0
LA 5 42 0 0 6 50 1 8 0 0
ME 0 0 3 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
MD 1 14 4 57 2 29 0 0 0 0
MA 24 59 10 24 7 17 0 0 0 0
MI 10 23 27 61 7 16 0 0 0 0
MN 1 3 27 84 4 13 0 0 0 0
MS 5 56 1 11 2 22 1 11 0 0
MO 3 15 15 75 2 10 0 0 0 0
MT 0 0 4 67 1 17 1 17 0 0
NE 2 40 1 20 2 40 0 0 0 0
NV 0 0 6 !© ; O 0 0 0 0 0 0
NH 2 33 4 67 0 0 0 0 0 0
NJ 10 32 6 19 12 39 3 10 0 0
NM 0 0 8 80 2 20 0 0 0 0
NY 16 55 7 24 5 17 1 3 0 0
NC 0 0 22 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
ND 1 25 1 25 1 25 1 25 0 0
OH 25 49 16 31 9 18 1 2 0 0
OK 1 7 13 93 0 0 0 0 0 0
OR 1 7 12 86 0 0 1 7 0 0
PA 8 36 7 32 6 27 0 0 1 5
RI 2 33 1 17 3 50 0 0 0 0
SC 1 8 10 77 2 15 0 0 0 0
SD 1 33 0 0 0 0 2 67 0 0
TN 6 35 6 35 3 18 2 12 0 0
TX 2 2 79 92 4 5 1 1 0 0
UT 3 21 6 43 4 29 0 0 1 7
VT 1 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
VA 0 0 17 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
WA 5 19 17 63 5 19 0 0 0 0
WV 1 20 3 60 1 20 0 0 0 0
WI 15 58 6 23 5 19 0 0 0 0
WY 1 33 2 67 0 0 0 0 0 0
228 20% 767 66%| 144 12% 24 2% 3 0%
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Table 14:
Cities that maintained same form of government for 
5 years (1993-1998)
STATE CITIES (N) SMC (N) SMC (%) CMC (N) CMC (%) GMC (N) GMC (%)
AL 11 6 55 4 36 1 9
AK 1 0 0 1 100 0 0
AZ 12 0 0 12 100 0 0
AR 10 6 60 4 40 0 0
CA 224 1 0 221 99 2 1
CO 17 0 0 16 94 1 6
CT 14 8 57 4 29 2 14
DE 2 0 0 2 100 0 0
DC 1 1 Oo 0 0 0 0
FL 62 4 6 55 89 3 5
GA 14 1 7 10 71 3 21
HI 1 0 0 0 0 1 100
ID 5 3 60 2 40 0 0
IL 62 13 21 40 65 9 15
IN 17 16 94 0 0 1 6
IA 12 0 0 12 100 0 0
KS 12 1 8 11 92 0 0
KY 9 1 11 7 78 1 11
LA 7 4 57 0 0 3 43
ME 2 0 0 2 100 0 0
MD 6 0 0 4 67 2 33
MA 28 20 71 8 29 0 0
MI 36 7 19 27 75 2 6
MN 29 0 0 25 86 4 14
MS 6 3 50 1 17 2 33
MO 17 3 18 12 71 2 12
MT 5 0 0 4 80 1 20
NE 2 0 0 1 50 1 50
NV 6 0 0 6 100 0 0
NH 6 2 33 4 67 0 0
NJ 18 7 39 6 33 5 28
NM 9 0 0 7 78 2 22
NY 21 14 67 7 33 0 0
NC 20 0 0 20 100 0 0
ND 2 1 50 1 50 0 0
OH 38 19 50 16 42 3 8
OK 13 0 0 13 100 0 0
OR 13 1 8 12 92 0 0
PA 13 6 46 5 38 2 15
RI 3 1 33 1 33 1 33
SC 10 0 0 8 80 2 20
SD 1 1 100 0 0 0 0
TN 14 6 43 6 43 2 14
TX 80 1 1 76 95 3 4
UT 8 2 25 5 63 1 13
VT 1 1 100 0 0 0 0
VA 17 0 0 17 100 0 0
WA 22 5 23 14 64 3 14
W V 3 1 33 2 67 0 0
WI 23 12 52 6 26 5 22
WY 3 1 33 2 67 0 0
968 179 18% 719 74% 70 7%
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Table 15:
City Size and Form of Government Crosstabulation
Form o f G overnm ent
TotalSMC CMC GMC
City Sm all Count 152 593 47 792
Size % w ithin City Size 19.2% 74.9% 5.9% 100.0%
% o f Total 15.7% 61.3% 4.9% 81.8%
M edium Count 17 99 9 125
% w ithin C ity Size 13.6% 79.2% 7.2% 100,0%.
% o f Total 1.8% 10.2% .9% 12.9%
Big Count 10 27 14 51
% w ithin C ity Size 19.6% 52.9% 27.5% 100.0%
% o f Total 1.0% 2.8% 1.4% 5.3%
Total Count 179 719 70 968
% w ithin C ity Size 18.5% 74.3% 7.2% 100.0%
% o f Total 18.5% 74.3% 7.2% 100.0%
Table 16:
Region and Form of Government Crosstabulation
Region
Total
Form o f Government
TotalSMC CMC GMC
Northeast Count 59 37 10 106
% within Region 55.7% 34.9% 9.4% 100.0%
% of Total 6.1% 3.8% 1.0% 11.0%
South Count 34 229 22 285
% within Region 11.9% 80.4% 7.7% 100.0%
% of Total 3.5% 23.7% 2.3%> 29.4%
Midwest Count 73 151 27 251
% within Region 29.1% 60.2% 10.8% 100.0%
% o f Total 7.5% 15.6% 2.8% 25.9%
Mountain Count 6 54 5 65
% within Region 9.2% 83.1% 7.7% 100.0%
% o f Total .6% 5.6% .5% 6.7%
Pacific Count 7 248 6 261
% within Region 2.7% 95.0% 2.3% 100.0%
%i o f Total .7% 25.6% .6% 27.0%
Count 179 719 70 968
% within Region 18.5% 74.3% 7.2% 100.0%
% o f Total 18.5% 74.3% 7.2% 100.0%
Table 17:
M S A  and Form of Government Crosstabulation
-M S A "
Form  o f G overnm ent
SMC CMC GMC Total
Non M SA Count
%  w ith in M SA 













MSA Count% w ith in M SA 














%  w ith in M SA 

























Statistics on Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Cities with Population of 25,000 or more
N
Valid Missing Mean Median Std. Deviation Range Minimum Maximum
Population (1996) 968 0 96193.42 48098.00 293617.63 7355872 25034 7380906
Population Density 968 0 3877.12 2989.75 3646.33 58591 11 58603
Population Growth 968 0 8.9227 5.2221 15.0055 157.93 -19.27 138.66
Median Age of Residents 882 86 34.082 34.300 4.789 51.8 2.3 54.1
Per Capita Income 968 0 22134.28 20053.50 7910.17 58361 8415 66776
Median Household Income 968 0 45200.72 40702.50 16103.98 124013 15882 139895
Unemployment Rate 880 88 4.055 3.400 2.429 24.6 .9 25.5
Percent Poverty 968 0 12.8535 12.0500 7.7359 46.10 .80 46.90
Crime Rate 735 233 5853.48 5106.00 3997.65 62822 988 63810
Median Home Value 968 0 147829.44 117900.00 107408.19 964300 35700 1000000
Percent Owner Occupied Home 881 87 59.519 59.600 13.094 71.4 21.3 92.7
Table 19:
Statistics on the City Government Fiscal Characteristics of the Cities with Population of 25,000 or more
N
Valid Missing Mean Median Std. Deviation Range Minimum Maximum
Revenue Capacity Per Capita 912 56 1043.93 860.43 676.21 9062 216 9278
Per Capita General Expenditures 912 56 1024.51 829.79 666.16 8140 176 8317
Per capita Tax Revenues 912 56 455.5085 378.0871 323.8554 4792.25 62.95 4855.20
Revenue Effort 912 56 .4509 .4510 .1325 .93 .04 .97
Composite Fiscal Stress Index 912 56 164.9503 165.8991 7.9987 64.95 120.08 185.03
Current Liabilities 912 56 137.5256 109.7580 122.7440 1313.08 .00 1313.08




Descriptives: Socioeconomic Characteristics of Different Forms of Governments
N Mean
Std.
Deviation Std. Error M inim um M axim um
Population (1996) SMC 179 140213.97 618800.40 46251.31 25552 7380906
CMC 719 77276.72 107104.68 3994.33 25034 1171121
GM C 70 177928.13 292401.11 34948.62 25203 1744058
Total 968 96193.42 293617.63 9437.23 25034 7380906
Population Density SMC 179 4192.20 4278.41 319.78 528 33728
CMC 719 3703.81 2854.10 106.44 11 22176
GMC 70 4851.52 7267.29 868.61 747 58603
Total 968 3877.12 3646.33 117.20 11 58603
P opula tion Growth SMC 179 3.2035 10.6394 .7952 -11.37 73.48
CMC 719 10.4736 15.1745 .5659 -19.27 134.04
GMC 70 7.6172 18.8631 2.2546 -14.66 138.66
Total 968 8.9227 15.0055 .4823 -19.27 138.66
M edian Age o f Residents SMC 174 34.396 3.959 .300 22.0 42.9
CMC 645 34.063 5.093 .201 2.3 54.1
GMC 63 33.406 3.450 .435 22.4 41.3
Total 882 34.082 4.789 .161 2.3 54.1
Per Capita Incom e SMC 179 20305.82 5521.43 412.69 9815 47187
CMC 719 22701.03 8465.74 315.72 8415 66776
GMC 70 20988.57 6255.44 747.67 12925 44021
Total 968 22134.28 7910.17 254.24 8415 66776
M edian Household SMC 179 40280.49 12515.39 935.44 19544 98390
Incom e CMC 719 46734.24 16851.24 628.45 15882 139895
GMC 70 42030.99 13343.28 1594.83 25085 94609
Total 968 45200.72 16103.98 517.60 15882 139895
Unem ploym ent Rate SMC 174 4.245 2.067 .157 1.2 11.4
CMC 644 3.986 2.566 .101 .9 25.5
GMC 62 4.244 1.822 .231 1.1 8.1
Total 880 4.055 2.429 8.188E-02 .9 25.5
C rim e Rate SMC 130 5882.99 3007.65 263.79 1598 15952
CMC 554 5729.39 4248.18 180.49 988 63810
GM C 51 7126.29 3136.87 439.25 2396 14551
Total 735 5853.48 3997.65 147.46 988 63810
Percent O w ner O ccupied SMC 174 58.196 13.447 1.019 26.0 92.2
Hom e CMC 644 60.182 12.926 .509 21.3 92.7
GMC 63 56.392 13.285 1.674 23.8 89.0
Total 881 59.519 13.094 .441 21.3 92.7











T a b l e  2 1 :
Descriptives: Municipal Fiscal Performance Measures of Different Forms of Government
N Mean
Std.
Deviation Std. Error Minimum Maximum
Composite Fiscal Stress SMC 156 164.1793 8.8776 .7108 139.41 185.03
Index CMC 690 165.0396 7.8406 .2985 120.08 184.07
GMC 66 165.8392 7.4039 .9114 140.40 179.78
Total 912 164.9503 7.9987 .2649 120.08 185.03
Revenue Capacity Per SMC 156 1316.92 1047.74 83.89 323 9278
Capita CMC 690 970.93 536.09 20.41 216 4936
GMC 66 1161.76 703.59 86.61 440 4733
Total 912 1043.93 676.21 22.39 216 9278
Per Capita General SMC 156 1283.45 995.50 79.70 305 8317
Expenditures CMC 690 954.54 542.90 20.67 176 4552
GMC 66 1143.96 710.49 87.45 413 4888
Total 912 1024.51 666.16 22.06 176 8317
FTE Rate SMC 141 162.15 133.08 11.21 2 898
CMC 602 105.45 84.00 3.42 3 604
GMC 63 128.28 72.76 9.17 43 415




Descriptives: Relative Fiscal Capacity Measure of Different Forms of Government
R ela tive  F isca l C apacity
N Mean
Std.
D eviation Std. E rror
95%  C onfidence Interval 
fo r M ean





SM C 156 .99822 2.6575E-02 2.13E -03 .99402 1.00243 .918 1.190
C M C 690 1.00061 2.3188E-02 8.83E -04 .99888 1.00234 .857 1.141
G M C 66 1.00075 1.7587E-02 2.16E -03 .99643 1.00508 .961 1.049
To ta l 912 1.00021 2.3445E-02 7.76E -04 .99869 1.00174 .857 1.190
Table 23:











Per Capita Total Revenue SMC 156 1586.55 1265.85 101.35 1386.35 1786.75 337 10719
CMC 690 1230.04 744.65 28.35 1174.38 1285.70 220 5038
GMC 66 1441.63 942.85 116.06 1209.85 1673.41 537 6337
Total 912 1306.33 880.13 29.14 1249.13 1363.53 220 10719
Percapita General SMC 156 1316.92 1047.74 83.89 1151.21 1482.62 323 9278
Revenue CMC 690 970.93 536.09 20.41 930.86 1011.00 216 4936
GMC 66 1161.76 703.59 86.61 988.80 1334.73 440 4733
Total 912 1043.93 676.21 22.39 999.98 1087.87 216 9278
Per Capita Total IGR SMC 156 391.16 493.90 39.54 313.05 469.28 18 3150
CMC 690 173.54 210.01 8.00 157.84 189.24 0 2227
GMC 66 286.51 310.15 38.18 210.27 362.76 5 17B0
Total 912 218.94 297.82 9.86 199.59 238.29 0 3150
Per Capita IGR from SMC 156 65.23 254.90 20.41 24.92 105.55 0 3150
Federal government CMC 690 29.51 48.60 1.85 25.87 33.14 0 539
GMC 66 49.39 54.69 6.73 35.94 62.83 0 229
Total 912 37.06 115.08 3.81 29.58 44.53 0 3150
Per Capita IGR from state SMC 156 325.93 414.66 33.20 260.35 391.51 0 2035
government CMC 690 144.03 189.75 7.22 129.85 158.22 0 1837
GMC 66 237.13 281.09 34.60 168.02 306.23 5 15B4
Total 912 181.88 258.81 8.57 165.07 198.70 0 20B5
Per Capita General SMC 156 892.16 688.15 55.10 783.33 1001.00 140 5997
Revenue From Own CMC 690 770.14 410.77 15.64 739.44 800.85 128 3776
Source GMC 66 847.86 476.15 58.61 730.80 964.91 290 2949
Total 912 796.64 476.07 15.76 765.70 827.58 128 5997
Per Capita Local revenue SMC 156 563.64 540.71 43.29 478.12 649.15 72 4855
from taxes CMC 690 427.35 250.04 9.52 408.66 446.04 63 2153
GMC 66 494.32 268.42 33.04 428.33 560.30 163 1439
Total 912 455.51 323.86 10.72 434.46 476.55 63 4855
Per Capita Revenue From SMC 176 378.16 397.96 30.00 318.96 437.37 6 2170
Property Tax CMC 714 218.35 222.03 8.31 202.04 234.66 0 2152
GMC 70 278.77 227.74 27.22 224.47 333.07 27 1359
Total 960 252.05 270.37 8.73 234.93 269.18 0 2170
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Table 24:





Error M inim um Maxim um
Population (1996) Dropped GMC 67 117180.33 336294.88 41085.0 25228 2721547
M aintained GMC 70 177928.13 292401.11 34948.6 25203 1744058
Adopted GMC 71 121103.65 137319.14 16296.8 25696 746737
Total 208 138963.51 267790.07 18567.9 25203 2721547
Population Density Dropped GMC 67 4736.07 6789.41 829.46 148 46577
M aintained GMC 70 4851.53 7267.32 868.61 747 58603
Adopted GMC 71 4572.85 3827.57 454.25 718 18400
Total 208 4719.21 6104.88 423.30 148 58603
Population Growth Dropped GMC 67 6.7630 12.5161 1.5291 -11.64 58.99
M aintained GMC 70 7.6166 18.8629 2.2545 -14.66 138.66
A dopted GM C 71 8.7889 40.2383 4.7754 -6 .38 326.06
Total 208 7.7418 26.7726 1.8563 -14.66 326.06
Median Age o f Residents Dropped GMC 62 34.484 3.341 .424 24.9 41.8
Maintained GMC 63 33.406 3.450 .435 22.4 41.3
Adopted GM C 71 34.217 3.531 .419 23.5 41.6
Total 196 34.041 3.457 .247 22.4 41.8
Per Capita Income Dropped GMC 67 21090.09 6493.84 793.35 8926 43288
M aintained GMC 70 20988.57 6255.44 747.67 12925 44021
Adopted GMC 73 20385.51 5574.22 652.41 12874 45708
Total 210 20811.32 6085.93 419.97 8926 45708
Median Household Dropped GMC 67 43084.30 13984.29 1708.45 23612 83802
Income M aintained GMC 70 42030.99 13343.28 1594.83 25085 94609
Adopted GMC 73 38795.95 11151.54 1305.19 25000 86052
Total 210 41242.48 12913.66 891.13 23612 94609
Unem ploym ent Rate Dropped GMC 62 4.003 1.867 .237 1.4 9.9
M aintained GMC 62 4.244 1.822 .231 1.1 8.1
A dopted GMC 71 4.262 1.796 .213 1.3 9.5
Total 195 4.174 1.821 .130 1.1 9.9
Crim e Rate Dropped GMC 49 5971.41 3519.01 502.72 1896 22580
M aintained GMC 51 7126.29 3136.87 439.25 2396 14551
Adopted GMC 59 6312.08 2879.35 374.86 3 14032
Total 159 6468.26 3185.09 252.59 3 22580
Percent O w ner Occupied Dropped GMC 62 60.018 12.722 1.616 22.6 88.0
Home M aintained GMC 63 56.392 13.285 1.674 23.8 89.0
Adopted GMC 71 55.542 12.210 1.449 26.6 81.8
Total 196 57.231 12.806 .915 22.6 89.0


















Composite Fiscal Stress Dropped GMC 64 165.0639 9.1546 1.1443 139.98 179.48
Index Maintained GMC 66 165.6870 7.5366 .9277 138.73 179.76
Adopted GMC 63 165.6816 8.4039 1.0588 145.99 185.28
Total 193 165.4786 8.3439 .6006 138.73 185.28
Revenue Capacity Per Dropped GMC 64 1082.19 643.20 80.40 187 3573
Capita Maintained GMC 66 1161.76 703.58 86.60 440 4733
Adopted GMC 63 1318.02 678.34 85.46 372 3056
Total 193 1186.38 679.29 48.90 187 4733
Per Capita General Dropped GMC 64 1049.09 638.34 79.79 233 3330
Expenditures Maintained GMC 66 1143.95 710.52 87.46 413 4888
Adopted GMC 63 1317.46 672.33 84.71 367 3057
Total 193 1169.13 680.31 48.97 233 4888
FTE Rate Dropped GMC 59 120.58 82.15 10.70 27 3S7
Maintained GMC 63 128.29 72.78 9.17 43 415
Adopted GMC 55 162.64 97.20 13.11 53 416


































1 (Constant) 172.497 2.470 69.828 .000 167.646 177.347
SMC -2.529 .766 -.117 -3.301 .001 -4.033 -1.025 .915 1.093
GMC -.191 1.120 -.006 -.171 .864 -2.390 2.008 .917 1.090
Population (1996) .000 .000 -.048 -1.179 .239 .000 .000 .682 1.466
Population Growth .013 .021 .022 .613 .540 -.028 .053 .859 1.164
Population Density .000 .000 .031 .803 .422 .000 .000 .773 1.293
Median Age of Residents .009 .074 .005 .118 .906 -.136 .153 .576 1.737
Per Capita Income .000 .000 -.488 -10.647 .000 -.001 .000 .542 1.844
Percent Owner Occupied Home .071 .027 .113 2.592 .010 .017 .125 .602 1.662
Unemployment Rate .043 .134 .013 .322 .748 -.219 .305 .697 1.434
Crime Rate .000 .000 -.063 -1.732 .084 .000 .000 .851 1.176
Current Liabilities -.006 .002 -.094 -2.645 .008 -.010 -.001 .907 1.102
MSA .988 .664 .059 1.488 .137 -.316 2.291 .732 1.366
Medium Size City -.214 .764 -.010 -.280 .780 -1.714 1.287 .900 1.111
Big City .572 1.334 .018 .429 .668 -2.047 3.192 .622 1.608

















Composite Fiscal Stress Index 165.1189 7.9889 693
SMC .16 .37 693
GMC .07 .25 693
Population (1996) 115724.04 343638.19 693
Population Growth 7.9900 14.0437 693
Population Density 3984.99 3776.36 693
Median Age of Residents 33.887 4.829 693
Per Capita Income 21911.28 8052.33 693
Percent Owner Occupied Home 58.508 12.726 693
Unemployment Rate 4.021 2.420 693
Crime Rate 5838.38 4056.83 693
Current Liabilities 138.2737 129.5976 693
MSA .34 .48 693
Small City .76 .43 693
Medium Size City .17 .37 693











Table 28:H1- Composite Fiscal Stress Index -  SMC Vs. GMC Cities
Model Summary









Change FChange df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .476® .226 .210 7.0998 .226 14.155 14 678 .000 1.597
a- Predictors: (Constant), Big City, Population Growth, Per Capita Income, Medium Size City, SMC, Population Density, Current Liabilities, GMC, 
Crime Rate, MSA, Percent Owner Occupied Home, Unemployment Rate, Population (1996), Median Age of Residents








1 Regression 9989.139 14 713.510 14.155 .000®
Residual 34176.331 678 50.408
Total 44165.470 692
a- Predictors: (Constant), Big City, Population Growth, Per Capita Income, Medium 
Size City, SMC, Population Density, Current Liabilities, GMC, Crime Rate, MSA, 
Percent Owner Occupied Home, Unemployment Rate, Population (1996), Median 
Age of Residents
























95% Confidence Interval 








1 (Constant) 1052 183.0 5.749 .000 692.852 1411.502
SMC 297.5 56.759 .174 5.242 .000 186.087 408.976 .915 1.093
GMC 173.7 82.965 .069 2.093 .037 10.751 336.550 .917 1.090
Population (1996) .000 .000 .240 6.256 .000 .000 .001 .682 1.466
Population Growth -3.964 1.536 -.088 -2.581 .010 -6.980 -.948 .859 1.164
Population Density -.008 .006 -.049 -1.364 .173 -.020 .004 .773 1.293
Median Age of Residents 23.298 5.458 .178 4.269 .000 12.582 34.015 .576 1.737
Per Capita Income .012 .003 .156 3.625 .000 .006 .019 .542 1.844
Percent Owner Occupied Home -19.14 2.025 -.386 -9.453 .000 -23.122 -15.168 .602 1.662
Unemployment Rate -19.86 9.894 -.076 -2.007 .045 -39.284 -.431 .697 1.434
Crime Rate .014 .005 .089 2.579 .010 .003 .024 .851 1.176
Current Liabilities .095 .162 .019 .584 .560 -.224 .413 .907 1.102
MSA -16.44 49.184 -.012 -.334 .738 -113.014 80.129 .732 1.366
Medium Size City 100.8 56.600 .059 1.780 .075 -10.371 211.895 .900 1.111
Big City 170.0 98.837 .069 1.720 .086 -24.036 364.091 .622 1.608

















Revenue Capacity Per Capita 1072.59 630.76 693
SMC .16 .37 693
GMC .07 .25 693
Population (1996) 115724.04 343638.19 693
Population Growth 7.9900 14.0437 693
Population Density 3984.99 3776.36 693
Median Age of Residents 33.887 4.829 693
Per Capita Income 21911.28 8052.33 693
Percent Owner Occupied Home 58.508 12.726 693
Unemployment Rate 4.021 2.420 693
Crime Rate 5838.38 4056.83 693
Current Liabilities 138.2737 129.5976 693
MSA .34 .48 693
Small City .76 .43 693
Medium Size City .17 .37 693












Table 32:H2-Revenue Capacity Per Capita -  SMC Vs. GMC Cities
Model Summary’









Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .565® .319 .305 525.97 .319 22.657 14 678 .000 1.469
a- Predictors: (Constant), Big City, Population Growth, Per Capita Income, Medium Size City, SMC, Population Density, Current Liabilities, GMC, 
Crime Rate, MSA, Percent Owner Occupied Home, Unemployment Rate, Population (1996), Median Age of Residents








1 Regression 87750761 14 6267911.5 22.657 .000®
Residual 1.88E+08 678 276646.477
Total 2.75E+08 692
3- Predictors: (Constant), Big City, Population Growth, Per Capita Income, Medium 
Size City, SMC, Population Density, Current Liabilities, GMC, Crime Rate, MSA, 
Percent Owner Occupied Home, Unemployment Rate, Population (1996), Median 
Age of Residents
































1 (Constant) -2611.69 936.021 -2.790 .005 -4449.544 -773.838
SMC 286.133 54.317 .166 5.268 .000 179.483 392.783 .929 1.076
GMC 180.713 79.992 .072 2.259 .024 23.650 337.776 .918 1.089
Population (1996) .000 .000 .225 6.109 .000 .000 .001 .682 1,466
Population Growth -4.007 1.477 -.089 -2.712 .007 -6.907 -1.106 .864 1.157
Population Density -.005 .006 -.029 -.830 .407 -.016 .007 .770 1.298
Median Age of Residents 22.356 5.272 .170 4.241 .000 12.006 32.707 .574 1.742
Per Capita Income .014 .003 .183 4.420 .000 .008 .021 .540 1.852
Percent Owner Occupied Home -18.167 1.945 -.365 -9.338 .000 -21.987 -14.347 .607 1.648
Unemployment Rate -23.965 9.563 -.091 -2.506 .012 -42.743 -5.188 .695 1.440
Crime Rate .010 .005 .062 1.880 .060 .000 .020 .841 1.189
Relative Fiscal Capacity 5244.568 885.022 .182 5.926 .000 3506.851 6982.286 .978 1.022
Relative Revenue Effort -29.524 4.212 -.225 -7.010 .000 -37.794 -21.255 .901 1.110
MSA -47.312 47.595 -.035 -.994 .321 -140.763 46.139 .727 1.375
Medium Size City 123.580 54.638 .073 2.262 .024 16.299 230.861 .899 1.112
Big City 208.325 94.995 .084 2.193 .029 21.805 394.845 .626 1.596

















Per Capita General Expenditures 1054.38 634.03 693
SMC .16 .37 693
GMC .07 .25 693
Population (1996) 115724.04 343638.19 693
Population Growth 7.9900 14.0437 693
Population Density 3984.99 3776.36 693
Median Age of Residents 33.887 4.829 693
Per Capita Income 21911.28 8052.33 693
Percent Owner Occupied Home 58.508 12.726 693
Unemployment Rate 4.021 2.420 693
Crime Rate 5838.38 4056.83 693
Relative Fiscal Capacity 1.00039 .02203 693
Relative Revenue Effort 55.0628 4.8255 693
MSA .34 .48 693
Small City .76 .43 693
Medium Size City .17 .37 693











Table 36:H3-Per Capita General Expenditures- SMC Vs. GMC Cities
Model Summary’









Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .611® .374 .360 507.35 .374 26.914 15 677 .000 1.424
a- Predictors: (Constant), Big City, Population Growth, Relative Revenue Effort, Relative Fiscal Capacity, Medium Size City, SMC, Unemployment 
Rate, GMC, Population Density, Median Age of Residents, Crime Rate, MSA, Population (1996), Percent Owner Occupied Home, Per Capita 
Income








1 Regression 1.04E+08 15 6927798.5 26.914 .000®
Residual 1.74E+08 677 257401.075
Total 2.78E+08 692
a- Predictors: (Constant), Big City, Population Growth, Relative Revenue Effort, 
Relative Fiscal Capacity, Medium Size City, SMC, Unemployment Rate, GMC, 
Population Density, Median Age of Residents, Crime Rate, MSA, Population 
(1996), Percent Owner Occupied Home, Per Capita Income






























1 (Constant) 34.619 172.827 .200 .841 -304.832 374.070
SMC 57.526 9.934 .211 5.791 .000 38.014 77.038 .925 1.082
GMC 20.292 14.207 .053 1.428 .154 -7.613 48.197 .908 1.102
Population (1996) .000 .000 .123 2.883 .004 .000 .000 .675 1.482
Population Growth -.673 .254 -.099 -2.647 .008 -1.172 -.174 .875 1.142
Population Density -.002 .001 -.089 -2.234 .026 -.004 .000 .782 1.279
Median Age of Residents 4.048 .953 .196 4.246 .000 2.176 5.921 .575 1.738
Per Capita Income -.001 .001 -.049 -1.021 .308 -.002 .001 .535 1.869
Percent Owner Occupied Home -2.627 .358 -.327 -7.337 .000 -3.330 -1.924 .617 1.620
Unemployment Rate -5.387 1.723 -.131 -3.126 .002 -8.771 -2.003 .699 1.430
Crime Rate .001 .001 .056 1.473 .141 .000 .003 ,848 1.179
Relative Fiscal Capacity 335.38 163.570 .073 2.050 .041 14.109 656.645 .975 1.026
Relative Revenue Effort -3.847 .760 -.188 -5.064 .000 -5.339 -2.355 .895 1.118
MSA 16.572 8.627 .080 1.921 .055 -.371 33.516 .715 1.399
Medium Size City 11.161 9.804 .042 1.138 .255 -8.095 30.418 .903 1.108
Big City 5.905 16.756 .016 .352 .725 -27.006 38.816 .613 1.633



















FTE Rate 121.89 99.45 590
SMC .16 .36 590
GMC .07 .26 590
Population (1996) 122505.53 370770.88 590
Population Growth 8.4905 14.6442 590
Population Density 3927.43 3836.34 590
Median Age of Residents 33.836 4.818 590
Per Capita Income 21883.96 8047.28 590
Percent Owner Occupied Home 58.603 12.387 590
Unemployment Rate 4.004 2.418 590
Crime Rate 5848.52 4234.96 590
Relative Fiscal Capacity 1.00017 .02157 590
Relative Revenue Effort 55.1314 4.8483 590
MSA .35 .48 590
Small City .76 .43 590
Medium Size City .17 .37 590














Table 40:H4 - FTE Employee Rate -  SMC Vs. GMC Cities
Mode! Summar^5









Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 ,544a .296 .277 84.55 .296 16.058 15 574 .000 1.188
a- Predictors: (Constant), Big City, Population Growth, Relative Revenue Effort, Relative Fiscal Capacity, Medium Size City, SMC, Unemployment 
Rate, GMC, Population Density, Median Age of Residents, Crime Rate, MSA, Population (1996), Percent Owner Occupied Home, Per Capita 
Income








1 Regression 1721833.9 15 114788.925 16.058 ,000a
Residual 4103266.1 574 7148.547
Total 5825100.0 589
a- Predictors: (Constant), Big City, Population Growth, Relative Revenue Effort, 
Relative Fiscal Capacity, Medium Size City, SMC, Unemployment Rate, GMC, 
Population Density, Median Age of Residents, Crime Rate, MSA, Population 
(1996), Percent Owner Occupied Home, Per Capita Income































1 (Constant) 161.5 8.840 18.265 .000 143.977 178.961
Adopted GMC .750 1.642 .042 .457 .648 -2.498 3.999 .679 1.473
Maintained GMC .520 1.912 .029 .272 .786 -3.262 4.303 .511 1.957
Population (1996) .000 .000 .026 .246 .806 .000 .000 .506 1.978
Population Growth .033 .042 .061 .779 .437 -.050 .116 .931 1.074
Population Density .000 .000 .005 .063 .950 .000 .000 .751 1.331
Median Age of Residents .473 .240 .185 1.966 .051 -.003 .948 .633 1.581
Per Capita Income -.001 .000 -.604 -5.755 .000 -.001 -.001 .511 1.955
Percent Owner Occupied Home .091 .070 .127 1.299 .196 -.047 .228 .584 1.711
Unemployment Rate -.187 .499 -.039 -.375 .709 -1.175 .801 .510 1.963
Crime Rate .000 .000 .066 .693 .490 .000 .001 .626 1.596
Current Liabilities .005 .008 .051 .595 .553 -.011 .021 .767 1.304
MSA -2.430 2.081 -.111 -1.168 .245 -6.548 1.688 .621 1.610
Medium Size City -2.045 1.891 -.092 -1.082 .281 -5.785 1.696 .775 1.290
Big City .198 2.547 .009 .078 .938 -4.841 5.237 .415 2.410

















Composite Fiscal Stress Index 165.0936 8.5873 143
Adopted GMC .34 .48 143
Maintained GMC .33 .47 143
Population (1996) 175584.62 312371,07 143
Population Growth 5.3541 15.8705 143
Population Density 4534.88 5915.87 143
Median Age of Residents 33.981 3.370 143
Per Capita income 20724.19 6308.42 143
Percent Owner Occupied Home 56.460 12.093 143
Unemployment Rate 4.183 1.807 143
Crime Rate 6497.22 2957.02 143
Current Liabilities 120.0184 92.0434 143
MSA .81 .39 143
Small City .63 .48 143
Medium Size City .18 .39 143












Table 44:Gomposite Fiscal Stress Index -  Adopted Vs. Maintained GMC Status Cities
Model Summary*’









Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .529a .280 .201 7.6771 .280 3.548 14 128 .000 1.745
a Predictors: (Constant), Big City, Per Capita Income, Adopted GMC, Population Growth, Population Density, Medium Size City, MSA, Current 
Liabilities, Crime Rate, Median Age of Residents, Percent Owner Occupied Home, Unemployment Rate, Maintained GMC, Population (1996)








1 Regression 2927.281 14 209.092 3.548 .000a
Residual 7543.999 128 58.937
Total 10471.280 142
a- Predictors: (Constant), Big City, Per Capita Income, Adopted GMC, Population 
Growth, Population Density, Medium Size City, MSA, Current Liabilities, Crime 
Rate, Median Age of Residents, Percent Owner Occupied Home, Unemployment 
Rate, Maintained GMC, Population (1996)































1 (Constant) 1476.4 709.065 2.082 .039 73.411 2879.422
Adopted GMC 144.668 131.670 .095 1.099 .274 -115.863 405.200 .679 1.473
Maintained GMC 68.629 153.346 .045 .448 .655 -234.793 372.051 .511 1.957
Population (1996) .000 .000 -.022 -.220 .827 1 b o —At .000 .506 1.978
Population Growth -7.073 3.374 -.155 -2.097 .038 -13.749 -.398 .931 1.074
Population Density -.004 .010 -.032 -.394 .694 -.024 .016 .751 1.331
Median Age of Residents 7.168 19.279 .033 .372 .711 -30.978 45.315 .633 1.581
Per Capita Income .037 .011 .319 3.205 .002 .014 .059 .511 1.955
Percent Owner Occupied Home -22.930 5.590 -.382 -4.102 .000 -33.990 -11.870 .584 1.711
Unemployment Rate 4.656 40.050 .012 .116 .908 -74.590 83.903 .510 1.963
Crime Rate -.012 .022 -.049 -.543 .588 -.056 .032 .626 1.596
Current Liabilities -1.149 .641 -.146 -1.792 .075 -2.417 .119 .767 1.304
MSA 211.581 166.931 .115 1.267 .207 -118.721 541.883 .621 1.610
Medium Size City 210.556 151.637 .112 1.389 .167 -89.484 510.595 .775 1.290
Big City 606.906 204.278 .329 2.971 .004 202.707 1011.104 .415 2.410

















Revenue Capacity Per Capita 1321.78 725.58 143
Adopted GMC .34 .48 143
Maintained GMC .33 .47 143
Population (1996) 175584.62 312371.07 143
Population Growth 5.3541 15.8705 143
Population Density 4534.88 5915.87 143
Median Age of Residents 33.981 3.370 143
Per Capita Income 20724.19 6308.42 143
Percent Owner Occupied Home 56.460 12.093 143
Unemployment Rate 4.183 1.807 143
Crime Rate 6497.22 2957.02 143
Current Liabilities 120.0184 92.0434 143
MSA .81 .39 143
Small City .63 .48 143
Medium Size City .18 .39 143












Table 48:Revenue Capacity Per Capita -  Adopted Vs. Maintained GMC Status Cities
Model SummaiV5









Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .592® .351 .280 615.77 .351 4.940 14 128 .000 1.549
a- Predictors: (Constant), Big City, Per Capita Income, Adopted GMC, Population Growth, Population Density, Medium Size City, MSA, Current 
Liabilities, Crime Rate, Median Age of Residents, Percent Owner Occupied Home, Unemployment Rate, Maintained GMC, Population (1996)








1 Regression 26223687 14 1873120.5 4.940 .000®
Residual 48533607 128 379168.804
Total 74757294 142
a- Predictors: (Constant), Big City, Per Capita Income, Adopted GMC, Population 
Growth, Population Density, Medium Size City, MSA, Current Liabilities, Crime 
Rate, Median Age of Residents, Percent Owner Occupied Home, Unemployment 
Rate, Maintained GMC, Population (1996)































1 (Constant) -2731.4 2665.302 -1.025 .307 -8005.6 2542.749
Adopted GMC 211.331 130.543 .137 1.619 .108 -46.990 469.653 .661 1.513
Maintained GMC 93.839 150.792 .060 .622 .535 -204.55 392.229 .506 1.978
Population (1996) .000 .000 -.015 -.152 .880 .000 .000 .504 1.984
Population Growth -6.777 3.312 -.147 -2.046 .043 -13.332 -.223 .924 1.082
Population Density -.006 .010 -.046 -.584 .560 -.025 .014 .777 1.286
Median Age of Residents 24.542 19.026 .113 1.290 .199 -13.107 62.190 .621 1.609
Per Capita Income .035 .011 .298 3.068 .003 .012 .057 .504 1.984
Percent Owner Occupied Home -24.238 5.361 -.400 -4.521 .000 -34.845 -13.630 .608 1.645
Unemployment Rate 4.317 39.194 .011 .110 .912 -73.240 81.875 .509 1.965
Crime Rate -.022 .022 -.088 -1.010 .314 -.064 .021 .630 1.587
Relative Fiscal Capacity 5251.93 2528.126 .148 2.077 .040 249.227 10254.6 .942 1.062
Relative Revenue Effort -28.594 10.516 -.203 -2.719 .007 -49.403 -7.785 .855 1.170
MSA 161.587 163.629 .087 .988 .325 -162.21 485.380 .619 1.617
Medium Size City 152.896 149.951 .081 1.020 .310 -143.83 449.622 .758 1.319
Big City 547.790 196.887 .294 2.782 .006 158.186 937.395 .427 2.340

















Per Capita General Expenditures 1295.54 732.89 143
Adopted GMC .34 .48 143
Maintained GMC .33 .47 143
Population (1996) 175584.62 312371.07 143
Population Growth 5.3541 15,8705 143
Population Density 4534.88 5915.87 143
Median Age of Residents 33.981 3.370 143
Per Capita Income 20724.19 6308.42 143
Percent Owner Occupied Home 56.460 12.093 143
Unemployment Rate 4.183 1.807 143
Crime Rate 6497.22 2957.02 143
Relative Fiscal Capacity .9983 .0206 143
Relative Revenue Effort 55.0124 5.1983 143
MSA .81 .39 143
Small City .63 .48 143
Medium Size City .18 .39 143












Table 52:Per Capita General Expenditures -  Adopted Vs. Maintained GMC Status Cities
Model Summary*3









Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .629a .396 .325 602.29 .396 5.550 15 127 .000 1.419
a- Predictors: (Constant), Big City, Relative Revenue Effort, Adopted GMC, Relative Fiscal Capacity, Per Capita Income, Population Growth, 
Population Density, MSA, Medium Size City, Percent Owner Occupied Home, Crime Rate, Median Age of Residents, Unemployment Rate, 
Maintained GMC, Population (1996)








1 Regression 30201621 15 2013441.4 5.550 ,000a
Residual 46069998 127 362755.892
Total 76271620 142
3. Predictors: (Constant), Big City, Relative Revenue Effort, Adopted GMC, Relative
Fiscal Capacity, Per Capita Income, Population Growth, Population Density, MSA, 
Medium Size City, Percent Owner Occupied Home, Crime Rate, Median Age of 
Residents, Unemployment Rate, Maintained GMC, Population (1996)






























1 (Constant) 120.3 375.89 .320 .749 -624.828 865.500
Adopted GMC 25.378 19.138 .129 1.326 .188 -12.561 63.316 .653 1.532
Maintained GMC 8.095 21.392 .042 .378 .706 -34.313 50.503 .510 1.952
Population (1996) .000 .000 -.009 -.081 .936 .000 .000 .496 2.017
Population Growth -1.487 .471 -.262 -3.155 .002 -2.422 -.553 .900 1.111
Population Density -.001 .001 -.061 -.695 .488 -.004 .002 .807 1.239
Median Age of Residents 5.559 2.750 .204 2.021 .046 .107 11.011 .608 1.645
Per Capita Income .002 .002 .152 1.297 .197 -.001 .006 .452 2.211
Percent Owner Occupied Home -3.645 .808 -.455 -4.514 .000 -5.246 -2.044 .608 1.646
Unemployment Rate -2.200 5.601 -.043 -.393 .695 -13.304 8.903 .510 1.952
Crime Rate -.004 .003 -.139 -1.390 .167 -.010 .002 .617 1.620
Relative Fiscal Capacity 109.0 352.50 .025 .309 .758 -589.772 807.826 .954 1.048
Relative Revenue Effort -1.859 1.518 -.105 -1.225 .223 -4.868 1.149 .834 1.198
MSA 27.106 24.350 .113 1.113 .268 -21.166 75.377 .602 1.650
Medium Size City 21.526 22.542 .088 .955 .342 -23.161 66.214 .729 1.372
Big City 41.356 27.507 .183 1.503 .136 -13.174 95.886 .416 2.405

















FTE Rate 152.50 92.45 123
Adopted GMC .33 .47 123
Maintained GMC .34 .48 123
Population (1996) 188891.77 334020.16 123
Population Growth 5.3849 16.2598 123
Population Density 4446.99 5965.08 123
Median Age of Residents 33.846 3.392 123
Per Capita Income 20694.41 6234.10 123
Percent Owner Occupied Home 56.261 11.551 123
Unemployment Rate 4.155 1.819 123
Crime Rate 6539.41 3068.68 123
Relative Fiscal Capacity .9980 .0211 123
Relative Revenue Effort 55.2509 5.2449 123
MSA .82 .38 123
Small City .62 .49 123
Medium Size City .17 .38 123












Table 56:FTE Employee Rate -  Adopted Vs. Maintained GMC Status Cities
Model Summary^









Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .581a .338 .245 80.32 .338 3.642 15 107 .000 1.282
a- Predictors: (Constant), Big City, Per Capita Income, Adopted GMC, Relative Fiscal Capacity, Relative Revenue Effort, Population Growth, 
Population Density, Medium Size City, MSA, Crime Rate, Percent Owner Occupied Home, Median Age of Residents, Unemployment Rate, 
Maintained GMC, Population (1996)








1 Regression 352434.783 15 23495.652 3.642 .000a
Residual 690269.965 107 6451.121
Total 1042704.7 122
a- Predictors: (Constant), Big City, Per Capita Income, Adopted GMC, Relative Fiscal 
Capacity, Relative Revenue Effort, Population Growth, Population Density, Medium 
Size City, MSA, Crime Rate, Percent Owner Occupied Home, Median Age of 
Residents, Unemployment Rate, Maintained GMC, Population (1996)











Table 58:Composite Fiscal Stress Index -  SMC Vs. GMC Cities
DV: Composite Fiscal Stress 
Index All cities SMC CMC GMC
Control Variables Std. B t Sig. Std. B t Sig. Std. B t Sig. Std. B t Sig.
Population -0,064 -1.571 0.117 -0.150 -1.107 0.271 -0.081 -1.174 0.241 0.154 0.714 0.480
Population Growth 0.035 0.955 0.340 -0.047 -0.387 0.699 0.005 0.117 0.907 0.183 1.339 0.190
Population Density 0.038 0.984 0.325 0.059 0.450 0.654 0.051 1.165 0.244 0.115 0.745 0.461
Median Age of Residents -0.004 -0.080 0.936 -0.249 -1.744 0.084 0.037 0.747 0.455 -0.204 -1.091 0.283
Per Capita Income -0.471 -10.269 0.000 -0.156 -1.059 0.292 -0.549 -10.992 0.000 -0.749 -3.465 0.001
Percent Owner Occupied Home 0.118 2.684 0.007 0.447 3.129 0.002 0.067 1.389 0.165 0.415 2.348 0.025
Unemployment Rate 0.023 0.555 0.579 0.125 0.964 0.338 -0.004 -0.091 0.927 -0.146 -0.719 0.477
Crime Rate -0.062 -1.692 0.091 -0.157 -1.371 0.173 -0.065 -1.632 0.103 -0.121 -0.720 0.476
Current Liabilities -0.078 -2.209 0.027 0.161 1.453 0.149 -0.107 -2.744 0.006 -0.426 -2.466 0.019
MSA 0.056 1.420 0.156 0.075 0.669 0.505 0.050 1.119 0.264 0.120 0.685 0.498
Medium Size City -0.005 -0.130 0.896 0.137 1.393 0.167 -0.023 -0.542 0.588 0.112 0.746 0.461
Big City 0.022 0.512 0.609 0.188 1.515 0.133 0.050 0.747 0.455 -0.073 -0.308 0.760
(Constant) 171.663 69.403 0.000 168.122 16.421 0.000 173.414 65.696 0.000 190.230 14.027 0.000
N 693 112 534 47
R 0.462 0.440 0.519 0.696
Adjusted R Square 0.200 0.096 0.252 0.302
Std. Error of the Estimate 7.147 8.636 6.699 6.468
F 15.396 1.985 15.981 2.659












Table 59:Revenue Capacity Per Capita -  SMC Vs. GMC Cities
DV: Revenue Capacity Per 
Capita All Cities SMC CMC GMC
Control Variables Std. B. t Sig. Std. B. t sig. Std. B. t Sig. Std. B. t Sig-
Population 0.261 6.711 0.000 0.348 3.305 0.001 0.019 0.269 0.788 -0.013 -0.060 0.952
Population Growth -0.108 -3.122 0.002 -0.011 -0.118 0.907 -0.070 -1.669 0.096 -0.263 -2.004 0.053
Population Density -0.054 -1.471 0.142 -0.060 -0.591 0.556 -0.097 -2.144 0.032 -0.081 -0.549 0.586
Median Age of Residents 0.193 4.526 0.000 0.314 2.823 0.006 0.176 3.417 0.001 0.205 1.142 0.261
Per Capita Income 0.130 2.985 0.003 0.064 0.559 0.577 0.201 3.862 0.000 0.430 2.068 0.046
Percent Owner Occupied Home -0.394 -9.471 0.000 -0.596 -5.365 0.000 -0.405 -8.027 0.000 -0.629 -3.702 0.001
Unemployment Rate -0.091 -2.350 0.019 -0.088 -0.873 0.385 -0.084 -1.821 0.069 -0.057 -0.294 0.771
Crime Rate 0.091 2.587 0.010 0.073 0.812 0.419 0.116 2.808 0.005 0.122 0.757 0.454
Current Liabilities -0.006 -0.178 0.859 -0.207 -2.400 0.018 0.049 1.212 0.226 0.195 1.174 0.248
MSA -0.006 -0.153 0.878 -0.171 -1.954 0.054 0.055 1.184 0.237 -0.009 -0.054 0.957
Medium Size City 0.053 1.551 0.121 0.107 1.398 0.165 0.091 2.038 0.042 -0.093 -0.646 0.523
Big City 0.077 1.893 0.059 0.160 1.660 0.100 0.053 0.754 0.451 0.306 1.346 0.187
(Constant) 1151.540 6.202 0.000 1308.942 1.649 0.102 1087.934 6.000 0.000 615.722 0.482 0.633
N 693 112 534 47
R 0.538 0.715 0.459 0.723
Adjusted R Square 0.277 0.453 0.192 0.354
Std. Error of the Estimate 536.481 669.500 460.148 609.755
F 23.049 8.647 11.568 3.099












Table 60:Per Capita General Expenditures -  SMC Vs. GMC Cities
DV: Per Capita General 
Expenditures All Cities SMC CMC GMC
Control Variables Std. B t Sig. Std. B t Sig. Std. B t Sig. Std. B t Sig.
Population 0.244 6.543 0.000 0.257 2.438 0.017 0.009 0.141 0.888 0.096 0.489 0.628
Population Growth -0.112 -3.368 0.001 -0.122 -1.406 0.163 -0.073 -1.859 0.064 -0.194 -1.541 0.133
Population Density -0.032 -0.908 0.364 0.005 0.054 0.957 -0.064 -1.519 0.129 0.012 0.092 0.927
Median Age of Residents 0.185 4.528 0.000 0.293 2.649 0.009 0.163 3.378 0.001 0.127 0.802 0.428
Per Capita Income 0.162 3.846 0.000 0.168 1.420 0.159 0.220 4.531 0.000 0.356 1.774 0.085
Percent Owner Occupied Home -0.376 -9.436 0.000 -0.561 -5.108 0.000 -0.363 -7.701 0.000 -0.548 -3.566 0.001
Unemployment Rate -0.103 -2.783 0.006 -0.019 -0.184 0.854 -0.106 -2.443 0.015 -0.203 -1.096 0.281
Crime Rate 0.062 1.846 0.065 -0.044 -0.484 0.629 0.087 2.244 0.025 0.092 0.607 0.548
Relative Fiscal Capacity 0.173 5.525 0.000 -0.018 -0.246 0.806 0.245 6.652 0.000 0.176 1.456 0.155
Relative Revenue Effort -0.228 -6.969 0.000 -0.216 -2.611 0.010 -0.283 -7.428 0.000 -0.222 -1.772 0.086
MSA -0.031 -0.840 0.401 -0.244 -2.783 0.006 0.031 0.715 0.475 0.012 0.076 0.940
Medium Size City 0.066 2.021 0.044 0.161 2.044 0.044 0.099 2.358 0.019 -0.084 -0.627 0.535
Big City 0.090 2.331 0.020 0.224 2.291 0.024 0.071 1.091 0.276 0.210 0.959 0.345
(Constant) -2249.285 -2.360 0.019 3363.984 1.050 0.296 -2861.927 -3.163 0.002 -5043.313 -0.826 0.415
N 693 112 534 47
R 0.588 0.723 0.559 0.767
Adjusted R Square 0.333 0.459 0.295 0.427
Std. Error of the Estimate 517.806 658.396 438.173 584.241
F 27.577 8.240 18.150 3.639












Table 611FTE Employee Rate -  SMC Vs. GMC Cities
DV: FTE Rate A I Cities SMC CMC GMC
Control Variables Std. B. t Sig. Std. B. t Sig. Std. B. t Sig. Std. B. t Sig-
Population 0.150 3.458 0.001 0.098 0.660 0.511 -0.021 -0.285 0.775 0.044 0.173 0.864
Population Growth -0.122 -3.180 0.002 -0.113 -0.919 0.361 -0.088 -2.030 0.043 -0.344 -2.115 0.043
Population Density -0.096 -2.381 0.018 -0.031 -0.208 0.836 -0.150 -3.289 0.001 -0.006 -0.037 0.970
Median Age of Residents 0.215 4.541 0.000 0.180 1.224 0.224 0.216 4.033 0.000 0.335 1.665 0.107
Per Capita Income -0.074 -1.518 0.130 0.021 0.128 0.898 -0.062 -1.154 0.249 0.302 1.225 0.231
Percent Owner Occupied Home -0.346 -7.580 0.000 -0.437 -2.712 0.008 -0.355 -6.987 0.000 -0.498 -2.536 0.017
Unemployment Rate -0.144 -3.355 0.001 -0.034 -0.252 0.802 -0.172 -3.608 0.000 0.099 0.440 0.663
Crime Rate 0.054 1.376 0.169 -0.066 -0.548 0.585 0.068 1.599 0.110 0.225 1.129 0.269
Relative Fiscal Capacity 0.060 1.661 0.097 -0.049 -0.480 0.633 0.101 2.481 0.013 -0.049 -0.310 0.759
Relative Revenue Effort -0.197 -5.188 0.000 -0.236 -2.151 0.035 -0.207 -4.911 0.000 -0.012 -0.076 0.940
MSA 0.084 1.983 0.048 -0.237 -1.992 0.050 0.191 4.007 0.000 -0.080 -0.362 0.720
Medium Size City 0.028 0.752 0.453 0.049 0.460 0.647 0.092 2.021 0.044 -0.144 -0.821 0.419
Big City 0.016 0.357 0.721 0.200 1.466 0.146 -0.002 -0.032 0.974 0.291 0.983 0.334
(Constant) 119.303 0.674 0.500 889.381 1.324 0.189 -13.932 -0.083 0.934 190.965 0.251 0.804
N 590 93 455 42
R 0.504 0.536 0.540 0.666
Adjusted R Square 0.237 0.170 0.271 0.184
Std. Error of the Estimate 86.864 128.043 72.215 68.995
F 15.078 2.454 13.982 1.713












Table 62:Composite Fiscal Stress Index -  Adopted Vs. Maintained GMC Status Cities
DV: Composite Fiscal Stress 
Index A I Cities Dropped GMC Maintained GMC Ado Dted GMC
Control Variables Std. B. t Sig. Std. B. t Sig. Std. B. t Sig. Std. B. t Sig.
Population 0.023 0.216 0.829 0.055 0.392 0.698 0.154 0.722 0.475 -0.269 -1.020 0.314
Population Growth 0.059 0.765 0.445 -0.115 -0.926 0.361 0.186 1.376 0.178 0.234 1.700 0.098
Population Density 0.003 0.035 0.972 0.460 2.567 0.015 0.114 0.749 0.459 0.115 0.717 0.478
Median Age of Residents 0.187 2.010 0.047 0.403 2.717 0.010 -0.201 -1.090 0.283 0.331 1.671 0.103
Per Capita Income -0.601 -5.798 0.000 -0.830 -4.991 0.000 -0.751 -3.518 0.001 -0.509 -3.057 0.004
Percent Owner Occupied Home 0.124 1.276 0.204 0.103 0.624 0.537 0.411 2.358 0.024 0.197 1.182 0.245
Unemployment Rate -0.040 -0.380 0.705 -0.219 -1.333 0.191 -0.149 -0.742 0.463 -0.266 -1.640 0.110
Crime Rate 0.070 0.762 0.447 -0.073 -0.520 0.607 -0.111 -0.671 0.507 0.247 1.442 0.158
Current Liabilities 0.050 0.590 0.556 0.456 3.139 0.003 -0.419 -2.457 0.019 0.122 0.885 0.382
MSA -0.114 -1.463 0.146 -0.226 -1.925 0.063 0.113 0.655 0.517 0.082 0.672 0.506
Medium Size City -0.083 -1.011 0.314 0.045 0.391 0.698 0.123 0.830 0.412 -0.198 -1.242 0.222
Big City 0.016 0.137 0.891 -0.279 -1.910 0.065 -0.112 -0.482 0.633 0.546 1.876 0.069
(Constant) 161.733 18.607 0.000 152.799 9.507 0.000 190.557 13.928 0.000 134.140 6.582 0.000
N 143 47 47 49
R 0.528 0.778 0.705 0.721
Adjusted R Square 0.212 0.466 0.319 0.360
Std. Error of the Estimate 7.624 6.968 6.525 6.734
F 4.178 4.351 2.799 3.247












Table 63:Revenue Capacity Per Capita -  Adopted Vs. Maintained GMC Status Cities
DV: Revenue Capacity Per Capita All Cities Dropped GMC Maintained GMC Adopted GMC
Control Variables Std. B t Sip. Std. B t Sig. Std. B t Sig. Std. B t Sig.
Population -0.031 -0.308 0.759 -0.030 -0.189 0.851 -0.013 -0.061 0.952 0.099 0.394 0.696
Population Growth -0.159 -2.165 0.032 0.052 0.371 0.713 -0.263 -2.004 0.053 -0.209 -1.591 0.120
Population Density -0.040 -0.499 0.619 -0.551 -2.744 0.010 -0.081 -0.549 0.587 -0.104 -0.680 0.501
Median Age of Residents 0.039 0.442 0.659 -0.190 -1.144 0.260 0.205 1.143 0.261 0.085 0.450 0.655
Per Capita Income 0.324 3.284 0.001 0.358 1.921 0.063 0.431 2.069 0.046 0.412 2.592 0.014
Percent Owner Occupied Home -0.390 -4.217 0.000 -0.565 -3.068 0.004 -0.629 -3.702 0.001 -0.424 -2.669 0.011
Unemployment Rate 0.011 0.111 0.912 0.106 0.577 0.568 -0.057 -0.293 0.771 0.383 2.473 0.018
Crime Rate -0.044 -0.502 0.617 -0.040 -0.256 0.799 0.122 0.757 0.454 -0.199 -1.212 0.233
Current Liabilities -0.148 -1.823 0.071 -0.372 -2.288 0.028 0.195 1.174 0.249 -0.378 -2.873 0.007
MSA 0.120 1.618 0.108 0.143 1.090 0.284 -0.009 -0.054 0.958 -0.073 -0.625 0.536
Medium Size City 0.131 1.670 0.097 0.014 0.109 0.914 -0.093 -0.645 0.523 0.339 2.227 0.032
Big City 0.341 3.129 0.002 0.462 2.829 0.008 0.306 1.347 0.187 0.155 0.558 0.581
(Constant) 1505.381 2.151 0.033 3664.770 2.730 0.010 614.991 0.481 0.634 1544.487 0.970 0.339
N 143 47 47 49
R 0.587 0.711 0.723 0.750
Adjusted R Square 0.284 0.331 0.354 0.417
Std. Error of the Estimate 613.887 581.899 609.720 526.125
F 5.698 2.898 3.100 3.857












Table 64:Per Capita General Expenditures -  Adopted Vs. Maintained GMC Status Cities
DV: Per Capita General Expenditures All Cities Dropped GMC Maintained GMC Adopted GMC
Control Variables Std. B t Sig. Std. B t Sig. Std. B t Sig. Std. B t Sig.
Population -0.029 -0.300 0.765 -0.009 -0.057 0.955 0.075 0.380 0.706 0.102 0.357 0.723
Population Growth -0.155 -2.157 0.033 0.070 0.460 0.649 -0.195 -1.547 0.131 -0.190 -1.246 0.221
Population Density -0.058 -0.750 0.455 -0.415 -2.110 0.043 0.019 0.152 0.880 0.058 0.344 0.733
Median Age of Residents 0.117 1.335 0.184 0.066 0.393 0.697 0.117 0.741 0.464 0.127 0.543 0.590
Per Capita Income 0.307 3.178 0.002 0.080 0.448 0.657 0.373 1.873 0.070 0.449 2.460 0.019
Percent Owner Occupied Home -0.412 -4.667 0.000 -0.647 -3.464 0.001 -0.548 -3.561 0.001 -0.322 -1.819 0.077
Unemployment Rate 0.012 0.124 0.901 0.020 0.109 0.914 -0.177 -0.961 0.344 0.370 2.046 0.048
Crime Rate -0.080 -0.943 0.347 -0.218 -1.387 0.175 0.093 0.612 0.545 -0.219 -1.176 0.247
Relative Fiscal Capacity 0.160 2.262 0.025 0.081 0.529 0.600 0.168 1.408 0.168 0.120 0.863 0.394
Relative Revenue Effort -0.187 -2.523 0.013 -0.245 -1.780 0.084 -0.218 -1.728 0.093 -0.103 -0.559 0.580
MSA 0.098 1.351 0.179 0.087 0.638 0.528 0.015 0.092 0.927 -0.023 -0.164 0.871
Medium Size City 0.110 1.424 0.157 -0.032 -0.253 0.802 -0.078 -0.584 0.563 0.308 1.744 0.090
Big City 0.309 2.957 0.004 0.380 2.277 0.029 0.227 1.036 0.308 0.054 0.171 0.865
(Constant) -3237.537 -1.220 0.225 2395.592 0.485 0.631 -4553.209 -0.761 0.452 -2974.497 -0.649 0.520
N 143 47 47 49
R 0.619 0.719 0.767 0.671
Adjusted R Square 0.321 0.326 0.426 0.246
Std. Error of the Estimate 603.758 587.410 585.078 594.293
F 6.172 2.714 3.621 2.204












Table 65:FTE Employee Rate -  Adopted Vs. Maintained GMC Status Cities
DV: FTE Rate All Cities Dropped GMC Maintained GMC Adopted GMC
Control Variables Std B t Sig. Std B t Sig. Std B t Sig. Std B t Sig.
Population -0.026 -0.237 0.813 0.060 0.348 0.731 0.046 0.180 0.858 0.150 0 469 0.643
Population Growth -0.265 -3.200 0.002 -0.539 -2.707 0.012 -0.340 -2.092 0.046 0.000 0 001 0.999
Population Density -0.071 -0.822 0.413 -0.538 -2.762 0.010 -0.013 -0.079 0.937 0.136 0 707 0.486
Median Age of Residents 0.211 2.102 0.038 -0.220 -1.061 0.298 0.338 1.683 0.104 0.528 1 941 0.063
Per Capita Income 0.162 1.402 0.164 0.080 0.381 0.707 0.291 1.191 0.244 0.216 1 085 0.288
Percent Owner Occupied Home -0.477 -4.802 0.000 -0.487 -2.536 0.017 -0.492 -2.511 0.018 -0.411 -1 975 0.059
Unemployment Rate -0.039 -0.359 0.720 -0.164 -0.801 0.430 0.095 0.422 0.676 0.215 1 086 0.287
Crime Rate -0.138 -1.437 0.154 -0.300 -1.761 0.090 0.222 1.112 0.276 -0.319 -1 566 0.129
Relative Fiscal Capacity 0.035 0.436 0.664 0.116 0.726 0.474 -0.021 -0.136 0.893 0.160 1 008 0.322
Relative Revenue Effort -0.092 -1.081 0.282 0.020 0.131 0.897 -0.015 -0.095 0.925 -0.160 -0 776 0.445
MSA 0.136 1.611 0.110 0.145 0.972 0.340 -0.075 -0.339 0.737 0.000 0 000 0.000
Medium Size City 0.114 1.270 0.207 -0.055 -0.413 0.683 -0.141 -0.808 0.426 0.392 1 913 0.066
Big City 0.197 1.627 0.107 0.167 0.928 0.361 0.283 0.957 0.347 0.009 0 025 0.980
(Constant) 68.972 0.185 0.854 147.384 0.219 0.829 60.694 0.083 0.935 -857.128 -1 103 0.280
N 123 41 42 40
R 0.572 0.746 0.665 0.683
Adjusted R Square 0.247 0.343 0.183 0.230
Std. Error of the Estimate 80.247 76.690 69.070 88.009
F 4.071 2.605 1.708 1.970
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